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An article entitled ‘Telling Tales: Bearing Witness in Jennifer Fox’s The Tale’ was 
published in Assay: A Journal of Nonfiction Studies in March 2020. The article 
was based on an early draft of my analysis of The Tale (Fox, 2018) in Chapter 
Two: Autofilmic Advocacy: Testimonial Remembering and Not Forgetting in 







In this thesis, I theorise Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing as a critical 
approach to the production and viewership of autobiographical experience on 
film. The analysis utilises autobiography, film, and adaptation studies to develop 
an ethical framework that considers the representation of autobiographical 
experience on film as a form of testimony. The research reveals the codes and 
conventions of the autobiographical ‘I’ on screen, to identify and interrogate the 
cinematic and empathic strategies that invite the viewer to bear witness. 
Fundamentally, Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing describes the unspoken 
agreement between subject and viewer, underpinned by a singular shared 
objective: to bear witness to the subjective truth of a life. 
I argue that the subjective truth of autobiographical experience is conveyed on 
screen along a continuum of representation. The project begins by exploring self-
reflexive film as self-witnessing, or autofilmic testimony, in the analyses of Arirang 
(Kim, 2011), Tarnation (Caouette, 2003) and Blue (Jarman, 1993), by mapping 
the first-person modes of address and documentary practices used in these films. 
The analysis moves on to explore The Tale (Fox, 2018) and Persepolis (2007) as 
narrative films that further constitute self-witnessing, whilst expanding the critical 
scope of autofilmic testimony to include the representation of traumatic memory 
and collective identity as advocacy. The thesis goes on to propose the cinematic 
adaptation of a literary autobiography as a secondary witnessing project, or 
auteurbiography, addressing questions of ethics, authorship, and fidelity. Using 
The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (Schnabel, 2007) to advance the notion of an 
ethical ‘pact’ between the filmmakers and the autobiographical subject, I argue 
that fidelity is crucial to the testimonial tone of auteurbiography. The analysis 
develops to consider issues of cinematic construction, creative authority, and 
relationality, exploring the hierarchies of authorship, ownership and 
representation that emerge throughout the adaptive process. The thesis 
concludes with a comparative case study of Being Flynn (Weitz, 2012) and Julie 
& Julia (Ephron, 2009), which exposes the limitations imposed by gender, genre, 
and commercial concerns, and the ways these issues can compromise the 
testimonial agenda of Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing. 
Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing draws together and builds upon existing 
scholarship within autobiography and film studies, to advance an intersectional 
and interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of autobiographical and testimonial 
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Autobiography might be best thought of as a thing made out of a thing done. 
Timothy Dow Adams 
Approaching Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing  
From The Truman Show (1998) to ‘True Crime’, Pariah (2011) to Periscope, the 
contemporary cultural landscape is replete with videographic attempts to bear witness to 
subjectivity on screen, with notions of autobiographical portraiture evolving in line with 
technological advancement and increased accessibility to filmic forms. In a recent special 
issue of a/b Auto/Biography Studies entitled ‘What’s Next? The Future of Auto/Biography 
Studies’ (2017), a number of contributors address the evolution of critical inquiry to reflect 
the current preoccupation with visual media (Anderst; Chaney; Kennedy; Poletti, 
Tamboukou; et al.). Maria Tamboukou remarks upon “the visual turn” in self-reflexive 
practices, arguing that autobiographies in visual media offer “a feeling of existential 
proximity to the subjects” determined by the registration of “feelings and emotions” 2017: 
pp. 359-60) that images – of the body in particular – can permit. Leah Anderst comments 
on the autobiographical innovations occurring in documentary films, whereby 
contemporary filmmakers are using cinematic media to revise and reconstruct notions of 
selfhood on screen (2017: pp. 255-257). These contemporary insights are revealing of the 
communicative and affective capacity of visual autobiographical narratives, and the 
intersubjective engagement and interpretation they inherently invite. Traditionally, 
opportunities to see into the lives of others have been the remit of the self-reflexive prose 
of the autobiography, or the robust research of the biography, but the popularity of social 
media, streaming services and video sharing sites means that opportunities to see into 
others’ lives, and equally be seen by others, are now broadly accessible. As a 
consequence, new reflections on what actually constitutes an autobiographical act 
abound, encompassing performance art, digital and graphic media, and, of course, film. 
Filmic forms predate many of the emerging visual media, but the visual turn has 
reinvigorated the longstanding interest in film as an autobiographical mode. 
Film, as an audiovisual and referential apparatus, provides a multimedial platform for story 
telling that extends an “offer of seeing” (Corner 2008: p. 22) that can broaden the 
representational scope of written autobiographical narratives. The inherently multilayered 
signification in film allows for the simultaneous communication of experience and context 
that are intrinsic to our engagement with autobiographical accounts as real. However, the 
concept of autobiographical film remains critically contentious, with life-writing and film 
scholars alike debating the particularities of production and perception that constitute the 
visual autobiographical mode. In her seminal essay ‘Eye for I – Making and Unmaking 
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Autobiography in Film’ (1980), Elizabeth W. Bruss contends that there can be “no real 
cinematic equivalent for autobiography” (1980: p. 296), a view largely attributable to the 
belief that filmmaking is a necessarily collaborative industry, which is fundamentally 
discordant with the unilateral and self-reflexive authorship of the literary autobiographical 
‘I’ (Lejeune, 1989). As both filmmaking practices and conceptions of what constitutes 
autobiography have evolved in the almost forty years since Bruss’ essay was published, 
interdisciplinary interest in autobiographical film continues to grow. But, theorising 
cinematic autobiographical subjectivity, and who has the authority to depict it, requires a 
bilateral approach that considers not only the ways in which autobiographical subjectivity 
can be conceived, constructed and conveyed on film, but also the combined proposition of 
showing and telling that filmic iterations of autobiographical experience afford.  
Emerging alongside the visual turn is a renewed interest in testimonial narratives, and the 
evaluation of the contemporary socio-political contexts in which they are produced and 
engaged (Gilmore and Marshall, 2019; Gilmore, 2019, 2017a, and 2017b; Snooks, 2017; 
Spallacci, 2017, et al.). The tenets of testimony are largely understood through legal and 
religious contexts, in which the subject is expected to deliver a truthful and verifiable 
account of an event or experience, to be received and/or judged by an impartial third 
party. However, the politics of testimony as a “self-representational act” (Gilmore and 
Marshall, 2019: p. 3) can be complicated by the contexts of trauma and crisis that require 
the subject to be their own eye-witness, and the cultural hegemonies that determine 
socio-political status. The recent #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo movements have 
brought testimonial discourse to the forefront of public consciousness, whereby the 
experiences of marginalised others, and their ability to attest to that experience, is 
reframed, marking a pivotal and urgent shift in the contemporary cultural context. In 
contemporary parlance, testimony establishes “a documentary, activist and 
commemorative politics around bearing witness” (Gilmore, 2017a: p. 307), bringing to the 
fore the intersectional ethics of engagement that testimonial witnessing entails.  
Leigh Gilmore argues that “testimony is an increasingly central feature of contemporary 
life”, which, consequently, makes it “crucial to parsing life narratives” (2017b: p. 307). The 
articulation of autobiographical experience, particularly in testimonial contexts, is 
motivated by the existential desire to be seen, heard and acknowledged, to share the 
reality of experience and enable others to conceive of the reported subjective experience 
as real. This involves an unspoken agreement between the subject and their chosen 
other, whereby the subject proposes to tell – or show – their subjective, experiential truth, 
and the other commits to receiving it as such. The empathy invited by such narratives is 
predicated on an acknowledgment of both similarities and differences, that enable the 
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reader or viewer to ‘feel with’ the subject’s experience from a distance that the textual 
boundary installs. But, when testimonial contexts are explicitly included within 
autobiographical narratives, both the ethical and empathic stakes of engagement are 
raised, because of the politics of witnessing that testimonial telling brings to the fore. 
When subjects bring experiential narratives to the public forum, the ethical and empathic 
parameters of engagement are determined by the formal and generic markers their texts 
contain. The use of visual media, particularly film, can allow subjects to capitalise on the 
dual offer of showing and telling these modes enable, to mobilise autobiography as 
testimony by presenting experience and testimonial contexts in tandem. Accordingly, the 
ways in which filmic autobiographical narratives are read and received as testimony are 
determined by the politics of witnessing initiated in and through the text, which signal its 
testimonial function and designate the viewer as witness.  
The convergence of filmic autobiographical modes and testimonial disclosure constitutes 
an “act of performative telling” (Snooks, 2017: p. 398), which can invite the viewer to bear 
witness to subjective experience through the ethically motivated and empathically driven 
‘contract’ the experiential narrative invokes. In this thesis, I theorise Contemporary 
Cinematic I-Witnessing as a dialogic approach to autobiographical subjectivity on film that 
foregrounds the “rhetorical proximity” of autobiography and testimony (Gilmore, 2001: p. 
20). I identify the codes and conventions that characterise the autobiographical invitation 
to ethical and empathic engagement in filmic depictions of subjective experience along a 
continuum of representation. Using Arirang (Kim, 2011), Tarnation (Caouette, 2007), and 
Blue (Jarman, 1993), I begin by mapping first-person modes of articulation in self-made 
and self-reflexive films that encompass documentary practices, to identify film’s 
testimonial propensity from the documentary margins. I further address filmic forms of 
self-witnessing in the narrative films The Tale (Fox, 2018) and Persepolis (Satrapi, 2007), 
all within the autobiographical and testimonial scope of autofilmic testimony. The analysis 
then moves on to address the testimonial capacity of cinematic adaptations of literary 
autobiography as biographical projects of secondary witnessing, or auteurbiography. The 
adaptation of The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (Schnabel, 2007) highlights the ethics of 
fidelity, relationality, and creative authority, whilst Being Flynn (Weitz, 2012) and Julie & 
Julia (Ephron, 2009) expose the limits of gender, genre, and commercial appeal when in 
contention with the faithful representation of auto/biographical experience. The analysis 
traverses the construction of the audiovisual narrative, along with the layers of creative 
discourse involved, to evaluate the ethical imperative of the votive testimonial witnessing 
structure thus engendered, and identify the modes of production that can facilitate 
empathic engagement to instantiate an intersubjective pact.  
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In this thesis, I construct an analytical framework that combines distinct critical 
approaches from autobiography, testimony, documentary and film studies to evince the 
ethical and empathic efficacy of the autobiographical invitation on screen. I-Witnessing, as 
a purposely dialogic description, denotes both the production of a filmic narrative that 
depicts autobiographical experience, and the process of testimonial engagement as 
witness to cinematic iterations of the autobiographical invitation .The research reveals the 
features and function of the autobiographical invitation on film in terms of the recognisable 
conventions of its instantiation, the profilmic representation of the autobiographical 
subject, and the re/mediation of their unique point of view and voice. The language and 
grammar of subjective experience on screen is interrogated to theorise the testimonial 
capacity of cinematic forms with reference to authorship, ethics, strategies of empathy, 
referentiality, and relationality. Fundamentally, Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing is 
posited as a reciprocal and ‘pactual’ project between subject and viewer with a singular 
shared objective: to bear witness to the subjective truth of a life.  
Literary Approaches to Autobiography and Testimony 
Literary autobiography is predicated upon a “pact” between the author and the reader, a 
pact that holds as its central tenet that the author, narrator and protagonist must be 
“identical” in the production of a “retrospective prose narrative written by a real person 
concerning his own existence” (Lejeune, 1989: p. 4). The autobiographical pact 
underwrites the intersubjective relationship between writer and reader, the acceptance of 
which is founded on the conviction that the tripartite construction of the “autobiographical 
‘I’” (Lejeune, 1989) authorises the autobiographer’s account as their own experience from 
their own point of view. Use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ signals self-reference within the 
text, which is verified by the inclusion of the author’s “proper name” (1989: p. 20) in the 
paratext; the reader reconciles the ‘I’ in the text with the real author outside of the text 
through their acceptance of the pact’s conditions, as autobiography is a “mode of reading 
as much as it is a type of writing” (Lejeune, 1989: p. 30). Consequently, autobiographical 
forms are reliant upon intersubjective engagement, whereby the referential labour is 
prompted by identifiable conventions of self-reflexive authorship.  
Rockwell Gray claims in his article entitled ‘Autobiography Now’ (1982):  
[t]o participate in the autobiographical mode, it is enough to reflect, to 
speak, or to act with an intention which is broadly self-narrative or self-
revealing. Of course, to be judged at all, such intention must find some 
expression in a symbolic form, particularly in language and gesture.  
(1982: p. 33) 
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Gray’s characterisation underscores the inherent interrelation of product and process at 
the heart of an autobiographical act, in that to constitute autobiography, the narrative must 
divulge the author’s self-referential intention and deliver a directive that implores the 
reader to engage with the narrative accordingly. Following Gray, Arnaud Schmitt confirms 
this assertion, highlighting the “three conditions” that identify autobiography (2018: p. 
473): “an autobiographical act must be ‘self-narrative or self-revealing’, it must be 
regarded (‘judged’) as such and finally, the speaker must find a way to materialise 
symbolically her intent to speak about herself” (2018: p. 473). But, as Schmitt observes in 
his recent article, “autobiographical forms seem to be constantly branching off with new 
means of self-showing or self-telling” (2018: p. 470), meaning that ‘judging’ autobiography 
in alternative forms and new media entails greater referential labour in addition to the 
interpretation of the requisite intra-textual cues. 
Schmitt explains that “we should consider autobiography both as an invitation (from the 
author) and as a willingness (on the reader’s part)” (original italics, 2017: p. 129), which 
accords with the contractual nature of autobiography tendered by Lejeune. However, 
Schmitt asserts: 
An autobiographical pact is not enough […]. To work, autobiography must 
remain ‘within this world’, or least not lose sight of it and of the experience 
of the author. Since nothing in the text can ensure that it will be read 
accordingly, and since the author is to a certain extent powerless when it 
comes to keeping the reading of [their] text within reasonable limits, it is 
up to the reader to sustain the referential effort’.  
(original italics, 2017: pp. 97-8) 
The reader’s referential labour is imperative to the way autobiography ‘works’ and it is the 
autobiographer’s responsibility to persuade their reader to sustain it, by inciting a readerly 
practice that Schmitt calls “emersion” (p. 126). Schmitt argues that, unlike “immersion”, 
which “is characterized by being focused for a certain amount of time on the diegesis of 
the text”, emersion requires “a process of defocusing, of remaining at the surface of a 
text”, and “of redirecting your attention to the source of the narrative (the actual events), 
not the actual representation of the events” (original italics, 2017: p. 126). Ultimately, 
emersion guides the reader through the pragmatic pact of reading autobiography that 
champions the authority of the autobiographical ‘I’, to a phenomenological mode of 
engagement that privileges the experience of the author as real. This simultaneous and 
oscillating reference beyond the text to the authorial source and back to their textual 
representation validates the experience of the author, by cuing the continuous 
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reconciliation of their authorship (process) with the representative textual content 
(product).   
Schmitt’s emersion draws a parallel with a critical approach that Shoshana Felman and 
Dori Laub describe as “shuttle reading” (1992: p. xv), which is outlined in the foreword to 
their seminal collection Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and 
History (1992). For Felman and Laub, shuttle reading is the “necessary work of 
textualization of the context” that must complement “the very basic and critical demand for 
contextualization of the text” (original italics, 1992: p. xv); they further contend:  
this shuttle movement […] –the very tension between textualization and 
contextualization– might yield new avenues of insight, both into the texts 
at stake and into their context– the political, historical, and biographical 
realities with which the texts are dynamically involved and within which 
their particular creative possibilities are themselves inscribed.  
(original italics, 1992: p. xv) 
Where the autobiographical reading practices of emersion and testimonial shuttle reading 
overlap is in their acknowledgement of the world outside the text, the world in which the 
subject’s experience occurred, and in which the subject does – or did – exist beyond the 
text. For self-referential narratives such as autobiography and testimony, the text and the 
context of its production are intrinsically linked, and therefore must be read in tandem.  
Autobiography and testimony, therefore, share a “rhetorical proximity” (Gilmore, 2001: p. 
20) in that both are formally self-referential accounts of lived experience that require a 
type of engagement that moves between the subject’s narrative and the real-world context 
in which the subject exists. But, as Leigh Gilmore argues: 
As a genre, autobiography is characterized less by a set of formal 
elements than by a rhetorical setting in which a person places herself or 
himself within testimonial contexts […] in order to achieve as proximate 
relation as possible to what constitutes truth in that discourse.  
(2001: p. 3) 
Though the formal elements of autobiography help us to identify that what we are reading 
is autobiography, the inherently testimonial contexts of its self-referential production 
instantiate an ethical and intersubjective witnessing structure that is also predicated on a 
dialogic invitation to apprehend subjective truth. The politics of witnessing that testimony 
invokes is related to the way it functions, in terms of the way subjects use testimony to 
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articulate and “work through” trauma (LaCapra, 2014). Constructing testimony entails 
“being a witness to oneself” (1992: p. 75), but, as Laub explains, testimonial witnessing is 
mobilised by “the intimate and total presence of an other” whose purpose “is to be 
unobtrusively present throughout the testimony” to enable and receive the subject’s 
experiential account (original italics, Laub, 1992: pp. 70-71) with the aim to discern their 
experiential truth (p. 76). Essentially, autobiography and testimony’s proximate rhetoric is 
determined by the reciprocity of willingness – the autobiographer’s willingness to share 
experience, and the reader’s willingness to accept their invitation – that convenes the 
testimonial witnessing structure. Autobiographers invite their readers to bear witness to 
self-witnessing, as without the reader as witness, the narrative cannot achieve testimonial 
truth. 
Self-made and self-reflexive films foreground the cognisance of form, rhetoric and modes 
of engagement that autobiography and testimony share, to manifest an autobiographical 
invitation that situates the viewer in the ‘intimate’ and ‘unobtrusive’ position of witness. It is 
on this basis that I argue autobiographical films constitute an audiovisual mode of self-
witnessing testimony. As such, they instantiate a pactual witnessing structure that situates 
the willing viewer as testimonial – and literal – witness to the subjective truth of 
autobiographical experience on screen. Though engaging with autobiography is 
fundamentally “an ethical act” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 93), testimonial  contexts – and the 
traumatic inflection they introduce – amplify the ethical imperative of the autobiographical 
invitation, as “narratives of witness”, according to Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, 
“entwine the narrator, the story, and the listener/reader in an ethical call to empathic 
identification” (2010: p. 134). In order to explore the ways in which films are able to entreat 
ethical and empathic viewership, it is necessary to consider the ways in which 
autobiography and testimony have been rendered on film previously, to establish how 
audiovisual media can produce the requisite invitation to bear witness and how viewers 
engage with these forms.   
Filmic Testimony and Autobiographical Film: Documentary Evidence  
Filmic testimony is predominantly considered a documentary form, a view that has 
evolved in relation to historiography and Holocaust studies, and the use of documentary 
footage in legal settings such as the Nuremberg Tribunal and the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee (TRC) (see Rascaroli, 2017; Douglas, 2017, 2006, and 1995; 
Ball, 2013; Craps, 2010; Felman and Laub, 1992; et al.). These testimonial contexts afford 
documentary forms a type of evidentiary eminence, which developed as a result of 
perceived objectivity and direct representation. In Issues in Contemporary Documentary 
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(2009), Jane Chapman attests that “documentary is a discursive formation”, which 
“[creates] a rhetoric of immediacy and ‘truth’” based on the presentation of “first-hand 
experience and fact” (2009: p. 8). Chapman’s evaluation highlights documentary’s 
assertion of direct address and non-fictional status, which endow documentary films with 
an invitational rhetoric that accords with autobiographical and testimonial narratives.  
Film and documentary theorist Carl Plantinga’s “critical realist” approach avers that 
“[documentary’s] epistemic claims can be rational and well justified” (2000: p. xii), defining 
documentary as “a subset of the broader category, nonfiction film and video”, which is 
“characterized by the assertive stance taken by the filmmaker(s) toward the world of the 
film” (Plantinga, 2010: p. xiii). According to Plantinga: 
in the case of documentaries, filmmakers assert that the states of affairs 
they represent occur in the actual world, and audiences implicitly 
understand that since the film is identified as a documentary, its claims 
and implications should be taken as assertions rather than fictions.  
(2010: p. xiii) 
Documentary’s assertive stance establishes “an implicit contract” whereby the filmmaker 
tacitly proclaims “veridical or truthful representation” and the viewer accordingly “expects 
that the film will offer veridical representations” (p. xiv). This contract is the basis upon 
which the ethics of “truth-telling or truth-showing” in documentary are founded (p. xiv) – 
drawing a parallel with the autobiographical invitation and the aforementioned structure of 
testimony –positing documentary as a contingent mode of witnessing.   
In today’s society, the ubiquity of digital and handheld camera devices – the likes of which 
are often found in smartphones and electronic tablets – and the presence of many digital 
platforms used for dissemination has led to a surge in personal documentary films, 
contributing to a “documentary boom”, which has emerged in tandem with the ongoing 
memoir boom of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Anderst, 2017: p. 255). 
Accordingly, the field of documentary studies has evolved in recent years, veering away 
from the founding sociological theories of the Griersonian tradition and the objective 
“creative treatment of actuality” (Grierson quoted in Chapman, 2009: p. 9) most 
associated with journalism and reportage, towards a less dogmatic doctrine that embraces 
documentary forms’ subjective potential. John Corner’s assertion that “the term 
documentary is always much safer when used as an adjective rather than a noun” echoes 
the tension between the terms autobiographical and autobiography, which arises primarily 
due to the terms’ synonymy for product and process. Moreover, Corner further reasons 
that “to ask ‘is this a documentary project?’ is more useful than to ask ‘is this film a 
16 
 
documentary?’” (original italics, 2002: p. 258) favouring the explanation that documentary 
is an exercise “grounded in the logics of exposition” (Corner, 2008: p. 10) rather than a 
determinate generic label. However, in his chapter in Thomas Austin and Wilma de Jong’s 
2008 edited volume Rethinking Documentary, Corner outlines the intricacy of 
documentary studies’ definitional quandary, citing aspects of “form”, “subject matter” and 
“purposes” as problematic and limiting lines of enquiry when considered in isolation 
(original italics, pp. 19-20). Corner instead points to the links between “aesthetics” and 
“cognition” (p. 20) in terms of documentary analyses that address “the organization of its 
visual design and the ‘offer of seeing’ it variously makes to audiences” (original italics, pp. 
21-22). Corner suggests that the most productive critical inquiry must resist the reductive 
impulse and embrace the dynamism of documentary’s representational capacity.  
Scholarship that theorises the self-referential capacity of filmic forms is similarly 
belligerent. Even the briefest survey of the available academic literature pertaining to 
autobiographical film reveals the complexity of its evaluation. The scholarship is 
unavoidably interdisciplinary, with analyses that encompass approaches from film and 
documentary studies, as well as the gamut of literary, sociological and psychoanalytic 
critique that informs life writing and auto/biography1 studies. However, the breadth and 
diversity of the critical attention afforded autobiographical film can also breed ambiguity, 
most evident in the lack of a consensus regarding the terminology used in its discussion. 
Autobiographical films are broadly – and often interchangeably – referred to as filmic 
autobiography, autobiographical documentary, non-fiction film, essay film, self-portrait film 
and first-person film (Anderst; Gernalzick; Lebow; Lane; Plantinga; Rascaroli; Renov, et 
al.).2 But, the variability of nomenclature is not indicative of entirely disparate conceptions 
of what actually constitutes autobiographical film, as will become clear.  
In his book The Autobiographical Documentary in America (2002), Jim Lane assembles a 
collection of case studies that “expand the scope of what might be considered an 
autobiography and a documentary” (p. 5). For Lane, “Autobiographical documentaries are 
presented as both autobiography and documentary, where the filmmakers engage in a 
series of generic agreements” (p. 23). The convergence of documentary and 
autobiographical covenants is enabled by a stylistic shift away from the traditionally 
objective and non-interventionist remit of documentary filmmaking, towards a deliberately 
subjective and overtly referential approach. Lane charts the development of 
autobiographical documentary forms through the avant-garde and observational direct 
 
1 In this context, auto/biography refers to the combined study of autobiographical and 
biographical texts often combined under the umbrella term life-writing. 
2 The specificity of each of these terms is clarified where pertinent to the discussion. 
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cinema movements of the 1950s and 60s, to the pivotal influence of “the European 
experiments in reflexive film” in the works of French filmmakers Jean Rouch and Jean-Luc 
Godard in the early 1970s (pp. 12-17). For Lane: “Reflexivity extends to subjectivity, 
reference, and autobiographical forms by directing viewers’ attention to the 
autobiographical subject, who is a filmmaker” (p. 18). As Lane explains, for filmmakers 
“reflexivity enables the autobiographical discourse that inextricably brings together 
autobiographers, their medium, and their life story” (p. 18), in an initiative that 
simultaneously convenes and represents the filmmaker’s first-person perspective.  
In the introduction to her collection of essays entitled The Cinema of Me: The Self and 
Subjectivity in First Person Documentary (2012), Alisa Lebow goes as far as to designate 
autobiographical documentaries “first person film”, which “goes beyond simply debunking 
documentary’s claim to objectivity” (p. 5). Lebow argues that “[i]n the very awkward 
simultaneity of being subject in and subject of, [first-person film] actually unsettles the 
dualism of the objective/subjective divide, rendering it inoperative” (original italics, 2012: p. 
5). Though Lebow acknowledges that “cinema is a somewhat recalcitrant object” in terms 
of “its ultimate resistance to rules” (p. 2), she seeks to define an admittedly broad-ranging 
“category” of first-person films. Nevertheless, Lebow, like Lane before her, limits the 
discussion of the autobiographical mode in filmic pursuits to the confines of documentary 
forms, whilst she makes the significant distinction that: “[t]he designation ‘first person film’ 
is foremost about a mode of address” (2012: p. 1), which accords with Plantinga’s 
identification of documentary’s assertive stance.  
In ‘To Act or to Perform: Distinguishing Filmic Autobiography’ (2006), Nadja Gernalzick 
contends that “filmic autobiography”, as “single-person produced personal cinema” is “a 
continuation of reflexive documentary film practice” (2006: p. 2), positing shared, 
identifiable codes and conventions such as “first-person filmic narrative”, “subjective 
camera technique” and the combination of “first-person voiceover with subjective camera 
perspective” as the dominant markers of the filmic autobiographical mode (pp. 2-3). 
Gernalzick’s observations attest to film’s capacity to reproduce the autobiographical ‘I’, 
with emphasis on the necessary embodiment of the subject and the cognate articulation of 
point of view. Similarly, for Lebow, first-person films “‘speak’ from the articulated point of 
view of the filmmaker who readily acknowledges her subjective position” (p. 1); however, 
she also argues that “first person film is not primarily, and certainly not always explicitly, 
autobiographical” (p. 2), with her critical approach allowing for the inscription of pluralistic 
and relational dynamics within the remit of first-person filmic ventures. This view is similar 
to that of Susanna Egan, for whom “film may enable autobiographers to define and 
represent subjectivity not as singular or solipsistic but as multiple and as revealed in 
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relationship” (p. 593), which advocates film’s aptitude for the representation of the 
inevitably relational construction of identity (Schmitt, 2017; Anderst, 2017; Smith and 
Watson, 2010; Eakin, 2008 and 1999; Miller, 2007; et al.). Though nuanced and nominally 
capricious, the media and methodological approaches that define self-reflexive filmic 
forms contribute to a constitutive ‘grammar’ of subjective films, the basis of which is rooted 
in documentary practices. Consequently, research pertaining to autobiographical film in its 
many guises must explore the utility of documentary and its creative concerns as the 
foremost filmic iteration of self-reflexivity and testimonial discourse.  
Rather than contribute to the wealth of critical inquiry that attests to filmic forms of 
autobiography within the scope of documentary practices, this project begins by 
interrogating documentary “limit cases” (Gilmore, 2001), which highlight the flexible 
frontiers of self-made and self-referential filmic forms as a vehicle for self-witnessing. The 
designation Autofilmic Testimony, as the term implies, establishes the ways in which the 
autobiographical invitation is coded on screen, but also signals the testimonial remit of the 
narrative and the witnessing structure that manifests as a result. The analysis addresses 
the ways in which autofilmic testimony can include, and equally preclude, empathic 
strategies according to the subject’s self-witnessing agenda, and proposes the 
parameters of the viewership pact that posits the viewer as willing witness.  
From its documentary limits, I then map the continuum of Contemporary Cinematic I-
Witnessing to further critique cinematic constructions of self-witnessing, by looking beyond 
recognisably documentary practices to the markedly collaborative medium of the narrative 
film. I propose that the expansive repertoire of the “multilaminated” (Hutcheon, 2013: p. 
21) cinematic medium can provide a representational platform for the complex and 
relational dynamics of autobiographical subjectivity and testimonial discourse beyond 
accepted conceptions of unilateral production. To further illustrate cinema’s 
representational capacity within the continuum, I move on to examine the ways in which 
the autobiographical invitation can be reproduced through cinematic adaptations of literary 
autobiographies. Taking the memoir as the originary act of self-witness, the analysis 
traces and interrogates the distance between the discoursal levels of the adaptive 
process, to determine the modes of engagement and production that can transpose and 
transmit the testimonial truth of autobiographical experience on film.  
The most obvious referential prompt within a literary autobiography is the autobiographical 
‘I’, with filmic equivalents identifiable through their first-person modes of address and self-
made, self-referential filmic narrative. The ways in which subjectivity is constructed in 
cinematic adaptations resemble reflexive documentary practices and the first-person 
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conventions of filmic autobiography, as discussed with reference to their documentary 
origins above. Gernalzick’s aforementioned 2006 evaluation of filmic autobiography 
references Robert Montgomery’s Lady in the Lake (1946) and David Holzman’s Diary 
(1967) by Jim McBride as examples of cinematic projects that do not comply with the self-
made and self-referential requisites of autobiographical construction, but which mimic and 
purposely imply a filmic equivalent of the autobiographical ‘I’. Evidently, these conventions 
are by no means exclusive to autobiographical films, but have become familiar as 
representative of embodied subjectivity and interiority, in terms of their use to convey the 
primacy and perspective of a specific character within film narratives.  Their use in 
adaptations, then, is a narrative strategy intended to convey subjectivity, but the reality of 
this subjectivity is understood in relation to the other paratextual and intertextual claims 
the film makes to reference its basis on autobiography. The overriding effect of these 
subjective audiovisual devices is to focus the viewer’s attention, and to encourage 
empathy and identification with the depicted experience of the other on screen; Schmitt 
asserts, “since autobiography stems from experience, their [the author’s] very peculiar 
experiential nature matters” (2017: p. 128) as this serves to interpolate the 
phenomenological experience of reading the text that “focuse[s] on the reality of one 
person” (2017: p. 122). If, as Barthes asserts, “the message is parametrically linked to its 
performance” (1994: p. 698), then the reinscription of the autobiographical ‘I’ and the 
preservation of the autobiographical subject’s experiential perspective are paramount. 
Consequently, autobiographical adaptations must make use of available cinematic and 
narrative strategies in order to remediate both embodiment and point of view as intrinsic to 
the autobiographical invitation. 
Adapting the Invitation  
If the autobiographical invitation and the relative instantiation of the testimonial witnessing 
structure are contingent upon first-person accounts, how can films that are not self-
reflexive invite viewers to bear witness to subjective truth? How is the autobiographical 
invitation adapted? What are the parameters for a viewership pact that can elide the 
increased distance between the subject and their autobiographical narrative? These are 
some of the key questions I address through the exploration of narrative films that 
transpose literary autobiographies from page to screen. My analysis posits that 
autobiographical adaptations can convene the testimonial witnessing structure outlined 
above, to promote the willing ethical and empathic engagement with cinematic subjectivity 
as representative of autobiographical experience. I also argue that the viewer is able to 
effectively overlook the necessary transmedial labour through emersive viewership that 
privileges the autobiographical subject, and their narrative, as real. The testimonial 
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context of autobiography as self-witness determines that the reader takes up the position 
of witness as receiver; therefore, the adaptation of an autobiography requires that the 
adapter begins from the position of willing witness, reading and receiving the 
autobiographer’s narrative and accepting their invitation, before subsequently taking up 
the role of secondary witness who reissues the autobiographical subject’s invitation in the 
adapted film. This process requires an ethical commitment to faithful representation that 
resists the auteurial impulse often evident in novel-to-film adaptations.   
Adapting autobiographical narratives highlights the ethical imperative of fidelity, which 
dictates that the adaptation must strive to preserve the autobiographical subject’s unique 
autobiographical invitation. But, the effect of fidelity within the context of cinematic I-
witnessing is that the adaptation is equivalent to secondary witnessing. Adapters become 
“the catalysts – or agents – of the process of reception” (original italics, Felman, 1992: p. 
213) by disseminating the testimony of the autobiographical subject on their behalf, and 
inviting others, as viewers, to bear witness. As a result, the adapter is essentially 
translating the autobiographical subject’s invitation, which involves an especially ethical 
transmedial transposition of the autobiographical subject’s self-witnessing narrative that 
can engender the intersubjective witnessing structure. In order to achieve this, the adapter 
must first accept the autobiographer’s invitation to bear witness, by engaging with the text 
and the context of its construction, before they can reissue the autobiographical subject’s 
invitation on screen; as Hutcheon confirms: “the adapter is an interpreter before becoming 
a creator” (2013: p. 84). The dialogic process of the acceptance, preservation and 
transposition of the autobiographical invitation amounts to what I call pactual integrity, 
which holds that the film text, and those involved in its production, resolve to tell the 
autobiographical subject’s story from their subjective point of view, and to produce a 
cinematic narrative of witness that invites the viewer to engage with the film as testament 
to the real autobiographical subject’s experiential truth.   
Though the cinematic adaptation of autobiography places particular emphasis upon 
fidelity to the source text and the preservation of the autobiographical invitation, adapted 
texts are by their very nature “hybrid constructions”, which, as Robert Stam contends, is a 
notion that “applies even more obviously to a collaborative medium like film” (2004: p. 4). 
The adaptation process involves numerous people, from the screenwriter and director, 
through to the actors, editors and cinematographers, all of whom are responsible for 
creating an audiovisual narrative that can place viewers “in the position of the witness who 
sees and hears” (original italics, Felman, 1992: p. 121) for themselves. Their aim is to 
focalise autobiographical experience, and recapitulate the real, without compromising the 
self-witnessing inflection of the subject’s story. Nevertheless, we should consider the 
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adapted text as a “palimpsest”, in that it carries the residual traces of the source text(s) 
from which it is adapted, but also the creative and stylistic modulations of the director as 
auteur, inclusive of their overall duties as “manager” and “organizer” of their screenwriter, 
cast and crew (Hutcheon, 2013: p. 83), which I designate the auteurial équipe.3 The 
“collective authoriality” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 139) that arises due to the collaborative input of 
the auteurial équipe, as contributors to the production and remediation of autobiographical 
subjectivity on screen, is steered by the director who is “ultimately held responsible for the 
overall vision and therefore for adaptation as adaptation” (original italics, Hutcheon, 2013: 
p. 85).  
The term auteur carries connotations of artistic authority and directorial dominance, which 
are potentially problematic in the context of autobiographical adaptations that are meant to 
convey the subjectivity of a specific other. Accordingly, what Andrew Sarris calls the 
“tension between the director’s personality and his material” (1962: p. 7) is a particular 
concern in the evaluation of adapted autobiographies, which I address in the conception 
of autobiographical adaptations as auteurbiography. Auteurbiography is my term for both 
the product and process of adapting a literary autobiographical source as tantamount to 
secondary witnessing. Firstly, the auteurial équipe must undertake a willing, ethical and 
empathic engagement with the source text, which equates to acceptance of the 
autobiographical invitation as outlined above in the discussion of literary autobiography. 
Secondly, the adaptation process entails the auteurial équipe’s extension of Schmitt’s 
emersion and Felman and Laub’s shuttle reading, in the oscillation between text and 
context that then leads to a literal, biographical exploration of the testimonial context. This 
stage of the adaptation process encompasses the research efforts made by the members 
of the auteurial équipe prior to production; the research is used to bring the context into 
the cinematic frame, informing the screenwriting process, decisions about setting, 
costume and casting, and the ways in which the subject should be embodied, or 
performed, on screen. Furthermore, this additional information expands the “scope” 
(Schmitt, 2017: p. 67) of the subject’s representation to effectively reduce the referential 
labour for the viewer. Finally, the director must then collate the auteurial équipe’s findings, 
as extrapolated through their metatextual investigative practices, towards the production 
of a cinematic representation of the reality of the autobiographical subject that 
corresponds with the source text.  
 
3 I use the French term équipe to acknowledge the French origins of auteur theory, as 
well as for its synonymy for ‘team’, ‘crew’, and ‘personnel’, none of which seemed 
adequate in English.   
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Typically, adaptations must overcome expectations of fidelity, whereby the literary source 
“is granted axiomatic primacy and authority”; Hutcheon recognises that “the rhetoric of 
comparison has most often been that of faithfulness and equivalence” (2013: p. 16). This 
kind of “fidelity criticism”, according to Brian McFarlane, “depends on a notion of the text 
having and rendering up to the (intelligent) reader a single, correct ‘meaning’ which the 
film-maker has either adhered to or in some sense violated or tampered with” (1996: p. 8). 
The expectation of fidelity as a critical framework is considered limiting at best and 
reductive at worst, but the persistent comparative rhetoric is intrinsic to evaluations of 
adaptations. However, as Thomas M. Leitch explains, thinking of adaptations in terms of 
dependency upon their literary sources  
inevitably impoverishes them because it reduces them to the single function 
of replicating (or, worse, failing to replicate) the details of that single source 
text […]. Taking fidelity as the decisive criterion of an adaptation’s value is 
tantamount to insisting that it do the same job as its source text without 
going outside the lines that text has established.  
(2007: p. 30)  
Leitch makes his point with reference to adaptations of novels, which largely resist a 
singular, prescriptive reading; but, to take up his idea of the predetermined ‘job’ of the 
source text, some autobiographies do have a specific testimonial function that is 
expedited by the ‘lines’ – or requisite pactual parameters – of the form. In the context of 
auteurbiographical adaptations then, there is an ethical obligation to not only preserve the 
autobiographical invitation, but to reproduce the assertive stance of the subject’s self-
witnessing narrative that determines the mode of reading – or viewership – required.  
Many cinematic adaptations signal their adapted status through “seemingly simplistic” and 
“familiar” paratextual truth claims like “based on a true story” (Hutcheon, 2013: p. 18), 
which purposely prompt the comparative rhetoric of fidelity criticism and the expectation of 
veridical truth associated with non-fiction films, as mentioned above. Referencing the 
source in this way acknowledges the dialogic, intertextual relationship between the source 
and the adapted text, whilst simultaneously positing a subtle and indistinct disclaimer. For 
this reason, ‘based on’ is a caveat without a quorum, which allows the adaptation to 
capitalise upon its claim to truthful representation, whilst it somewhat ironically frees it 
from the absolute assertion of faithful and direct replication. However, auteurbiographical 
adaptations require more than a precedent title card or marketing message as surety that 
the film narrative operates within the same “horizon of expectations” (Jauss, 1970: p. 13) 
as its source. Though the films included in Section Two of this study do incorporate an 
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equivalent paratextual proposition to buttress the cinematic invitation to bear witness, it is 
the use of recognisably subjective conventions and the ubiquity of the representation of 
the subject within the cinematic discourse that stimulates emersive viewership, and the 
necessary referential labour that can ensure that the viewer does not “lose sight of” 
(original italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 97) the real autobiographical subject.  
Emersive viewership, and the referential resolution needed to overlook/subtend the 
disparate levels of discourse between the autobiographical source text and the adapted 
film requires a substantial effort on the part of the viewer. Director and film theorist, Sergei 
Eisenstein’s “montage principle” (1970: p. 37) offers a useful conceptual framework that 
helps to articulate the viewer’s intuitive compression of the multi-layered and collaborative 
creative process – as is required for emersive viewership – in his description of the 
intersubjective creative “output” of what he calls “the spectator” (1970: p. 37). For 
Eisenstein: 
[I]t is precisely the montage principle, as distinguished from that of 
representation, which obliges spectators themselves to create, and the 
montage principle, by this means, achieves that great power of inner 
creative excitement in the spectator which distinguishes an emotionally 
exciting work from one that stops without going further than giving 
information or recording events.  
(original italics, 1970: p. 37) 
Considered within the context of auteurbiographical adaptations, the ‘inner creative 
excitement’ as Eisenstein puts it, is the cognitive referential labour that occurs during the 
phenomenological reading of an autobiographical text, which can be made manifest in 
emersive viewership of the adapted film assuming that the cinematic narrative 
appropriately incites the viewer’s reconciliatory effort. As an example, Eisenstein offers:  
[B]etween the representation of an hour on the dial of a clock and our 
perception of the image of that hour, there lies a long chain of linked 
representations of separate characteristic aspects of that hour. […] 
[P]sychological habit tends to reduce this intervening chain to a minimum, 
so that only the beginning and the end of the process are perceived.  
(Eisenstein, 1970: p. 22) 
The “aggregation” that occurs effectively reconciles the disparate ‘characteristic aspects’ 
of the representation and the object and/or concept it represents, which constitutes the 
cognitive “‘mechanics’ of the formation of an image” (Eisenstein, 1970: p. 21). Emersive 
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viewership, as a comparable subconscious exercise, enables the viewer to perceive the 
real autobiographical subject through their cinematic representation, and to ultimately 
engage with their autobiographical invitation in spite of the multi-levelled adaptation 
process. In other words, the viewer will accept the subject and their depicted experience 
on screen as the autobiographical subject’s as long as the depicted experience prompts 
them to do so.         
Approaching Empathy 
Theorising cinematic I-witnessing requires a review of the empathic engagement often 
taken for granted in narratives of witness. Though narrative empathy is largely 
hypothesised in relation to fictional texts, as seen in the work of Suzanne Keen (2006; 
2013), Nancy Snow (2000), and Anderson and Anderson (2009), life-writing scholarship 
has recently begun to consider the prevalence of narrative strategies of empathy in an 
autobiographical context (Anderst, 2019 and 2015; Schmitt, 2017). Leah Anderst identifies 
the “tracks” (2015: p. 273) of narrative empathy in Doris Lessing and Alison Bechdel’s life 
writing, across traditional literary and comic memoirs, arguing that autobiographical 
narratives can entreat empathic responses from readers at intra- and extra-textual levels. 
Anderst addresses the ways that relational dynamics and the embodied politics of 
autobiographical modes resonate with readers, providing productive “channels” (2015: p. 
273) for empathic engagement and identification that operate within and through the 
narrative. Schmitt’s phenomenological model posits empathy at the centre of 
autobiographical engagement, which, as mentioned above, is the result of sustained 
referential labour and the privileging of autobiographical experience as real (2017). In her 
most recent article, Anderst (2019) theorises documentary’s empathic potential as an 
autobiographical mode in her evaluation of Marlon Riggs’ Tongues Untied (1989); this 
reading interrogates narrative empathy, in contrast with her evaluations of the visual 
strategies of empathy in Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home (2006), which she frames as 
comparable with a more traditional written memoir (2015). Whilst Schmitt cites 
neurological research and the faculties of mirror neurons in his phenomenological 
approach to autobiography, making passing references to films, both Schmitt and Anderst 
stop short of reconciling the autobiographical invitation with film’s largely uncontested 
capacity to elicit empathic and emotional responses.  
Outside of autobiography and documentary studies, film scholars have long considered 
the affective aptitude of film. Often, discussions default to the use of terms like 
‘identification’ and feeling ‘moved’ as emotions and feelings, which are easy to 
acknowledge, are far more difficult to define. Nevertheless, the fact that film is adept in 
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eliciting emotional responses in viewers is largely uncontested, with a broad spectrum of 
critique that offers a substantive insight into cinema’s empathic proclivity. Berys Gaut 
offers a relatively simplistic distinction between identification and empathy, which holds 
that identification is “imaginative” (1999: p. 206), as a viewer must “imagine feeling what a 
person (or character fictionally) feels” (original italics, 1999: p. 206). Empathy, however, 
“requires one to share in the feelings one ascribes to [a person or character]” (p. 207) 
often mobilised in film by sequences of point-of-view shots and “expressive reaction 
shots” that enable viewers to envisage themselves in the character’s situation (p. 209). In 
‘The Scene of Empathy and the Human Face’ (1999), Plantinga expresses a preference 
for the term “character engagement” instead of identification, in agreement with Murray 
Smith, arguing that the notion of identification is “misleading” (p. 244) and “too confusing 
to be useful” (p. 287) in the evaluation of viewers’ affective engagement with film. 
Empathy, on the other hand, “consists of a capacity or disposition to know, to feel, and to 
respond congruently to what another is feeling”, which “may incorporate varied sorts of 
emotional experience” as opposed to a singular, discernible emotion (p. 245). Empathy 
then is both the aptitude and the process by which a viewer feels “congruent emotions” (p. 
245) in response to film characters, prompted by engagement with the audiovisual 
narrative and the “viewing context” that can further condition affective responses (p. 248).  
Greg M. Smith’s “mood-cue approach” to filmic analysis also points to “emotion cues”, 
which encompass “narrative situation, facial and body information, music, sound, mise en 
scène, [and] lighting”, as “the smallest unit[s] for analysing a text’s emotional appeals” 
(1999, p. 116). In addition to cues, Smith contends that “emotion markers” help viewers to 
sustain their “mood” or “predisposition toward expressing emotion” (p. 118), as sequences 
that do not elaborate upon the film’s narrative arc, nor the “goal” of the protagonist, but 
serve to maintain the viewer’s expectancy for emotional engagement and “encourage the 
mood to continue” (p. 118). For Smith, it is a film’s organisation of both cues and markers 
that promote and sustain a viewer’s mood in response to what they watch, which indicates 
the way that conventions of filmic narrative and construction can promote a particular 
affective purview. 
This accords with Noël Carroll’s observations that “some genres seem to traffic in certain 
specifiable emotions” and that “some genres also aim at arousing specific emotions in 
spectators as a condition of being an instance of the very genre in question” (1999, pp. 
34-5). It is conceivable, indeed likely, then, that viewing a film with prior expectations for 
its content, as determined by generic labels and familiarity with the tendencies and tropes 
of said genre, can guide the way that a viewer approaches a film in the first place. 
Therefore, there is purchase in the contention that the deployment of specifically 
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subjective conventions, when pre-empted by the appropriate paratextual prompts 
(references to real people/name and genre distinctions such as documentary, etc.) can 
signal to a viewer that what they are watching is, and should be viewed as, representative 
of real, autobiographical experience. It is on this basis that I map the codes and 
conventions of cinematic I-witnessing, in terms of the way a film manifests a subject’s 
autobiographical and testimonial invitation, to identify the ways in which they buttress and 
invoke ethical and empathic engagement.   
It is important to acknowledge that empathic engagement is never guaranteed, as Keen 
points out in her evaluation of narrative strategies of empathy in prose: “Readers may and 
do sometimes respond indifferently to appeals to their feelings” (2011: p. 372). She goes 
on to explain that indifference does not necessarily indicate “incompetence”, on the part of 
the author or the reader, rather that “it reflects differences in readers’ dispositions and 
experiences” (2011: p. 32). Frames of reference and emotional capacity vary according to 
each person’s individual character and experiential history, and atypical responses to 
narrative stimuli cannot be ruled out. However, films can prompt empathic engagement on 
numerous different levels (as outlined above), and my identification and analysis of the 
empathic strategies used in autofilmic testimonies and auteurbiographies throughout this 
thesis does not presuppose their universal efficacy. As Keen and others have suggested, 
empirical research into the ways in which empathy functions is needed, but this is beyond 
the scope of my project.     
Roger Luckhurst contends: 
Abject theories of the ethical and empathetic response to the pain of the 
other pour out of academic presses, all of which find little purchase in the 
brutal geo-politics of the contemporary world.  
(Luckhurst, 2008: p. 213) 
Though I recognise the limitations of overt identification with testimony in the body of this 
research, the witnessing model presented here acknowledges the intersectional politics of 
a globalised society, drawing on diverse examples of autobiographical subjectivity on film 
to address the complexity of self-reflexive practices and their theoretically cross-cultural 
empathic potential. Testimonial accounts inevitably reference traumatic experience, and 
traumatic contexts in turn affect the ways in which autobiographical narratives can be 
recalled and related as narratives. Consequently, my analysis aims to address the effects 
and implications of trauma, where relevant, but within the remit of the witnessing 
framework proposed. As a medium that can transcend geographical and cultural borders, 
film is capable of communicating both the similarities and differences in subjective 
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experience, but, as I hope becomes clear, is particularly proficient at presenting the 
shared tendencies of the human condition.    
Overview of the Chapters 
This thesis is divided into two sections, to mark the transition from evaluations of self-
made and self-referential films to the analysis of filmic adaptations of literary 
autobiography. In Chapter One of the first section, documentary “limit cases” (Gilmore, 
2001) are examined as filmic forms of self-witnessing that reveal and interrogate formal 
boundaries and documentary conventions in an autobiographical and testimonial context. 
The analysis primarily maps the parameters of autofilmic testimony in Kim Ki-duk’s 
Arirang (2011), Jonathan Caouette’s Tarnation (2003) and Derek Jarman’s Blue (1993), 
as contemporary examples of self-made and self-reflexive, audiovisual narratives of 
witness, to propose the intersubjective model that equates viewership with testimonial 
witnessing.  
With the testimonial witnessing structure as an analytical framework, the analysis then 
develops the premise of autofilmic testimony in Chapter Two, to consider the 
representational and relational scope of cinematic I-witnessing in feature films. Jennifer 
Fox’s The Tale (2018) and Marjane Satrapi’s animated Persepolis (2007) demonstrate 
autofilmic testimony’s metonymic potential, and the advocacy that can be achieved 
through intra- and extra-textual tracks of empathy in autobiographical films. The two very 
different films under scrutiny in this chapter demonstrate the extended contextual capacity 
afforded by more traditional cinematic approaches, and the analysis gestures towards 
adaptive strategies that can mobilise the autobiographical invitation to bear witness within 
the multihanded industry of conventional filmmaking practices. 
Section Two traces the degrees of separation between literary autobiography and the 
ethical and empathic adaptation of the autobiographical invitation from page to screen. 
Adaptation theory informs the analysis of the distinct levels of the adaptive discourse, to 
propose auteurbiography as a biographical endeavour that can – and should – preserve 
and promote an autobiographical subject’s unique invitation to instantiate emersive 
viewership as testimonial witnessing. Chapter Three offers Julian Schnabel’s 2007 
adaptation of Jean-Dominique Bauby’s The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (1997) as the 
auteurbiographical prototype, identifying the responsibilities of the auteurial équipe in their 
collective role as secondary witness and the necessity of pactual integrity. The analysis 
addresses the source memoir, the screenplay, and the final film text, foregrounding issues 
of fidelity, authorship and embodiment in the remediation of vulnerable subjectivity, to 
28 
 
highlight the ethical and empathic imperatives of bearing witness to autobiographical 
experience.   
The final chapter posits Being Flynn (Weitz, 2012) and Julie & Julia (Ephron, 2009) in a 
comparative case study, to critique the creative and cinematic boundaries of 
auteurbiographical adaptation. Chapter Four considers the referential responsibility 
inherent in relational auto/biographies, and concordant implications for their adaptation 
within a mainstream, Hollywood context. The effects of relationality, the ‘star system’, 
auteur status, and related hierarchies of ownership and authorship are considered 
alongside issues of fidelity, gender and genre, which highlight the ethical and empathic 
imperative of pactual integrity. This chapter brings into relief the limits of auteurbiography 
to illustrate the margins of cinematic I-witnessing, and the issues of genre, auteurship and 
adaptive interpretation that can preserve, and potentially preclude the cinematic 






Section One: Autofilmic Testimony  
30 
 
Autobiography is more tellable because its purpose is to unpack the chaotic narrative of 
one’s experience, or, in other words, it is tellable because this is exactly its purpose: to 
make it tellable. 
Arnaud Schmitt  
2. Asserting the Testimonial I/Eye: Self-Witnessing as Autofilmic Testimony in 
Arirang, Tarnation and Blue  
Autobiographical and testimonial films are largely perceived to be the remit of 
documentary forms, a view that is attributable to the “implicit contract” that documentaries 
construct between the filmmaker and the viewer, which is underpinned by the dialogic 
offer and expectation of “truthful representation” (Plantinga, 2010: p. xiv).The 
documentary contract echoes the invitational rhetoric of autobiography and testimony, 
installing the viewer as a willing witness to the events and experience conveyed on film. 
When the filmmaker becomes the subject of the documentary, the implicit contract 
invoked posits the viewer as witness to the filmmaker’s subjective truth, with the “offer of 
seeing” (Corner, 2008: p. 22) the film makes determined by the assertion of the filmic first-
person perspective of the autobiographical ‘I’. My conception of autofilmic testimony in this 
chapter combines approaches from autobiography, testimony, and documentary studies 
to analyse the ways in which Kim Ki-duk’s Arirang (2011), Jonathan Caouette’s Tarnation 
(2007), and Derek Jarman’s Blue (1993) assert the autobiographical ‘I’ in their films to 
instantiate the testimonial witnessing structure, as outlined in the introduction. I transpose 
Gilmore’s notion of the “limit case” (2001) from life writing to documentary forms to argue 
that the films analysed in this chapter interrogate the generic boundaries of documentary, 
whilst they simultaneously capitalise on the conventions and assertions of subjectivity and 
reflexivity that documentary practices afford to convey the testimonial truth of 
autobiographical experience as a filmic mode of self-witnessing.  
Self-witnessing is a dialogic process underpinned by an intersubjective agreement 
between a subject and a willing witness, much like the autobiographical pact between the 
autobiographical ‘I’ and the reader (Lejeune, 1989), as explained in the introduction. This 
proximate rhetoric (Gilmore, 2001) is predicated on the invitational dynamic of self-
referential narratives, whereby the subject shares the subjective truth of lived experience, 
and the other willingly accepts their invitation to bear witness to that truth. The films I 
designate autofilmic testimony issue the invitation by making clear their self-made and 
self-referential status, with the subject-filmmaker using recognisable autobiographical and 
documentary conventions to convey the filmic narrative’s subjective and testimonial 
premise. Literary “narratives of witness” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p 134) entreat ethical 
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and empathic engagement that necessitates a concerted referential effort, which requires 
the reader to read the testimonial context of the narrative and the narrated experience as 
real (see Schmitt, 2017 and Felman and Laub, 1992). Autofilmic testimonies can reduce 
this referential and reconciliatory effort, through the combined offer of “truth-telling” and 
“truth-showing” (Plantinga, 2010: p. xiv) that documentary forms make, as mobilised by 
the perceived “immediacy” and factuality (Chapman, 2009: p. 8) of the documentary 
mode. The autofilmic testimonies I analyse in this chapter take advantage of the reflexive, 
discursive and evidentiary aspects of documentary practices to convene the testimonial 
witnessing structure, whilst simultaneously exploiting the creativity and flexibility that filmic 
media permit. 
The autofilmic testimonies in this chapter demonstrate the ways that filmmaker-subjects 
use film as a vehicle for self-witnessing, and illustrate the ways in which film can capture 
the dimensions of autobiographical subjectivity on screen. My analysis of these films 
introduces key concepts such as performativity, empathy, relationality, embodiment, and 
voice, all of which inform the theoretical approach of Contemporary Cinematic I-
Witnessing, and the construction of a filmic autobiographical invitation to testimonial 
witnessing. Beginning with Arirang, I address the ways in which Kim self-consciously 
invokes and resists the designation documentary as an assertion of creative and 
testimonial agency. Kim offers a complex and performative model of self-witnessing within 
his autofilmic testimony, which illustrates the multilateral empathic potential afforded by 
filmic media, and the flexibility of documentary practices for rendering subjective truth on 
screen. In Tarnation, Johnathan Caouette posits self-witnessing within a relational 
construction, situating subjectivity and autobiographical experience within a familial 
context. Caouette makes use of found footage and photographic images to ‘cite’ the 
memory work of testimonial telling and to assist with the referential reconciliation of the 
autobiographical ‘I’. The final film, Blue, is a particularly radical example of autofilmic 
testimony, in which Derek Jarman purposely obfuscates the embodiment of 
autobiographical subjectivity in a deliberately political gesture. In Blue, Jarman mobilises 
voice and entreats multiple strategies of empathy to manifest an autobiographical 
invitation that requires significant referential and reconciliatory effort. Collectively, the films 
in this chapter outline and interrogate the parameters of autofilmic testimony to determine 
film viewership as ethical and empathic testimonial witnessing. 
Artistic Agency in Arirang 
Kim Ki-duk is an award-winning and prolific South Korean screenwriter, director and 
filmmaker who, after a near-fatal accident on one of his film sets in 2008, embarked upon 
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a self-imposed three-year hiatus from the filmmaking industry. During this time Kim 
withdrew from society, taking up residence in an isolated cabin at the foot of the South 
Korean mountains, where he made an entirely self-produced and self-reflexive feature-
length film entitled Arirang (2011). Arirang premiered at the Cannes Film Festival in 2011, 
dividing critics but ultimately winning the Un Certain Regard prize.4 The film documents 
Kim’s solipsistic attempt to process the trauma of the accident, in a self-interrogatory, 
testimonial project constructed in his preferred creative medium, using a Mark II digital 
camera. Often identified as a documentary, Kim’s film purposely interrogates the diametric 
relationship between fiction and nonfiction, whilst making use of recognisably 
documentary and first-person filmic practices to assert the autobiographical invitation to 
testimonial witnessing.     
From the outset, the viewer is alternately given “fly on the wall” (Chapman, 2009: p. 10) 
and first-person subjective perspectives into Kim’s daily routine, fashioned with a distinctly 
“raw documentary feel” through the use of “hand-held camerawork” (Chapman, 2009: p. 
15) in the establishing shots. The close quarters of the simple cabin Kim inhabits are 
shown through a mounted camera from various fixed positions, and a sense of 
containment conveyed from Kim’s first-person perspective as he navigates his sparse 
surroundings. These subjective techniques foster “intimacy”, which for Schmitt 
“corresponds to what is very personal and private” (2017: p. 151) in autobiographical 
narratives. This intimacy is further realised in the viewer’s seemingly uncensored access 
to Kim’s everyday “reality” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 122), which includes chopping wood, the 
consumption of basic meals cooked atop a simple furnace, and defecating outdoors in the 
snow. The film maintains “the look of a single-person-produced filmic autobiography” 
throughout, which for Gernalzick encompasses “purposely shaky hand-held camera 
images, fast pans, rough cuts [and] white noise on the soundtrack” (2006: p. 8), coupled 
with extreme close-ups of Kim’s face. The use of these recognisable conventions signals 
the first-person mode of address, through which the viewer is invited to bear witness to 
the conditions of Kim’s self-imposed exile. Aside from a cat, Kim is the singular focal 
subject of the film, leaving little doubt as to his status as the “target of empathy” (Schmitt, 
2017: p. 121) and the embodied autobiographical ‘I’ (Lejeune, 1989) as author, narrator 
and subject of the filmic discourse. Kim’s basic existence is asserted as autobiographical 
experience in a documentary style that conveys the implicit “generic agreements” (Lane, 
2002: p. 23) of the autobiographical mode and its cognate claim to subjective truth, which 
consequently installs the viewer as an intimate and unobtrusive witness (see Laub, 1992).  
 
4 Kim shared the prize with Andreas Dresen for Stopped on Track (2011). 
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Kim’s stoic environment is an appropriate setting for “the cultivation of an autobiographical 
conscience”, by which “one learns to be, and even strives for a sense of being, overseen” 
(Gilmore, 2001: p. 20). Following Foucault, Gilmore asserts that “autobiography can be 
viewed as a discipline, a self-study in surveillance” (p. 20), which for Kim entails a literal 
self-surveillance exercise enacted by turning the camera upon himself. As a filmmaker, 
Kim employs the creative medium with which he is most familiar to carry out his 
autobiographical act. From the isolation of his cabin, Kim’s act of self-witnessing emerges 
piecemeal, primarily through “intense monologues […] in front of the camera on a tripod” 
(Gernalzick, 2006: p. 8) in another recognisable convention of filmic autobiography. Kim’s 
film conforms to the typically masculine autobiographical archetype, whereby the camera, 
and subsequent autofilmic testimony, is “the mirror in which the individual reflects his own 
image” (Gusdorf, 1980: p. 33). Kim asserts his self-reflexive agenda to the camera – and 
the viewer – to formally issue the autobiographical invitation: “By filming myself, I want to 
confess my life. Myself as a director and as a human being. I am making a film about me” 
(10:57-11:13). This statement of autobiographical intent, which Kim frames as confession, 
clearly sets out his narrative focus and designates the individualistic autobiographical 
paradigm and testimonial context in which the film operates.  
 




Figure 1.2: The second Kim faces the subject Kim in the ‘interview’. 
The retrospective remit of autobiography coupled with the immediacy of the filmic form 
necessitates a narrative strategy that can reconcile the ‘present’ of the filmic discourse 
with the ‘past’ of the narrated experience. Schmitt argues “there is always a dilatory space 
between the event and the writing of the event”, which “creates a fundamental 
discrepancy between the experiencing-I and the narrating-I” (2017: p. 141). For Schmitt, 
the two ‘I’s are in “constant interaction” within the autobiographical narrative, as the author 
must represent the particularities of experience as it happened along with the impact that 
experience had and the way the experience is remembered (2017: p. 141). Kim attempts 
to address this discrepancy in the film by staging a dialogic self-interrogation, instating a 
performative narrative strategy to convey the particularities of experience in tandem with 
its ongoing impact. In a mid-close shot, Kim is seated in his tent opposite the camera, 
positioned at a slight angle to it, and looking out of shot to the right (16:47) (see Figure 
1.1). Then, from off screen, Kim’s voice asks “you like living in a tent out in the country? 
Do you? Say it. Living in a cabin so cold you need a tent inside?” (16:47-17:00). The 
rough cut reveals the source of the voice as a second Kim, with the editing giving the 
impression that they are seated opposite one another in the tent through an eyeline 
match; the second Kim has his hair tied up, looking out of shot to the left (17:01) (see 
Figure 1.2). The second Kim addresses the subject Kim by his “proper name” (Lejeune, 
1989: p. 20), one of Lejeune’s requisite referential anchors in an autobiographical text, 
before levelling questions that provide the viewer with significant experiential and 
contextual details. Kim literally “calls himself as witness for himself” (Gusdorf, 1980: p. 29) 
within the film, in line with his individualistic and masculine construction of the 
autobiographical narrative. The stylised ‘interaction’ between the two Kims offers the 
narrating ‘I’’s retrospective perspective on past experience, to articulate both the 
particularities, and the consequent impact of the events, in tandem, to effectively elide the 
narrative distance between the experiencing ‘I’ and the narrating ‘I’. As the exchange 
concludes, Kim addresses the second Kim: 
You, who questions me, you’re Kim Ki-duk too. Not the Kim Ki-duk I am 
now. You’re the natural Kim Ki-duk who’s looking at my life. Thank you for 
your questions […]. Thanks for the opportunity to talk. I really appreciate 
it. 
(38:41-39:10) 
Kim’s expression of gratitude serves to confirm that both sides of the interview-style 
exchange belong to him, making clear that the testimonial narrative refers to him as the 
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real, individual autobiographical subject, Kim Ki-duk. In addition, a third Kim watches the 
exchange on a monitor (see Figure 1.3), which further indicates the interactive scene’s 
construction, as the viewing Kim’s position outside of the interaction on screen suggests 
his overall authorial control. The viewing Kim can be read as what Leah Anderst calls “the 
viewing ‘I’” in her article ‘”I’VE SPENT A LOT OF TIME LOOKING at these images: The 
“Viewing 'I” in Contemporary Autobiographical Documentary’ (2013).5 For Anderst, the 
viewing ‘I’ “is a figure that stages or highlights the ambivalent movement, characteristic of 
many life narratives, between narrative coherence and the fragmentation of an 
autobiographical self” (Anderst, 2013, p. 223). Kim’s inclusion of an embodied viewing ‘I’ 
draws attention to not only the ‘constructedness’ of the filmic discourse, but also the 
representation of the autobiographical ‘I’ within the narrative, as multiple iterations of the 
self across time throughout the testimonial project. Kim’s fragmented representation of 
self/witness offers a paradoxically multiple and unilateral autobiographical narrative 
structure; he preserves the “dominant individualistic paradigm of male-authored 
autobiographical texts” (Benstock, 1988: pp. 7-8), and the self-made and self-reflexive 
construction of autofilmic testimony, whilst allowing for the necessary narrative 
convergence of the experiencing ‘I’, narrating ‘I’, and the viewing ‘I’. This performative 
narrative strategy is a sophisticated assertion of the autobiographical ‘I’ as self-witness 
within the testimonial narrative, whereby Kim is able to provide the testimonial truth of 
experience alongside an evaluative exploration of the impact of experience, all from his 
own subjective perspective.  
 
Figure 1.3: The viewing Kim watches the subject Kim on a monitor. 
In addition to the performative construction of the autobiographical ‘I’ on screen, the 
interview construction also highlights the second Kim’s function as a “coaxer/coercer” 
(Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 64) within the interaction, whose role is to prompt the subject 
 
5 The article’s title is presented here as it appears in the journal.  
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Kim’s testimonial account. Following Plummer, Smith and Watson explain that in relation 
to autobiographical narratives, a coaxer/coercer “is any person or institution or set of 
cultural imperatives that solicits or provokes people to tell their stories” (2010: p. 64), 
ranging from friends and relatives, to figures in more formal contexts like religious 
confession and legal testimony (2010: pp. 65-66). Kim’s self-imposed solitude denies the 
inclusion of a material coaxer within the autobiographical narrative, so he manifests one in 
the figure of himself, framing what is essentially his self-reflexive monologue as an 
‘interview’ between the id and the ego (Freud, 1923/1961) in a performative, binary 
expression of conflicted selfhood. The second Kim asks:  
What’s been up with you since 2008? Is it because of that accident while 
shooting Dream in a jail? That actress in the hanging scene? You went off 
to another cell and cried right? It was an accident. Bet you got scared. 
You never saw that coming. Seeing her hanging there scared you to 
death. But you ran up the ladder and saved her! Then what’s the 
problem? You think if you didn’t act fast, you could have killed someone 
whilst making a movie? Scares you to death thinking about it. That’s when 
you decided to quit making films? From that shock? Tell me you bastard!”  
(18:43-19:46)  
This performative narrative strategy brings the testimonial context into the filmic discourse, 
elaborating upon the events that led to Kim’s exile to provide historical framing for the 
narrative and reduce the referential labour for the viewer. In the reverse shot, the subject 
Kim is close to tears, silently wiping his eyes and avoiding the eyeline of the second Kim, 
as yet unable to directly articulate self-witness (19:46). As the second Kim continues his 
questioning, the subject Kim glances toward the camera, acknowledging the viewer as the 
“unobtrusively present” witness (Laub, 1992: p. 71) (see Figure 1.4) (21:10). Though the 
interview construction between the two versions of the autobiographical subject draws 
attention to its artifice within the formal documentary context of the film, it invokes a 
distinctly documentary convention:  
the talking head, and the interviewee’s testimony are traditionally seen as 
being at documentary’s cognitive heart, the powerhouse of claims to any 
‘reality effect’ and very much concerned with conveying specific 
information and ideas.  
(Cox, 2018: pp. 4-5) 
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The ‘interview’ functions at three different levels within the filmic discourse: to coax the 
autobiographical and testimonial narrative from the subject, as a vehicle for introducing 
the testimonial context delivered by the second Kim, and to simultaneously install and 
interrogate the ‘reality effect’ of a recognisably documentary convention.  
 
Figure 1.4: The subject Kim acknowledges the camera/viewer. 
In Arirang, Kim’s self-witnessing testimony articulates the effects of the Dream incident on 
his career, whilst also revealing the ongoing impact of the traumatic event upon his 
psyche. The second Kim, in the role of the interviewer described above, states “I hate to 
see you like this […]. You’ve been traumatised […]. You’re still in shock. Right?” (20:20-
22:02). When Kim eventually responds to the second Kim’s coaxing, he concedes:  
There’s nothing I can say. What would I say? That there was an accident 
during that film shoot. What meaning would that film have? And because 
of that trauma, I can look back on life, on how I’ve been making films. And 
think about what to do from now on.  
(25:30-27:02)  
Kim goes on to reveal that he still feels responsible for almost causing the actress to lose 
her life for his artistic vision; he blames himself for making unethical creative decisions 
and for always striving for “realistic details” (27:41) in his films. The revelation of trauma 
underscores the filmic narrative’s self-witnessing function, which emphasises the ethical 
and empathic imperative of the testimonial witnessing structure. The subject Kim’s initial 
silence under the second Kim’s intense questioning is indicative of testimony’s innate 
tension; for Gilmore, “the subject of trauma refers to both a subject struggling to make 
sense of an overwhelming experience in a particular context and the unspeakability of 
trauma itself” in terms of trauma’s “resistance to representation” (p. 46).6 The struggle for 
 
6 See also Caruth, 1995 and Felman and Laub, 1992. 
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Kim is determined by the need to process and articulate trauma, whilst unable to find an 
outlet, or witness, that will enable him to do so. The Dream incident is identified as the 
impetus for Kim’s creative crisis and subsequent withdrawal from society; he states: 
“Making films was a happy job for me. But suddenly… It was like I got hit with a hammer 
then” (35:38) quantifying the impact of the experience in terms of a physical blow. The 
‘impact’ of the traumatic incident on Kim leaves him unable to make films, which makes 
him ‘unhappy’, but his three-year abstinence from filmmaking perpetuates his 
unhappiness. In ‘Truth and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle’ (1995), Laub refers 
to the testimony of a female Holocaust survivor who participated in his Fortunoff Video 
Archive interviews (p. 64); he describes the way the survivor experienced, and ultimately 
perpetuated, a sense of social detachment in the years afterwards. Her ongoing struggle 
with the desire to articulate experience, coupled with her inability to effectively relate to 
others, resulted in what Laub describes as the survivor’s “self-inflicted emotional 
imprisonment” (p. 64). Though his original trauma is of a different order, Kim’s struggle is 
similarly perpetuated and self-imposed, as his elective exile precludes the necessary 
testimonial process that could liberate him from his ongoing ordeal. Kim evaluates this 
existential stasis at a later point in the monologue: “whether I live pitifully in this shack, or 
make a big hit film and get so happy I can’t sleep […]. There’s no big difference. We live 
by the law of inertia” (48:28-50). Kim fails to realise that the inertia he perceives is 
exacerbated by his withdrawal, and further determined by his lack of a creative and 
testimonial outlet.  
Laub explains that testimony is a “process of exploration and reconciliation” (1995: p. 74) 
through which the subject is able to assimilate the ‘world’ before trauma with their 
circumstances in the present in order to liberate themselves from the perpetual struggle 
(Laub, 1995: p. 70). In a meandering response to his shadow – another performative 
incarnation of selfhood – Kim identifies the “need for time to get over the pain”, to “hate 
then forgive” (1:01:58), which speaks to the necessary processing and reconciliation of 
traumatic experience. For Kim, emancipating himself from the film industry was a failed 
attempt to “work through” (LaCapra, 2014: p. 47) trauma, which he eventually achieves in 
the production of his autofilmic testimony, as an artistic outlet for self-witnessing. In line 
with Laub’s notion of reconciliation, Gilmore asserts that “trauma […] always exists within 
complicated histories”, which means that self-witnessing “entails contextualizing [trauma] 
within history” (2001: p. 31). Accordingly, the self-witnessing narrative that emerges in 
Arirang depicts Kim conducting a retrospective and autobiographical evaluation of his life 
prior to the Dream incident, focusing primarily on his work and relationships, which he 
considers inextricably linked. In an introspective monologue, the subject Kim muses:  
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Basically, if I sum up my life in a word, I think it’s loneliness up to this 
point. I didn’t have any friends in school. My only friend was a mixed kid 
people despised […]. Whether there were people around me, I was 
basically a lonely person. 
(45:42-46:29)  
This observation echoes the sentiment of an earlier reflective moment, in which Kim 
recalls his life before filmmaking, when he “always felt lonely and sorry for [himself]” 
(34:27). Kim’s self-exploration reveals that he has always had difficulties forging 
relationships and relating to others, but that through film he found “a way of 
communication” (52:08), and built relationships with co-workers that felt “like family” 
(23:51) for him. The loss of those relationships, and the concurrent exclusion of his 
chosen creative and communicative outlet, are two important factors in Kim’s inability to 
liberate himself from trauma. Furthermore, Kim’s filmmaking career is central to his sense 
of self; his frustration at his self-imposed loss of agency and identity manifest in the 
statement “I want to film to show that I am still a director” (57:06). Kim elaborates on his 
earlier statement of autobiographical intent, cited above, in a series of conflicting claims:  
I can’t make a film so I’m filming myself. My life right now is a 
documentary and a drama. I’m the actor now. That’s what I think films are. 
A truth. […] I’m filming myself into a drama right now. People may call this 
a documentary, but I think it is a drama.  
(55:24-56:15) 
Kim specifically addresses the tension underlying the process of making Arirang, between 
the subjective truth of self-witness and the expression of traumatic experience, 
acknowledging the critical tendency to classify film as diametrically documentary or 
drama, non-fiction or fiction. However, Kim’s evaluation is particularly telling, as it is also 
revealing of his traumatised reluctance for realism, which underwrites the narrative 
complexity of the film. For Kim, filmmaking is an important aspect of his identity, which he 
seeks to reassert through his autofilmic testimony. However, he remains aware of the 
industry critique his film will inevitably attract, and this anxiety underpins his desire – and 
reluctance – to return to filmmaking. Sociologist, Erving Goffman describes the existential 
tension underlying attempts to convey selfhood to others: 
the individual may attempt to induce the audience to judge him […] in a 
particular way, and he may seek this judgement as an ultimate end in 
itself, and yet he may not completely believe that he deserves the 
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valuation of self which he asks for or that the impression of reality which 
he fosters is valid.  
(1990: p. 32)  
Whilst refusing to designate the film a documentary, Kim readily deploys recognisably 
documentary conventions to underpin the testimonial claim to subjective truth inherent in 
the process of self-witnessing. At the same time, Kim attempts to reassert the lost artistic 
authority that defines his professional identity as a filmmaker through Arirang. 
Consequently, and in spite of all narrative and contextual indications to the contrary, Kim 
attempts to moderate his autobiographical invitation – whilst paradoxically invoking the 
testimonial tenor of documentary – in his attempt to subtend generic distinctions and 
reassert his creative agency as intrinsic to his liberation through the self-witnessing 
process.  
In working through his traumatic experience towards a return to filmmaking, Kim 
reconciles his past with his present by engaging with his own films, watching them on his 
laptop inside his tent. Kim is overcome with emotion as he watches yet another version of 
himself onscreen, this time as the male protagonist, a monk, in his own feature Spring, 
Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring (2003). The monk undertakes an arduous pilgrimage 
to the top of a mountain, climbing through snowy woodland whilst carrying a heavy effigy, 
dragging a circular stone that is tied to his waist behind him. The scene is intercut with 
closely-framed shots of Kim watching intently, wrapped protectively in a blanket; as the 
monk struggles on screen, Kim begins to weep, progressing to convulsive sobs and high-
pitched wails of despair. This complex “scene of empathy” (Plantinga, 1999) illustrates the 
numerous ways in which autofilmic testimony can prompt and sustain the 
phenomenological invitation to ‘feel with’ the autobiographical subject in the act of 
testimonial witnessing. Plantinga explains that “facial expressions in film not only 
communicate emotion, but also elicit, clarify and strengthen affective response – 
especially empathetic response” (1999: p. 240). He further argues that these responses 
are mobilised “through the processes of affective mimicry, facial feedback, and emotional 
contagion” (Plantinga, 1999: p. 240) as related to our human ability to read and 
communicate with other people. Plantinga draws on theoretical approaches from the 
behavioural sciences to describe the “core of pancultural similarities for the expression 
and recognition of basic emotions” (p. 242) on the human face, which allow and 
encourage empathic engagement as part of the communicative process. He further 
references the work of film scholars Noël Carrol and Ed Branigan to explain the way that 
film narratives capitalise on viewers’ ability to ‘read’ faces, and encourage us to reconcile 
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filmic editing techniques that imply proximity to determine the cause and effect of the 
emotional states of the characters represented on screen (p. 241). For Plantinga, the 
scene of empathy comprises “extended closeups of emoting faces” (p. 244), either in 
isolation or within a point-of-view structure, which, together with “narrative context” (p. 
251) prompt viewers to respond empathically.  This empathy, Plantinga explains, entails 
responding “congruently” (p. 245) as opposed to sharing the same emotions as the film 
character, characterised by a shared “orientation” (p. 245) – or feeling with. Plantinga’s 
understanding of empathy accords with Schmitt’s, who explains that acceptance of the 
autobiographical invitation entails “empathic relation”, which involves “acknowledging [the 
subject’s] horrifying reality” and “believing him” (original italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 110). 
Accordingly, the scene of empathy in Arirang, described above, invites empathic 
engagement in a number of ways. Initially, the viewer shares in Kim’s viewing experience, 
by watching him watching the monk suffering through his pilgrimage. Kim’s emotional 
response to the film can be read as his own empathic engagement with the film character, 
the monk, for whom Kim experiences congruent emotions that relate to his perception of 
the character’s hardship within the fictional narrative. However, the narrative context, as 
determined by Arirang’s self-witnessing agenda, invites the viewer to feel with the 
autobiographical subject Kim, for whom the film he is watching represents his former 
happiness as a filmmaker, which he wishes to regain. There are a number of subtextual 
cues in the first half of Arirang that prompt the viewer to reconcile the monk’s solipsistic 
journey with Kim’s isolated self-witnessing project, namely the close shots of Kim’s 
cracked heels and the snow-covered hillsides in the establishing shots, which are mirrored 
in the scenes he watches from Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring. Nevertheless, 
whether Kim’s tears belong to his own sorrow, or to his empathic response to the film 
character, or to the perceived similitude between the monk’s plight and his own, Kim’s 
demonstrative desolation on screen is undeniably affecting; the close shots of Kim’s face 
and his seemingly credible outpouring of emotion convey recognisable sadness, which 
prompts congruent emotions in the viewer through affect contagion and facial mimicry. 
But, most significantly, the scene of empathy extends Kim’s phenomenological, 
autobiographical invitation to ‘feel with’ him to the viewer in their role as willing, ethical and 
empathic witness, as he shares the reality of his testimonial process.     
The film’s final scenes take the testimonial narrative to a creative and metaphorical 
extreme, in which Kim achieves reconciliation and liberation by exercising his artistic 
agency. The extended scene of empathy represents a turning point for Kim within the film, 
after which he emerges from the struggle of his self-imposed exile to ‘execute’ three 
unseen figures in the city. The documentary aesthetic is retained throughout, as close, 
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subjective shots show Kim crafting a pistol; however, the truth-telling program of the film is 
progressively subverted, as Kim drives through the night to shoot three unseen targets. At 
the sites of the first two shootings, the viewer is denied the proximity heretofore afforded 
throughout the film, as Kim exits the car at each location, leaving the camera – and the 
viewer – in the vehicle’s passenger seat. At each location, the viewer sees an unsteady, 
hand-held shot of the exterior of a building, before a single gunshot is heard and Kim 
returns to the car. At the third location, the subjective perspective is reinstated, and the 
viewer accompanies Kim into a building, hearing his footsteps as he descends the stairs 
(1:25:46). The gun comes into shot from the right of the frame, and the triggers is pulled, 
but once again, neither Kim nor the target are visible (1:25:53). On returning to his vehicle, 
Kim exhales heavily, with the same relief he displayed after watching Spring, Summer, 
Fall, Winter… and Spring (1:19:20), which likens his unseen actions with his earlier 
emotional release, framing both encounters as equally cathartic. Kim then disarms the 
pistol and places it in the centre console before driving away (1:26:08). When he returns 
to the cabin, Kim positions himself once more in front of the mounted camera, breathing 
heavily with wet hair, staring directly into the lens. The reverse shot is from Kim’s 
subjective perspective, and the blurred image comes into focus to reveal that the gun is 
mounted in place of the camera (1:26:52). This subjective reverse-shot construction is 
repeated, before Kim gives the directorial instruction “Ready! Action!” (1:27:15), his last 
words on screen echoing his first. After the cut, the close-up shows Kim’s hand pulling on 
a taught wire, which, as the following shot discloses, controls the gun’s firing mechanism 
(1:27:19); the close framing of the weapon mirrors the earlier scene in which Kim pulled 
the trigger on the unseen target (1:25:53). The gun shot accompanies a jump-cut to an 
image of a wooden crate, painted with a figure riding a ‘haetae’ (1:27:21).7 The haetae is a 
mythical creature that symbolises law and justice in Korean mythology (Choi, 2005); 
however, Chongko Choi points out that in contemporary cultural understanding, the 
haetae is an emblem of protection, as “a good animal that prevents disasters” (2005: p. 
38). In ‘Narrating Pain: The Power of Catharsis’ (2007), Richard Kearney explores the use 
of myths and “the cathartic function of fictional narratives” (2007: p. 57), drawing on the 
work of Aristotle, Claude Levi-Strauss and Lisa Schnell to describe the “purgative release” 
(2007: p. 59) from trauma that fictional narratives can offer. For Kearney, “what cannot be 
solved historically […] can be resolved fictionally” (p. 54) through the cathartic and 
“equilibrating function” (p. 54) of narrative. In Arirang, the executions Kim carries out offer 
catharsis through fictional, narrative restitution, whereby he is able to exorcise those he 
 
7 The haetae is also found in Chinese folklore, spelled xiezhi, and is similarly associated 
with notions of justice. 
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feels have come between him and his liberation from traumatised inertia, including 
himself. Kim invokes both the image and the myth of the haetae, to underscore the sense 
of ‘justice’ his fictional actions afford. The final ‘shot’, which plays on the synonymy of the 
verb’s use in videography and the firing of weapons, signifies resolution, as the elimination 
of the traumatised self, and the ultimate reassertion of agency through filmmaking.  
The coda to the autofilmic testimony confirms Kim’s liberation and reconciliation, 
concluding the film with a final assertion of creative and narrative authority. The viewer 
shares Kim’s subjective viewpoint as he drives away from his isolation, followed by an 
unsteady pan of his paintings, with an intertitle that reads: “Paintings drawn in 1990, in 
Cap d’Agde, France” (1:28:01). The photographic montage that follows shows Kim in 
various candid poses, at press conferences, on film sets, and winning awards; these shots 
are complemented by stills from some of his films (1:29:10-1:30:13). The raw audio that 
accompanies these final scenes is Kim’s titular refrain: the folksong ‘Arirang’. These final 
scenes echo a reflective episode in the middle of the film (40:40-41:47), where Kim 
drunkenly sings Arirang in front of the camera, intercut with shaky panning shots of his 
paintings, film posters and scripts hanging in a sparse basement. Kim explains the song’s 
meaning: “when I sing this song, I can understand it all […]. It means self-realisation” 
(41:48-42:16), claiming that for him, the song’s lyrics represent the inevitable ups and 
downs of life. Within the film’s testimonial context, the song comes to signify the process 
of self-witness, through which Kim explores, reflects upon, and reconciles his traumatically 
inflected autobiographical experience. The final sequence of images coupled with Kim’s 
singing draws together the ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ of Kim’s narrative of witness, to 
underline the testimonial function of the film and emphasise the reconciliation of the 
fragmented autobiographical subject. The ultimate inscription of narrative authority and 
autobiographical subjectivity is contained within the singular, hand-painted title-card that 
bears only Kim’s name (1:30:14), closing the autofilmic testimony with a paratextual 
reference to real, liberated Kim Ki-duk who continues to exist beyond the filmic frame. 
***      
In Arirang, Kim uses the recognisable subjective conventions of filmic autobiography and 
documentary to install the intimacy of his autobiographical invitation, whilst refusing 
generic distinction in the testimonial narrative. Instead, Kim chooses to articulate self-
witnessing through individualistic, creative and performative narrative strategies that 
enable him to explore and evaluate his experience in a typically masculine 
autobiographical project. The multiple iterations of the subject on screen convey the 
fragmented psyche of a traumatised subject, whilst simultaneously converging the 
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autobiographical ‘I’ to convey a unified, introspective and retrospective account of his 
career and relationships. Kim’s testimonial truth emerges through stylised coaxing, to 
contextualise his solipsistic withdrawal from filmmaking as the self-imposed perpetuation 
of traumatised inertia. With the viewer as his requisite unobtrusive and willing witness, 
Kim articulates the reconciliatory process of self-realisation, inviting empathic engagement 
through unguarded, emotional episodes that are intensified by the filmic narrative mode. 
For Kim, the production of his autofilmic testimony is a necessarily creative and cathartic 
expression of self-witnessing, through which he is able to work through traumatic 
experience to reassert his lost creative agency. Kim’s return to filmmaking in the years 
since Arirang’s release attests to his definitive liberation from the artistic and existential 
struggle he overcomes in his autofilmic testimony. 
Testimonial Textures in Tarnation  
Aspiring actor and filmmaker Jonathan Caouette’s first film, Tarnation premiered at MIX 
NYC in 2003 before an edited version was screened at the Sundance Film Festival in 
2004. The latter version of Caouette’s “weirdly beautiful, cubist act of self-exploration” 
(Foundas, 2004) was invited to Cannes, where it received two nominations in the Golden 
Camera and C.I.C.A.E. Award categories. The film went on to win numerous awards on 
the festival circuit, including the British Film Institute’s Sutherland Trophy (2004) and the 
National Society of Film Critics award for Best Non-Fiction Film (2005). Caouette’s 
autofilmic testimony primarily focuses upon his relationship with his mother, whilst 
exploring childhood trauma and mental illness with reference to his own family history. 
According to Anna Poletti, Jonathan Caouette “expands upon and continues the tradition 
of personal documentary filmmaking” (2012: p. 160) to effectively convey autobiographical 
experience within a relationally constructed and contextually discursive narrative 
continuum. In addition to subjective and reflexive documentary practices, Caouette 
incorporates an amalgamation of found footage taken from home videos, family 
photographs and answering machine messages to construct a multimedial, first-person 
perspective with an evidentiary aspect. Tarnation provides an overview of Caouette’s 
childhood with reference to the instability caused by his mother’s mental health issues, to 
evaluate the ongoing impact of his mother’s condition on his life and self-formation. As 
autofilmic testimony, Tarnation illustrates the ways in which self-witnessing in film can 
convey the relational and familial context of autobiographical experience. Furthermore, 
Caouette’s use of multimedial and intertextual citations evince the memory work of 
testimonial telling, to assist with the viewer’s referential reconciliation of the 
autobiographical ‘I’ within and through the text.    
45 
 
Where Arirang advances a solipsistic model of self-witnessing, Caouette’s Tarnation 
elucidates self-witness within a relational and familial model, where the context of his 
“social frame” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 11) is intrinsic to his testimonial account. In his book The 
Autobiographical Documentary in America, Jim Lane claims “The story of the filmmaker’s 
life, who that filmmaker is, emerges in relation to the mosaic of the family as 
autobiography encompasses the biography of the family” (2002, p. 95-6), whilst Judith 
Butler asserts that “the ‘I’ has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation – or 
set of relations – to a set of norms” (2005: p. 8). For Caouette, the filmic articulation of the 
testimonial I/eye entails an autobiographical narrative that emerges within his family 
dynamic, which, as the film reveals, is largely at odds with the traditional, hegemonic 
standard. The scenes that introduce the familial context of his autobiographical act show 
chronologically sequential photographs of Caouette’s grandparents, Rosemary and 
Adolph Davis, as well as their daughter, Renee, as a child, whilst the intertitles narrate a 
traditional family history: 
Once upon a time in a small Texas town in the early 1950s, a very good 
man met a very good woman… The man, Adolph and the woman, 
Rosemary… fell in love and got married. They had a beautiful daughter, 
Renee. Everything in their lives was bright, happy and promising.  
(08:11-08:49) 
Caouette invokes the fairy-tale introduction to imply the normative and optimistic familial 
standard that his testimonial account eventually subverts, but which also provides familial 
and contextual background information for the viewer within the filmic discourse. This 
narrative strategy establishes both the “positionality” and “relationality” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 215) of Caouette’s autobiographical narrative, which determine his 
autobiographical “subject position” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 215). Smith and Watson 
explain that positionality “designates how speaking subjects take up, inhabit, and speak 
through” particular cultural and historical “discourses of identity” (2010: p. 215), whilst 
relationality refers to the way that autobiographical narratives interact and intersect with 
the biographies of relational others (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 216).8 In the sequence 
quoted above, Caouette offers contextual framing for his self-reflexive project, to convey 
the historical and geographical details of narrative positionality, whilst asserting the 
relational structure of his autobiographical act of self-witnessing.    
 
8 See also Eakin (2008 and 1999) and Miller (2007). I examine relationality more closely in 
Chapter Four in the discussion of auto/biographical narratives. 
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The testimonial agenda of Caouette’s film is revealed through the autobiographical 
narrative’s relational dynamic, which focusses primarily on his relationship with his 
mother, Renee Le Blanc. Renee is the first person to be revealed on screen, and her 
name is listed first in the film’s opening credits, which makes her central role clear from 
the outset and designates her a “significant other” within Caouette’s autobiographical 
narrative. For Smith and Watson, significant others are those “through whom the narrator 
understands her or his own self-formation” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 86), as key 
figures within the subject’s autobiographical experience. After establishing the familial 
context in the sequence described earlier, Renee’s past dominates the narrative, as 
Caouette goes on to disclose the circumstances that caused the idyllic family structure to 
break down. Caouette reveals that his mother fell from the roof of her house as a child, 
resulting in a period of paralysis that ultimately led to a course of electroshock therapy 
(10:02); this incident is foregrounded as the catalyst for Renee’s lifelong struggle with 
mental illness, which underpins the film’s relational testimonial narrative. Caouette uses 
intertitles to explain that in the years after the fall, Renee was frequently hospitalised for 
psychiatric treatment (11:27), further stating that her psychosis made her both erratic and 
vulnerable, with traumatic consequences for them both:  
In the winter of 1977 […] Renee, in a psychotic state, took Jonathan to 
Chicago with no money and no place to stay. They immediately 
encountered trouble. Renee was raped in front of Jonathan by a man who 
picked them up off the street.   
(12:00-12:40) 
Renee’s rape and her subsequent psychological deterioration led to her further 
institutionalisation, which meant Caouette was taken into foster care (13:09). But, whilst 
Caouette’s grandparents fought for custody of him, he suffered “extreme emotional and 
physical abuse” (13:57) at the hands of his foster parents, which went on for two years. In 
that time, Renee was subjected to more electro-shock therapy, which permanently altered 
her “personality” and “state of mind” (14:26-14:46). Caouette reports these related events 
in tandem to emphasise the connection between his mother’s traumatic experience and 
his own, which makes her testimonial narrative intrinsic to his act of self-witnessing.   
Autobiographical and testimonial accounts that include intimate biographical details 
require a sensitive and ethical approach, particularly in cases that reference the lives of 
“vulnerable subjects” (Couser, 2004). G. Thomas Couser defines vulnerable subjects as 
those who may be unable to vouch for themselves, including minors, and those with 
significant impairments or disabilities, stating their inability “to offer meaningful consent” as 
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a particularly ethical concern (2004: p. xii). He further emphasises the “urgent need for 
ethical scrutiny” in “intimate life writing”, which involves the representation of family 
members or romantic partners (2004: p. xii), asking “what are the author’s responsibilities 
to those whose lives are used as ‘material’?” (2004: p. 34).9 This question is especially 
complex in Tarnation, as the inclusion of his close family – especially his mother – is 
fundamental to Caouette’s self-witnessing project. Renee’s inclusion within the film’s 
testimonial narrative is fundamentally problematic due to her history of trauma and mental 
illness, which make her particularly vulnerable. Caouette incorporates Renee’s personal 
testimony in a relational and dialogic structure by staging interviews, which, as explained 
in my analysis of Arirang, are a documentary convention with connotations of reality and 
truth. Renee is depicted as both a reluctant and unreliable self-witness, as her verbal 
accounts waiver between seemingly lucid candour and outright denial. When Caouette 
questions Renee about the fall, she becomes frustrated and walks out of the closely 
framed shot (1:04:18-1:04:24). After the cut, Renee refuses another of Caouette’s 
interview questions, when he asks about her memories of the time she spent in 
psychiatric facilities (1:04:24-1:04:36). Caouette can be heard from behind the camera 
encouraging Renee’s co-operation, whilst he quickly turns the camera to follow her 
through the apartment, asking: “will you please just help me with my stupid film?” 
(1:04:45). These scenes posit Caouette as a “coaxer/coercer” (Smith and Watson, 2010: 
p. 64) (as explained with reference to Arirang, above), as he tries to encourage Renee’s 
personal account. But, Caouette’s self-witnessing agenda dominates the filmic discourse, 
as from Renee’s former position in front of the camera, he levels “You know, I’d like to find 
out a few things about myself too” (1:05:43). This exchange exemplifies the tension 
implicit in what Couser calls “collaborative autobiography”, which he deems “oxymoronic” 
(2004: p. 35). Couser explains: “although the process by which the text is produced is 
dialogic, the product is monological” because “[t]he dialogue is managed and presented 
by one party, the nominal author” (2004: p. 35). This tension is further evinced when 
Renee takes control of the camera to film Caouette; Caouette literally exerts his narrative 
authority by remonstrating with Renee over her handling of his camera, before physically 
reclaiming the equipment and his narrative authority (1:12:00-05). In Tarnation, Renee’s 
elocutions are both prompted and deliberately positioned within the film’s narrative to 
support and sustain Caouette’s own self-reflexive and testimonial point-of-view. 
Consequently, Caouette’s attempt to present his mother’s testimony in tandem with his 
 
9 I focus on the issues pertaining to the representation of vulnerable subjects in Chapter Three, 




own is overshadowed by the self-witnessing agenda of his autofilmic testimony, which, 
though relationally constructed, is ultimately and necessarily self-interested.  
The most obvious assertion of Caouette’s self-reflexive and autobiographical focus is the 
prevalence of his own image within the filmic discourse. Amongst a plethora of often 
fleeting intertextual images, the most pervasive are those that depict Caouette himself, as 
a visual inscription of embodied autobiographical subjectivity. The profusion of 
photographic and videographic images of Caouette are indicative of his narrative 
sovereignty, serving as a constant reminder for the viewer of his status as the 
autobiographical subject and empathic target of the autofilmic testimony. Much like Kim in 
Arirang, Caouette capitalises on the affective and empathic potential of closely framed 
shots of his face, in a recurrent autofilmic posture that sees the subject returning the 
viewer’s gaze, to which I will return. As Anna Poletti and others have observed, Caouette 
“expands upon and continues the tradition of personal documentary filmmaking” (2012: p. 
160),10 by reappropriating images of himself from “inherently intimate” (2012: p. 164) 
home videos. The intimacy suggested by Caouette’s use of “archival documents” (Poletti, 
2012: p. 160) is predicated on the “connotative relationship to the private sphere as a site 
of production and viewing” that home videos imply (p. 163), which refers to the fact that 
they are often made and consumed in familial settings as “’home truths’” (p. 164). By 
allowing the viewer access to such personal footage in the film, Caouette provides 
multiple images of himself as the embodied subject, whilst simultaneously establishing the 
required intimacy for empathic engagement. His intertextual narrative strategy invites the 
ethical and empathic mode of viewership that equates to testimonial witnessing, with an 
offer of verification and authenticity inscribed by the personal and archival qualities of the 
“‘cited’” (Poletti, 2012: p. 167) footage.   
The use of multimedial artefacts in Tarnation is a characteristically autobiographical and 
documentary practice, which speaks to the truthful and “veridical” (Plantinga, 2010: p. xiv) 
offer of showing and telling that autofilmic testimony issues. But, Caouette’s intertextual 
narrative approach also communicates the way in which he reconciles the narrated ‘I’ of 
the testimonial narrative (product) with the narrating ‘I’ of the documentary endeavour 
(process). In Caouette’s case, the narrating ‘I’ is emphatically asserted as the viewing ‘I’, 
which Anderst describes as “a self born from the autobiographer's encounter with images, 
a self that thinks through and analyzes the very processes of life narrative by pausing over 
images” (Anderst, 2013: p. 215). Caouette’s identity as both a filmmaker and an 
autobiographical subject emerges through his relationship with the camera, and through 
 
10 See also Anderst, 2013; Orgeron and Orgeron, 2007, Renov, 2008, and Scott, 2004. 
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the videos and photographs he has taken, viewed, and reinserted into the testimonial 
narrative. Where Kim inhabits multiple roles within his autofilmic testimony, using 
fragmented, performative iterations of the self to construct a coherent, dialogic narrative, 
Caouette both cites images of the “‘real’ or historical ‘I’” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 72) 
and situates his narrating ‘I’ within the filmic discourse at the same time. In other words, 
the various archival and documentary images of Caouette represent subjectivity at 
different times within the narrated autobiographical experience, to show how he engages 
with his past in the process of constructing his testimony. For Anderst, the videos and 
photographs Caouette uses “function as technologies of memory” (2013: p. 225), which 
are both reviewed and inserted into the film as ‘real’ records of self and experience. In 
Anderst’s discussion of Tarnation, she draws on Patricia Hampl’s work on 
autobiographical filmmaking, which describes the genre as “preoccupied not with telling a 
life story but with conveying perception itself, with searching for the peculiar character of 
the perceiving consciousness" (1996: p. 56), which accords with Schmitt’s assertion that 
“since autobiography stems from experience, [the autobiographer’s] very peculiar 
experiential nature matters” (2017: p. 128). The way Caouette assembles the home-video 
footage and photographs, along with audio recordings, clips from television and film, and 
popular songs, reflects the dissociative condition he defines in the film. The frenetic, 
collage effect of seemingly disparate images and audio conveys the ‘perceiving 
consciousness’ of his viewing ‘I’ through the spectrum of Caouette’s “depersonalization 
disorder” (22:26), which is described onscreen as “persistent or recurrent episodes of 
feeling detached from, and as if one is an outside observer of, one’s mental processes or 
body (feeling like one is in a dream)” (22:27). Speaking of the section of film accompanied 
by his audio diary from autumn 1986, the time he was hospitalised after accidentally 
ingesting PCP, Caouette reflects in the director’s commentary that he “let the sound sort 
of choose where the photographs and footage would go” (26:45). The images displayed 
depict Caouette confronting the camera’s gaze, whilst physically battling a manic, 
emotional episode, pulling at his face and hair, intercut with a poised, pre-teen Jonathan 
who is smoking a cigarette in an oversized blazer (25:35). The photomontage is 
foregrounded against images of severed, bloody limbs representative of the underlying 
detachment Caouette articulates in his audio diary, which connects the otherwise 
incongruent layers of imagery. Antony Rowland argues:  
Testimony can only be performed through form and genre, and poetic 
forms are adept – particularly in the lyric – at conveying the epiphanic 
moment, truncated traumatic recollections, silences beyond the black print, 
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and the emotive space that need not be repressed behind the supposed 
objectivity of testimonial facts.  
(2014: pp. 4-5) 
Caouette’s “lyrical use of editing” (Anderst, 2013: p. 235), in the above examples and 
throughout Tarnation, allows him to convey the “epiphanic moment[s] of witnessing” 
(Rowland, 2014: p. 5) inherent in testimonial narratives. Tarnation’s multimedial, audio-
visual mosaic construction is indicative of Caouette’s perception of autobiographical 
experience, how it is re-viewed, reviewed and reassembled in the film, and consequently 
shared with the viewer as personal, if not necessarily coherent, subjective truth.   
Scott McCloud’s model from Understanding Comics (1993) offers another useful approach 
to ‘reading’ Tarnation as autofilmic testimony, providing practical means for the 
interpretation of Caouette’s multimodal imagery and often frenetic narrative structure as a 
kinetic form of “sequential art” (Eisner in McCloud, 1993: p. 5). Although Tarnation is a 
motion picture, it is chockfull of photomontages, panels of images, and short video clips, 
which can be read as referential “concepts” and representative “icons” (McCloud, 1993), 
all of which are spliced together by sequential edits and anchored by intertitles in a 
progressive visual story. These edits can be perceived as “gutters” (McCloud, 1993: p. 
66), that invite the viewer to reconcile – or ‘close’ – the gaps in the narrative. For example, 
Caouette has no footage of his time in foster care, yet it is important for him to present a 
visual to accompany the narrative intertitles that necessarily describe this significant and 
traumatic period of his life. To address this, Caouette presents footage of his own young 
son, Joshua, as a toddler sandwiched between photographs of himself at a similar age 
(13:40-14:08); the edits encourage “closure” (McCloud, 1993: p. 63) that makes the series 
of images appear to be representative of Caouette in his infancy. The viewer is able to 
reconcile this image as Caouette due to his editing – which acts as a gutter – where 
“human imagination takes two separate images and transforms them into a single idea” 
(McCloud, 1993: p. 66). Similarly, Caouette posits footage of a woman having a bite-plate 
placed into her mouth intercut with multiple snapshots of his mother, flickering between 
images of Renee and the anonymous woman with electrical visual and audio effects as an 
ancillary for Renee’s shock treatment (15:34-15:56). By supplementing representative 
imagery in place of authentic, autobiographical artefacts within the collage construction of 
his autofilmic testimony, Caouette is able to address the inarticulability of traumatic 
experience, and “its resistance to representation” (Gilmore, 2001: p. 45). The testimonial 
context and the ethical and empathic parameters of the testimonial witnessing structure 
encourage the viewer to either overlook, or ‘close’ these referential inconsistencies as a 
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condition of bearing witness. By inviting the viewer to engage with the aspects of his 
testimonial truth that are most resistant to narrative representation, Caouette remains true 
to the agenda of self-witnessing in spite of his creative management of visual materials. 
 
Figure 1.5: Caouette performing ‘Hilary’ in a home-video. 
In addition to the explicitly constructed sequences in Tarnation, Caouette conveys the 
testimonial truth of traumatic experience in a number of performative and intertextual ways 
that rely upon the viewer’s referential and reconciliatory effort. One scene in particular has 
received significant critical and academic attention, namely the home-video footage of 
Caouette’s characterisation of “Hilary Chapman Laura-Lou Garia” (15:59) at the age of 
eleven (Anderst, 2013; Poletti, 2012; Chapman, 2009; et al.). The character Caouette 
plays is presented as a young mother and domestic abuse victim, seemingly testifying to 
having shot her husband ‘Jimmy’ after enduring years of abuse. The scene involves a 
costumed Caouette in a direct address to camera; ‘her’ body language is submissive and 
anxious, and her speech stuttered throughout the testimonial account (see figure 5). 
Academic approaches to the scene focus primarily on the way the performance conveys 
Caouette’s childhood experience with abuse and domestic violence, as Chapman 
contends: “The effect of this scene is a complex one as it becomes only too clear to the 
viewer that the boy has knowledge of domestic violence, victim psychology and court 
procedures” (2009, p. 61). Chapman also claims that the ‘character’ Caouette inhabits 
challenges “the subjective nature of the scene” by the very nature of its performativity, 
given the way “it is acted out as representing a made-up world” (p. 61). But, for Chapman, 
the performance betrays experience, which accords with Caouette’s self-witnessing 
agenda. However, Poletti goes on to explain that Caouette’s performance, and the 
intertextual cues that emerge in the Hilary scene, reveal that there is more to this scene 
than a performative testimony of personal experience. Though Poletti does not contest the 
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“truth-telling power” (p. 168) of Caouette’s performative footage, she argues that this 
scene, when considered within the intertextual “collage” construction of the film (p. 167), 
represents Caouette’s “deliberate attempt to dissolve the boundaries between the 
documents of popular culture and the moving images of the family archive” (pp. 167-8). 
For Poletti:  
The use of popular culture and the camera as technology of self are central 
to the autobiographical project of Tarnation, where ‘evidence’ of experience 
and affective intensities are drawn from sources far beyond the domestic 
and the personal. 
(p. 168) 
As a result, the Hilary vignette is both unsettling and engaging as an authentic insight into 
Caouette’s traumatic childhood, but also revealing of his performative experiments with 
the ‘cultural scripts’ of television and film. Anderst’s conception of Caouette’s viewing ‘I’ 
supports Poletti’s reading of this scene, as Anderst claims “Caouette links his 
autobiographical self, his self as a filmmaker and a creator, with his history as a viewer of 
many different kinds of visual media” including “television, feature films, movie musicals, 
and underground films” (2013: p. 215). Consequently, the Hilary testimony functions as a 
complex “scene of empathy” (Plantinga, 1999) within the testimonial context of the film. 
The direct and affective engagement of the viewer is invited by Caouette’s indirect 
expression of an experiential truth claim, whilst the testimonial scene simultaneously 
“[models] all the genre traits of melodrama which communicate a ‘true story’ of 
victimisation” (Poletti, 2012: p. 166). The viewer engages with Caouette’s performed 
testimony and the subjective truth it seeks to convey, whilst the scene’s empathic potential 
is drawn from its dual status as authentic archival footage of the real subject and the 




Figure 1.6: Caouette delivers his final confessional address to camera. 
By contrast, the most direct testimonial address Caouette makes in Tarnation complicates 
empathic engagement, as a consequence of its performative emotional display. Caouette 
attempts an evaluative piece-to-camera in the bathroom of his New York apartment at the 
end of the film, this time without the smokescreen of performed character. In the 
commentary, Caouette claims that he originally conceived of the film’s ending as a 
fictional episode in which his grandfather would shoot him, similar to the restitution scene 
in Arirang, but he concluded that “The ending needed to be the god-damned truth” 
(1:20:00). However, the confessional address appears staged, as Caouette constructs a 
scene intended to summarise and underscore the self-witnessing agenda of the film in 
what he calls (in the director’s commentary) his attempt to “cap the ending with a 
testimony” (1:21:03). Caouette self-consciously prepares for his delivery, seated on the 
toilet in front of the mounted camera. He smokes a cigarette and adjusts the framing, 
before finally beginning to speak: “It’s like five in the morning and I wanted this to kind of 
be in the dark like it was when I was younger” (1:21:28). Here, Caouette admits that the 
staging of the scene is a deliberate attempt to create narrative continuity, referencing the 
numerous home-videos that punctuate the film in which he is alone in the bathroom with 
just his camera for company. Caouette mentions the proximity of his mother, which he 
feels threatens the integrity of expression: “My mother is downstairs right now […] so I’m 
really, I’m really scared of letting myself go to, um, talk about anything right now” 
(1:22:00). In the ensuing monologue, Caouette struggles to articulate the emotional 
impact of coping with his mother’s psychological problems, before admitting “I don’t ever 
want to turn out like my mother, and I’m scared because, um, when I was little and she 
was my age, the age I am now, which is 31, um, she seemed a lot better than she does 
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now” (1:22:50-1:23:18). At this point it becomes clear that Caouette’s relationship with his 
mother contributes to his fear of experiencing the same psychological deterioration she 
has suffered, and that her proximity exacerbates this underlying anxiety. The scenes 
preceding the address show that Caouette has become Renee’s primary caretaker, as 
she now lives with him and his boyfriend, David Sanin Paz, in New York. Caouette 
confronts and articulates the realisation that his mother’s problems will always be his 
problems by proxy, before acknowledging the subjective truth that permeates the 
relational structure of his autofilmic testimony: “I love my mother so much, as fucked up as 
it is. I can’t escape her” (1:23:21-33). Caouette’s confessional again highlights the 
relationality of their ongoing shared experience, bringing into relief the “auto/biographical 
demand” (Gilmore, 2001: p. 72) of testimony. But, in the DVD commentary that 
accompanies this scene, Caouette admits that he is “not a fan of any of this [footage]” 
(1:21:21), adding that the scene was intended to convey the emotions he felt upon 
becoming his mother’s caretaker. In the commentary, Caouette explains that he wanted to 
cry, to “half act and half be real” (1:21:38), but that he “couldn’t conjure up any tears” 
(1:21:41) (see Figure 1.6). The ‘truth’ of what Caouette is saying is not diminished by his 
lack of emotion on screen, but his inability to cry precludes the kind of affect contagion 
prompted by emotional scenes of empathy, as seen in Arirang. Caouette’s admission of 
dissatisfaction with his own monologue for lacking in genuine sentiment implies that he 
considers the authentic narrative construction of testimony and the relative affective 
intensity of autofilmic self-witnessing as inextricably linked. But, the testimonial witnessing 
structure is not dependent upon such strategies to ensure willing empathic engagement, 
as the autobiographical invitation of the first-person address, and the testimonial context 
of the film both encourage and sustain the viewer’s empathic engagement in their role as 
a willing witness.  
Caouette’s autofilmic testimony pushes the boundaries of the documentary form in an 
intertextual and relational construction of self-witnessing. The ‘offer of seeing’ the film 
makes illustrates autobiographical experience through the use of multimedial artefacts of 
memory and creative and lyrical narrative strategies; these afford the viewer an insight 
into the historical and testimonial context of self-formation, whilst demonstrating 
Caouette’s unique subjective perspective as influenced by his engagement with visual 
culture. Caouette’s understanding of his traumatic past is conveyed in a relational 
narrative structure that recognises his mother’s significant role in both his autobiographical 
experience and his testimonial narrative, which underscores the inevitably social framing 
of subjectivity. Though markedly performative in places, like Arirang, Caouette’s 
willingness to share the subjective truth of self-witnessing is sustained through pervasive 
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and persistent inscriptions of the autobiographical invitation, which manifests in recurrent 
subjective framing and the assertive and generic documentary practices of filmic 
autobiography.     
Hearing the Body in Blue  
Derek Jarman, who died in February 1994, was a prolific artist, writer and filmmaker. As a 
queer, British man with AIDS, Jarman allowed his work to articulate unapologetically his 
sexual, ideological and political proclivities, often to the detriment of his public and artistic 
repute. Jarman was a committed and unguarded diarist; even when his illness denied him 
the capacity to see or write for himself, he accepted the assistance of those closest to him 
to enable his self-reflections in the months before his death (Peake, 1999). Excerpts from 
these diaries, coupled with extended passages from Jarman’s lyrical and philosophical 
autobiography Chroma: A Book of Colour - June ‘93 (1994), make up the script for the 
meandering narrative that provides the soundtrack for his final film, Blue (1993). Where 
Arirang and Tarnation are considered above as documentary limit cases, Blue inhabits the 
outer margins of generic distinction in a number of ways. Unlike both Caouette’s and 
Kim’s films, which privilege the visual image of the autobiographical subject and the 
construction of subjective point-of-view, Jarman’s film challenges both the conventions of 
unilateral production and the filmic representation of autobiographical subjectivity through 
the renunciation of a visible embodied subject; Jarman instead assembles a palimpsestic 
and polyphonic testimonial performance of his autobiographical experience with AIDS-
related illness over a static blue screen (see Figure 1.7). The self-witnessing agenda of 
testimony and the inherent plea for empathic relation that underpins the intersubjective 
pact of filmic autobiography are both evident in Jarman’s final film, functioning to incite the 
testimonial witnessing structure and sanction Blue’s inclusion in the present study. 
Although Jarman’s film largely interrogates the first-person ‘grammar’ of autofilmic 
testimony that I have described above, it expands the modality of the autofilmic 
testimonial I/eye to explore the nuances of queer identity and illness in respect to agency, 
ethics, and empathy to depict a self-witnessing project that privileges bodily experience 




Figure 1.7: Jarman’s blue screen. 
For Jarman: “The image is a prison of the soul” (36:40), a prison he willfully rejects in Blue 
in favour of a fixed blue screen. Consequently, the foremost reason that Blue is 
considered as a limit case is the absence of the embodied subject within the cinematic 
discourse as a visible prompt to autobiographical engagement, and the diegetic 
representation of the testimonial I/eye as the visible referent for the real, autobiographical 
body. The denial of physical, embodied subjectivity complicates the representation of the 
empathic target as the focal anchor of the cinematic invitation, which in turn interrogates 
the autobiographical pact and challenges the referential effort of the viewer. However, the 
absence of the subject/narrating ‘I’ as object/narrated ‘I’ within the cinematic frame is a 
deliberate denial with multiple intersecting agendas within Jarman’s testimonial project.  
Jarman’s failure to appear on screen is purposely defiant and markedly political; choosing 
not to include his own image is a rejection of a potentially metonymic representation of 
AIDS victimhood, circumventing his reduction to “a problematically inflected image of the 
Person With AIDS” (Parsons, 2018: p. 377). Furthermore, the absence of the body 
interferes with the viewer’s innate evaluative impulse, denying them the capacity to 
interpret physical characteristics upon which we often depend in order to determine the 
parameters of age, gender, class and race. As Smith and Watson contend, “Cultural 
discourses determine which aspects of bodies become meaningful […]. They determine 
when the body becomes visible, how it becomes visible, and what that visibility means” 
(2010: p. 38) in the construction of the autobiographical subject’s “socio-political body”. 
This body is determined by “a set of cultural attitudes and discourses encoding the public 
meanings of bodies that underwrite relationships of power” (p. 38). The refusal of an 
embodied, signified, and therefore codified body obfuscates the viewer’s understanding of 
the subject through established cultural and socio-political discourses, forcing the viewer 
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to work harder to engage with the subject and steering them to the paratext to enable the 
reconciliation of the film’s testimony with the embodied subject.  Consequently, Jarman’s 
film relies upon his status as a prolific artist and politically active public figure to alleviate 
some of the referential labour involved, whilst still installing the intersubjective pact of 
autobiographical viewership that leads back to the body, but on his terms.    
As an artist and a high-profile gay advocate, Jarman was acutely aware of the pervasive 
cultural discourse of the late twentieth century in Britain, most evident in the ways he 
exploited and subverted the patriarchal hegemony of the Thatcherite body politic for the 
majority of his career.  In Blue, Jarman “[blends] visionary queer politics with experimental 
modes of self-representation” (Parsons, 2018: p. 376), an approach that recurs throughout 
his multimedial, artistic back catalogue, a catalogue which becomes significant as 
contextual framing for the absent, embodied subject. For example, in The Angelic 
Conversation (1985), Jarman “draws clear distinctions between a brutal present and an 
ideal past” (Peake, 1999: p. 337) in what Jarman himself describes as “a series of slow-
moving sequences through a landscape seen through the windows of an Elizabethan 
house” in which “Two men find and lose each other” (Jarman, 1997: p. 133). The 
homosexual relationship depicted in The Angelic Conversation, coupled with the 
quintessentially British landscape in which it is set, provide insight into Jarman’s identity 
and his introspective focus as an artist. Jarman’s biographer, Tony Peake, claims that in 
The Angelic Conversation “Jarman wanted to make a film without self-hatred, without the 
violence and imprisonment implicit in so many gay or homoerotic films”, further stating “it 
remained the film of which [Jarman] was always the most proud, the one he felt most truly 
represented him” (1999: p. 337). Moreover, many of Jarman’s pointedly anti-
establishment paintings are explicitly self-referential, particularly those produced in his 
later years. For example, ‘Fuck Me Blind’ (1993) encompasses a riposte to the Thatcherite 
attitudes to homosexuality and the AIDS epidemic in the wake of the Section 28 mandate, 
and a more intimate reference to his own failing eyesight at the hands of the disease. On 
a similar theme, ‘Morphine’ (1992) (see Figure 1.8) is a politically charged response to 
media homophobia in which Jarman smears photocopies of a tabloid front page ‘outing’ a 
soap actor in red and black oil paint with the word ‘morphine’ etched into the canvas. 
Jarman stated about this painting: “Pain can be alleviated by morphine but the pain of 
social ostracism cannot be taken away”.11 In a more traditionally autobiographical act, 
Jarman published Dancing Ledge (1984) through which he undertook an unambiguously 
self-focused literary study; in the book he intended to “write about his sexuality not as one 
 
11 This statement is widely referenced in popular culture, and originally appeared under 
the painting in the Tate. 
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of a ‘they’, but as an ‘I’” (Peake, 1999: p. 320), asserting his individuality as part of a 
community as an emissary instead of a metonymic representative. Indeed, Jarman’s body 
of work is unequivocally reflective of his political and personal perspective, offering 
essential context for the testimonial register of Blue. Accordingly, viewing Blue through the 
testimonial agenda of self-witness, and as a deliberately autobiographical act requires that 
the viewer “shuttle” (Felman and Laub, 1992) between this historical framing and the film 
text, as metatextual engagement with Jarman’s artistic legacy provides context for his 
testimony in the absence of the autobiographical body.     
   
Figure 1.8: Jarman’s ‘Morphine’.12 
As is the case for both Kim and Caouette, as a filmmaker, Jarman’s natural testimonial 
outlet is inevitably filmic, albeit an undeniably artistic and unconventional Jarmanian 
construction. According to Linda Haverty Rugg: “the absence of a body purposefully 
engages the spectator in a way that suggests redefinition of subjectivity and the 
construction of selfhood” (2006: p. x). Rugg observes this effect in Tracy Emin’s 
autobiographical installations My Bed and Everyone I Have Ever Slept With, 1963–1995, 
which use material objects to “perform as radical self-exposure without depicting the self 
 
12 Copyright: Jarman’s Estate. 
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as body” (2006: p. x). Jarman’s autofilmic testimony similarly entails the rejection of bodily 
representation as the finite measure of the subject: 
For accustomed to believing in image, an absolute idea of value, his world 
had forgotten the command of essence: Thou Shall Not Create Unto 
Thyself Any Graven Image, although you know the task is to fill the empty 
page. From the bottom of your heart, pray to be released from image.  
(36:03-22) 
In the voice track that accompanies the unmoving screen, Jarman denounces the 
confines of the image, paraphrasing and reappropriating a passage from Exodus (20:4) 
and thus extending this mandate to the viewer. Whilst the use of biblical language and the 
imperative “pray” are revealing of Jarman’s religious affiliations, what is most significant is 
the communicative structure: Jarman implores the viewer to engage with the text in a 
specific way, to dispense with the image and attend to what the film ‘says’, rather than 
what it ‘shows’. For Alexandra Parsons this is tantamount to “an imaginative means of 
enacting the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power refrain: ‘Stop looking at us. Start listening 
to us’” (2018: p. 377). By telling rather than showing his experience with AIDS-related 
illness, Jarman “retains a powerful agency” (Parsons, 2018: p. 387), controlling both the 
manner and the media by which to carry out his act of self-witness. The pervasive 
monochromatic screen is an auxiliary for the embodied subject, a purposeful “metaphor of 
self” (Olney, 1980) that anchors Jarman’s experience to the viewing experience, thus 
administering the phenomenological invitation of autobiography. Colour becomes a 
conduit for the autobiographical body, and, in conjunction with the testimonial narrative, a 
visual emblem of bodily experience. Originally conceived as a loop of filmed footage of 
one of Yves Klein’s paintings, the digital image of ‘International Klein Blue’ was produced 
as the visual backdrop for Jarman’s testimonial voice, as a literal referent for the 
numerous monochrome mediations contained within the narrative, and as an oblique and 
deliberately defiant reminder of the testimonial source: Jarman’s absent, ailing body. In 
Blue, the blue screen is Jarman, the inescapable, belligerent image that floods the 
viewer’s field of vision in place of a politicised physical form that might undermine the 
autobiographical lamentation of the narrative voice. Parsons argues, “Color becomes a 
way to bypass image, or language, to prompt direct communion between artist and 
audience” (2018: p. 375); in Blue, the direct communion occurs as a result of the 
autobiographical invitation in spite of bodily absence, as the blue screen holds an inherent 
coercive power. For as long as the blue screen holds the viewer’s gaze, “color promotes 
ethical spectatorship” as “a means to bear witness to the terrible effects of the virus” 
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(Parsons, 2018: p. 377), which entreats the intersubjective structure of testimonial 
witnessing.  
As the viewer willingly watches the blue screen, they agree to receive Jarman’s testimony 
without the requisite body, inevitably focusing the referential labour on the spoken 
testimony it foregrounds. The fixed visual stimulus of the blue screen dictates that the 
audience must concert their attentive efforts on the audio elements of the film, which 
better designates the audience as “listener” (Laub, 1992: p. 71) rather than viewer. 
However, this does not diminish the inherent empathic relation of testimonial witnessing, 
as “For the testimonial process to take place, there needs to be a bonding, the intimate 
and total presence of an other – in the position of one who hears” (Laub, 1992: p. 70). For 
Dori Laub, the listener’s unobtrusive presence throughout the process of self-witnessing 
entails a conscious and conscientious connection, as “there has to be an abundance of 
holding and of emotional investment in the encounter” (Laub, 1992: p. 71). Viewing Blue 
as an act of self-witness, the viewer/listener willingly accepts Jarman’s audiovisual 
invitation as primarily an ‘offer of hearing’ rather than seeing.  
The testimonial script13 for Blue is comprised of extracts taken from Jarman’s diaries and 
the ‘Into the Blue’ chapter of Chroma (1994), all of which centre on his autobiographical 
experience with AIDS-related illness, as the basis of the testimonial act. In print, the 
narrative asserts the autobiographical ‘I’ through the traditional unification of 
author/narrator/protagonist (Lejeune, 1989) and the contractual and referential 
reconciliation with the autobiographical body. As the witnessing structure assumes that 
testimony is delivered first-hand, so too does it adopt the tenets of the autobiographical 
pact; the testimony is contingent upon the reconciliation of the autobiographical ‘I’ with the 
testifying body, which in the absence of the embodied subject is dependent on voice as a 
referential anchor. Smith and Watson claim that “orally performing an autobiographical act 
minimizes the distances between the narrator and the narratee” (2010: p. 97) as it 
constitutes a direct and interactive address. But Jarman’s autobiographical act is 
performed by intermediaries including John Quentin, Nigel Terry, and Tilda Swinton 
instead of Jarman himself in the film. This performative strategy interrupts the direct 
address, which also subverts the viewer’s reconciliation of the voice as the paratextual 
anchor to the testifying body. The performative nature of Jarman’s testimony potentially 
confounds the witnessing structure, unless the viewer is able to overlook the referential 
conflict. To successfully achieve this, the viewer must hear the ‘I’ in the testimony itself, as 
 




asserted directly in the fundamental testimonial missive, “I shall not win the battle against 
the virus – in spite of the slogans like ‘Living with AIDS’" (15:51), which is unequivocally 
Jarman’s. Without a visual representation of Jarman’s body to contradict the testifying 
voice, the viewer is more able to accept the diegetic voice/s of the film as Jarman’s. This 
suspension of disbelief speaks to the ethical privileging of autobiographical experience as 
“real” (Schmitt, 2017), which the ethical and empathic engagement with autobiography as 
testimony dictates. Furthermore, the referential labour of emersion leads back to the 
autobiographical source, which means that reconciliation of the testimonial voice with the 
real autobiographical subject is mediated – and indeed, superseded – by the willing 
acceptance of the autobiographical invitation and the ethical participation in testimonial 
witnessing that the viewer agrees to when they choose to watch the film.  
In Blue, empathic relation is facilitated by an inevitable return to the body as the “site of 
autobiographical knowledge” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 49) and the “paratextual 
anchor” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 96) to embodied experience, in spite of the lack of a visible 
empathic target. According to Tan, the “lack of moving visual stimulus impacts upon the 
emotional action tendencies often felt in film viewership” (Tan, 1996:  p. 74), such as the 
multidimensional empathic relation triggered by Kim crying in Arirang; however, in Blue 
empathic relation is dependent upon the viewer/hearer’s reception of Jarman’s testimony 
within the witnessing structure described above. In her book A Theory of Narrative 
Empathy (2006), Suzanne Keen explains “the mechanisms underlying empathy” (2006: p. 
207) with reference to neuroscience and the bodily, precognitive responses related to our 
“emotion sharing abilities” (2006: p. 207). Keen goes on to clarify, “Simply hearing a 
description of an absent other’s actions lights up mirror neuron areas during fMRI imaging 
of the human brain” (Keen, 2006: p. 208), which reflect in the hearer a physiological 
response to the experiences of others that happens even when they are unable to see 
them. What Keen describes is the involuntary ‘feeling with’ of empathic relation that 
occurs when the account of experience is accepted and understood as real. This 
empathic relation is particularly potent in autobiographical accounts, when the reality is 
described as the experience of a real person. Jarman’s descriptions of his body in pain 
interpellate the viewer to consider their own; this is what Keen refers to as “broadcast 
strategic empathy”, which functions in Blue as an appeal to the viewer “to feel with 
members of a group, by emphasizing common vulnerabilities and hopes through 
universalizing representations” (original italics, 2006: p. 215). Broadcast strategic empathy 
assumes the viewer as other, positioned outside of Jarman’s experience, but with whom 
Jarman wishes to share his experience by way of self-witnessing through relatable 
scenarios. The largely universal and relatable experience of receiving an injection is just 
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one example: “The nurse fights to find a vein in my right arm. We give up after five 
attempts. Would you faint if someone stuck a needle into your arm? I've got used to it - but 
I still shut my eyes” (16:44-57). Jarman literally asks the viewer as witness to consider 
their own bodily reaction to the familiar procedure. Despite the fact that the viewer is 
unable to see the metal piercing the skin, they are able to conceive of the experience 
through empathic bodily resonance, again forcing the referential focus back to the body, 
not as other, but as similar to our own. However, Jarman’s personal trauma is pervasive in 
even the most arbitrary descriptions, indicative of his ongoing contention with his own 
mortality: 
The drip stings. A lump swells up in my arm. Out comes the drip. An 
electric shock sparks up my arm. How can I walk away with a drip 
attached to me? How am I going to walk away from this? 
(19:10-30) 
Within the context of his illness, the relatable medical processes Jarman describes are 
reframed as “futile care” (Smith, 2000), capable of alleviating some of his symptoms, but 
incapable of saving him from his inevitable death. Consequently, Jarman’s broadcast 
strategic empathy functions at two levels fundamental to autofilmic testimony: he asks that 
the viewer ‘feel with’ him in response to his autobiographical invitation in an act of 
empathic relation, and invites the viewer to simultaneously and ethically bear witness to 
his testimonial act of self-witness.  
There are multiple empathic strategies at work in Jarman’s testimony, as the film’s 
audience is invited to feel with him specifically, and more broadly to empathise with others 
suffering with AIDS-related illnesses, some of whom may be watching his film. For Keen, 
“ambassadorial strategic empathy addresses chosen others with the aim of cultivating 
their empathy for the in-group, often to a specific end” (original italics, Keen, 2006: p. 
215). Jarman’s ‘in-group’ consists of those who have died, or are dying from AIDS-related 
illness. He references his friends by name, inviting the viewer to extend their empathy to 
them:  
David ran home panicked on the train from Waterloo, brought back 
exhausted and unconscious to die that night. Terry who mumbled 
incoherently into his incontinent tears […]. Howard turned slowly to stone, 
petrified day by day, his mind imprisoned in a concrete fortress until all we 




By naming real others whom he identifies as members of his afflicted collective, Jarman 
cultivates the viewer’s empathy for them, and by extension others, who are facing the 
inevitable mortality of AIDS in a deliberately ambassadorial gesture. At the same time, 
Jarman’s descriptions of the experiences of the collective functions as “bounded strategic 
empathy”, which, as Keen explains, “operates within an in-group, stemming from 
experiences of mutuality and leading to feeling with familiar others” (original italics, 2006: 
p. 215). Evidently, these empathic strategies are by no means mutually exclusive, as 
Jarman’s inclusive testimony makes multilateral empathic appeals to viewers who may or 
may not be familiar with the realities of his condition. Jarman’s persistent references to the 
bodily processes of AIDS-related illness are constant reminders of the bodily suffering it 
imposes, and the insurmountable trauma of the terminal condition that affected all who 
were afflicted at that time. The multiple empathic strategies in Blue foreground the 
advocacy inherent in Jarman’s self-witnessing autofilmic testimony.  
***: 
When Jarman’s autobiographical writings become the voice of his filmic testimony, 
mapped onto a brilliant aquamarine screen, the viewer is invited to bear witness without 
the visual crutch of the embodied subject. However, Jarman’s purposeful withholding of 
the visual referential anchor commands a particularly emersive engagement from the 
viewer, a process by which the viewer must willingly look beyond the cinematic frame to 
the paratextual context in which the embodied subject exists. For Jarman, testimonial 
witnessing must breach the limits of filmic representations of subjectivity in order to 
effectively communicate the reality of his experience with AIDS-related illness, a reality 
that for him is unequivocally political. Jarman’s testimony encompasses living with, and 
dying of, AIDS, at a time when empathy for him, and the British gay community, was in 
short supply; this personal perspective is inevitably reflected in his oeuvre of self-reflexive 
works. Jarman’s refusal to metonymically embody AIDS victimhood on screen is not a 
disavowal of the illness’ potency; rather, it is a deliberately political gesture by which he 
refuses to become a spectacle in favour of his multiply representative role as a 
spokesman. Through his personal experience, Jarman commands attention and empathy 
for a community of which he was proud to be a part, and which he was reluctant to leave. 
By telling rather than showing his experience, Jarman deviates from documentary and 
autobiographical filmic conventions, but successfully facilitates the empathic relation of the 
autobiographical invitation by entreating the intersubjective witnessing structure of 
testimony. For Kate Higginson “Blue negotiates, and essentially stages a dialogue 
between, the material realities of AIDS and a desire to escape the same” (2008: p. 80) 
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and this is an inherent tension at the core of Jarman’s autofilmic testimonial endeavour. 
The material realities of AIDS-related illness are reflected in the limited visual stimulus, as 
well as through the descriptions of arbitrary medical procedures that inevitably fail to save 
him. Nevertheless, Jarman’s testimonial invitation to feel with him is a lyrical mediation on 
living as a gay man with AIDS in Britain at a particularly resistant cultural moment, which 
deploys the artistic and filmic media with which he was so familiar to elicit the ethical 
witnessing he felt he was denied in real life. Whether defined as political performance art, 
adapted autobiography or documentary, Blue’s status as Jarman’s self-witnessing 
autofilmic testimony is determined by our willingness to bear ethical and empathic witness 
to the subjective truth it presents.      
*** 
The autofilmic testimonies analysed in this chapter demonstrate the ways in which film 
can issue an intimate and autobiographical invitation to bear witness. As self-made and 
self-reflexive films, Arirang, Tarnation, and Blue offer subjective perspectives into the 
particularities of autobiographical experience, drawing historical and paratextual context 
into the filmic discourse in creative, performative, and discursive ways. The films are 
unified in their self-witnessing agenda, in spite of their differing filmic constructions, with 
each film asserting a distinct, subjective offer of seeing/hearing. In Arirang, Kim capitalises 
on the recognisable conventions of documentary and filmic autobiography to assert his 
first-person perspective, whilst interrogating generic boundaries through stylistic strategies 
that allow him to bring historical and contextual details into the filmic narrative. Caouette 
retains the designation documentary, but makes use of lyrical edits and intertextual 
citations to construct a coherent account of autobiographical experience that requires the 
viewer to overlook authorial intervention in order to understand the relational configuration 
of self-formation. In Blue, Jarman unapologetically invites the viewer to look beyond the 
visual stimulus of the film, in a self-witnessing project that requires a willing engagement 
with the metatextual framing of the filmic narrative in order to reconcile the distinctly 
personal and political context of the testimonial project. Though the films analysed in this 
chapter deploy unique narrative strategies to assert their testimonial truth, each of them 
evinces an inherent invitation through their willingness to share it. As a result, viewership 
comes to constitute acceptance of the subject’s autobiographical and testimonial 
invitation, which requires a willing, ethical and empathic engagement with the filmic 
narrative that can reconcile the subject’s account with their real lived experience.     
My analysis in this chapter introduces important critical and theoretical approaches to 
autobiographical and testimonial narratives that illuminate the parameters and protocols of 
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self-witnessing on film. The ways in which subjects use performative strategies to convey 
autobiographical experience provide a significant insight into the specific contexts of 
testimonial telling, such as Kim’s self-imposed isolation, Caouette’s shared experience 
with his mother, and Jarman’s deliberate, political defiance. Issues relating to embodiment 
become particularly pertinent in visual media, as cinematic I-witnessing largely entails 
showing and seeing as well as telling. The subject on screen is the central focus of 
autobiographical and testimonial films, and accordingly, their bodies become textual 
surfaces and referential anchors for their narratives and experience. Related to 
embodiment within the scope of visual narratives of witness, empathic engagement is 
often prompted and elicited through facial affect and subjective framing, as seen in 
Arirang and Tarnation, and deliberately withheld in Blue. However, Blue does illustrate the 
way that voice, as another significant characteristic of subjective narratives, can be 
asserted and mobilised to instantiate an intersubjective connection with the viewer and 
encourage empathic relation. Finally, the social and relational contexts of subjective 
experience are inevitably implicated in autobiographical and testimonial accounts, whether 
willingly omitted, as in Arirang, overtly asserted as in Tarnation, or implicitly invoked as 
they are in Blue. Self-witnessing through filmic media requires the subject to represent the 
reality of experience, which necessitates the introduction and negotiation of the multiple 
and interrelated dimensions of subjectivity within their narratives of witness in order to 






Trauma is never exclusively personal. 
      Leigh Gilmore 
2. Autofilmic Advocacy: Testimonial Remembering and Not Forgetting in Jennifer 
Fox’s The Tale and Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis  
As established in Chapter One, the construction of the testimonial I/eye in film is 
contingent upon the recognisable codes and conventions of subjective self-witnessing, 
facilitated by both documentary practices and the ethical and empathic witnessing 
structure engendered by the autobiographical invitation. This chapter will advance this 
critical framework to explore the machinations of memory and representation in two 
explicitly testimonial films, Jennifer Fox’s The Tale (2018) and Marjane Satrapi’s 
Persepolis (2007). By incorporating critical perspectives from testimony, trauma, and 
autobiography studies, I analyse each film’s multi-layered witnessing structure, which 
includes production, viewership, and cultural impact. The analysis includes the exploration 
of intra- and extra-textual strategies of empathy, which contribute to the ethical and 
empathic mode of viewership that underpins cinematic I-witnessing. Ultimately, the 
analysis concludes that the empathic relation autofilmic testimony invites is tantamount to 
ethical witnessing, which persists as a form of activism beyond the viewing experience. 
Both The Tale and Persepolis are explicitly – and collaboratively – constructed as feature 
films, in contrast with the unilateral and documentary practices considered in Chapter 
One; but, in each case the film project is written and directed by the autobiographical 
subject who retains both authorial and auteurial agency, thus preserving the 
autobiographical invitation. As will become clear, the filmmaker-subjects, Jennifer Fox and 
Marjane Satrapi, craft their testimonies from the dual positions of self-witness and 
“witness to the process of witnessing” (Laub, 1995: p. 62) to facilitate intricate networks of 
empathy within and through the intersubjective witnessing structure of autofilmic 
testimony. Furthermore, I argue that autofilmic testimony’s empathic potential as a form of 
self-witnessing can develop within both a relational and representational model. As such, 
the films explored in this chapter advance the critical purview of autofilmic testimony 
towards the possibility of therapeutic creative practice and the empathic potential of 
engagement with the same.   
*** 
As an award-winning screenwriter, director, cinematographer and producer, Jennifer Fox 
has made a career of bearing witness. Fox won the Grand Prize for Documentary at the 
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Sundance Film Festival with her debut project Beirut: The Last Home Movie (1987), a 
cinéma vérité film in which Fox accompanies her former classmate, Gaby Bustros to 
Beirut to visit Bustros’ family in the midst of a civil war. As someone who is familiar with 
both sides of the camera lens, Fox is well versed in the dialogic relationship that film 
invites, having turned the camera upon herself in both Beirut, and the curation of the 
documentary film series Flying: Confessions of a Free Woman (2006): a collaborative, 
relational memoir project that bears witness to “modern female life” around the world (Fox 
in Bussel, 2007). In witnessing the testimonies of other women whilst making Flying: 
Confessions, and rediscovering an essay she wrote as a child, Fox was compelled to re-
evaluate a relationship from her past, which brought to the fore a traumatic personal truth. 
Fox’s most recent film, The Tale (2018), explores this realisation of repressed child sexual 
abuse, in which she repurposes her documentary acuity in the construction of an 
introspective, narrative film with extremely sensitive and provocative content. In a 
cinematic act of self-witness, Fox interrogates the machinations of trauma and memory to 
produce a raw and culturally significant autofilmic testimony. The film traverses the 
parallel timelines of past and present, through explorations of memory and its failures, to 
ultimately reconcile the truth of traumatic childhood experience and its lasting impact upon 
the subject’s life and relationships.  
Like Fox, Marjane Satrapi is professionally engaged in numerous creative disciplines; as 
an author, cartoonist, screenwriter and director, Satrapi’s career boasts a catalogue of 
projects that exploit her complementary competencies in predominantly visual media in 
numerous languages. Satrapi’s animated autofilmic testimony Persepolis (2007) is 
adapted from her comic autobiography of the same name, originally published in French 
in four volumes between 2000 and 2003. The comic Persepolis won many prestigious 
accolades including the Angoulême Coup de Coeur Award and the American Library 
Association’s ‘Best Book for Young Adults’, with the film receiving yet further critical 
acclaim, winning the Cannes Film Festival’s Jury Prize (2007) and making Satrapi the first 
woman to be nominated for the ‘Academy Award for Best Animated Feature Film of the 
Year’. Satrapi’s feature-length animation assumes a similar, oscillating temporal structure 
to The Tale, allowing Satrapi to both articulate and evaluate her childhood perspective in 
tandem with the additional retrospective insight of having survived both the cultural and 
geographical upheaval she experienced as a consequence of the Islamic Revolution, 
whilst also illuminating both the personal and collective consequences of the militant Shah 
regime and its legacy in her native home, Teheran.  
Each of the films mobilises self-witness as autofilmic testimony, which not only postulates 
personal, autobiographical experience, but also bears witness to the scope and scale of 
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the creators’ respective traumas in a wider context. For Fox, her autofilmic testimony 
sheds light on the often effaced, yet endemic issue of child sexual abuse, and the intricate 
and intersubjective exercise of remembering forgotten trauma, whilst Satrapi allows her 
autofilmic testimony to bear witness to the cultural trauma imposed upon the Iranian 
collective, incorporating the historical and experiential accounts of others, in a remedial 
representation of “not forgetting” (Chute, 2008: p. 94). The subjects’ decisions to use 
narrative filmic forms offer further insight into each woman’s process of self-witnessing 
and production, and in each case, the specificity of the personal constitutes advocacy for 
like others, which further manifests as a form of activism in the paratextual framing and 
reception of the film. 
Telling Tales: Mediating Memories 
Whilst making the documentary series Flying: Confessions of a Free Woman, Jennifer 
Fox rediscovered a middle-school essay that made her rethink her first sexual experience. 
As she reconsidered her childhood memories from a position of adult retrospect, Fox 
came to realise that what she had considered a relationship was in actual fact sexual 
abuse, committed by two people whom she had respected and loved. The belated 
realisation was the impetus for an autobiographical project that saw her move away from 
the vocational mode of documentary to construct a narrative film of self-witness. When 
asked to explain The Tale in an interview, Fox stated “It’s about unravelling denial, using 
myself as the red thread” (Fox in Reilly, 2018), a statement that compounds the 
significance of her self-witnessing project within a testimonial context on both a personal 
and a cultural level. As a retrospective act of self-witness, the production of The Tale 
allowed Fox to address suppressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, leading her to 
question herself and her ideologies in the present in order to confront her past and 
reshape her future.  
As the keystone of the creative process of self-witness, the essay is the autobiographical 
artefact that galvanised Fox’s testimonial enquiry, as indicated by the title-card at the 
film’s end, which reads: “Based on ‘The Tale’ written by Jenny Fox, age 13” (1:49:03). 
Though ‘The Tale’ was written as a scholastic creative writing assignment, the first-person 
narrative retains the essayistic and autobiographical posture of introspection, articulating 
first-hand experience within a progressive and evaluative framework. The essay’s totemic 
presence within the film serves as a reminder to the viewer that the film is the product of 
real-world self-witness, further underscored by Fox’s retention of her own name for the 
central character (played by Laura Dern) – a deliberate decision intended to authenticate 
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the personal and testimonial pedigree of the film. On the film’s official website (2018), Fox 
attests: 
By leaving the Jennifer character’s name as mine, I am there to tell 
[naysayers], ‘no, this really happened. And yes, I did really feel ‘love’ for 
these people as they robbed me of my trust and betrayed and hurt me’.  
Fox’s use of her own name is a deliberate gesture that inscribes autobiographical intent, 
but also serves to counter the pervasive cultural doubt that beleaguers the disclosure of 
sexual violence. In her book Tainted Witness: Why We Doubt What Women Say About 
Their Lives (2017), life-writing scholar Leigh Gilmore contends that in contemporary 
culture, the inherent truth claim of female testimony is often questioned, as a 
consequence of pervasive patriarchal discourses of power within testimonial settings. 
Though not completely exempt from this cultural bias, Gilmore argues that “Autobiography 
is more flexible than legal testimony” as it allows women to exploit “its literary elasticity to 
assert legitimacy” (p. 9). By placing an autobiographical document at the centre of the 
cinematic discourse, and designating a nominal avatar as representative of the 
autobiographical ‘I’, Fox is able to command the contractual invitation of autobiography to 
reinforce The Tale’s testimonial efficacy. 
In the film, Jennifer Fox’s testimonial invitation is immediately issued through the 
voiceover that precedes the opening scene, in the phrase “The story you are about to see 
is true… as far as I know” (0:45). This introductory missive is indicative of three key 
considerations within the context of autofilmic testimony: the installation of the testimonial 
‘I’, the declarative truth claim of testimony, and the acknowledgement of the fallibility of 
subjective memory within the context of traumatic testimony. As discussed in Chapter One 
with reference to Derek Jarman’s Blue, the voice is the referential anchor of the embodied 
subject and “target of empathy” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 121) of autobiographical discourse, in 
this case the testimonial ‘I’, which extends the relational invitation to empathic witnessing 
to the viewer by asserting the truth claim of testimony. Within the same statement, the 
testimonial ‘I’ pronounces “the epistemic dilemma of testimony” (Krämer, 2016: p. 32), 
which indicates both the impossibility of the verification of traumatic experience and the 
caveat of its incommunicability. The Tale holds both testimonial truth and traumatic 
memory in critical tension throughout, as Fox attempts to bear witness to the 
circumstances of her childhood sexual abuse in dialogue with the revelatory rationale of 
adult retrospect as a performative reenactment of self-witness. 
The Tale is a manifestation of “autobiographical portraiture”, which “is a way of offering a 
performative testimony about the manner in which personhood is constituted in relation to 
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experiences of trauma” (Snooks, 2017: p. 399). By extension, the screenplay14 for the film 
is the structural framework for Fox’s performative testimony, as an antecedent and 
retrospective act of self-witness that contributes to The Tale’s testimonial offer of showing 
and telling. The assembly of the screenplay is suggestive of the scriptotherapeutic 
practice of “writing out and writing through traumatic experience” (Henke, 1998: p. xii), as 
the process by which Fox was able to construct a coherent account of the labour of self-
witness as the basis of her autofilmic testimony. The screenplay is an all-encompassing 
account of the memory work that self-witnessing entails, the manner by which Fox 
recalled and reimagined her experience, and the authentication of self-reflexive 
representation inscribed with the requisite real name of the autobiographical ‘I’ (Lejeune, 
1989). Realised as a film, the self-witnessing agenda of the screenplay transmits Fox’s 
testimonial invitation through an intersubjective pact with the viewer, inviting them to bear 
witness to her traumatic past, but also to the process of self-witness that facilitates 
testimony.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the autobiographical subject must address the discrepancy 
between the experiencing ‘I’ of the past and the narrating ‘I’ of the present within the self-
witnessing narrative of the film, which for Kim involved the performative installation of a 
“coaxer/coercer” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 64). In essence, testimony is the revelation 
of a traumatic experience, which “does not exist until it can be articulated and heard by a 
sympathetic listener” (Gilmore, 2001: p. 6), whose role can also involve prompting the 
subject to talk. Kim’s narrative emerges through a stylised interview, whilst Fox portrays a 
similar coercive paradigm in The Tale. At the beginning of the film, the adult Jennifer’s15 
refusal to define her childhood story as disclosure, and ultimately accept her experience 
as traumatic, complicates testimony’s relational dynamic, confounding the invitation to 
bear witness. After finding the essay, Jennifer’s mother, Nettie (Ellen Burstyn), calls 
multiple times in the film’s early scenes, expressing concern for her daughter and 
attempting to initiate the witnessing paradigm (2:30-3:01). At this point Jennifer avoids 
contact, but is visibly unsettled by the implications of her mother’s concern; when 
questioned about her preoccupation by her fiancé, Patrick (played by Common), she 
explains “sorry, I was just thinking about my mom. She’s been calling and she read this 
story I wrote as a kid about my first boyfriend, and I hadn’t told her about it because he 
was older, so she’s beside herself trying to reach me” (5:21). Nettie attempts to coax 
 
14 A copy of the original screenplay was generously provided for reference purposes by 
Associate Producer Stefanie Diaz, on behalf of Jennifer Fox, in support of this research. 




Jennifer’s testimony,16 but Jennifer dismisses her mother’s concerns; however, the sharp 
flashbacks that follow Nettie’s calls constitute “an instantly recognizable device to mark a 
traumatic return” (Luckhurst, 2008, p. 180), as these flashbacks are “the unconscious 
language of repetition through which trauma initially speaks” (Gilmore, 2001, p.  7) within 
the film’s self-witnessing narrative. These fragmentary flashes of memory invade both 
Jennifer’s work (3:45) and sex with her partner (4:30) before the receipt of the story 
triggers a more coherent flashback to the environment in which it was written (5:57-6:52). 
The original school assignment instructions “Like Tom Sawyer: Write a fiction story set in 
your hometown” are visible within the frame as the younger Jenny’s voiceover 
accompanies the subjective viewpoint of her pen strokes on the pink paper (6:44), the 
same paper that Jennifer is holding – and reading – in the narrative present. The 
coincidence of voiceover in tandem with the production of self-referential writing is a 
recognisable cinematic trope of first-person representation, used to instantiate the 
narrating ‘I’ of the autobiographical discourse, further inscribing the testimonial voice and 
its cognisant empathic invitation. The presence of the document in the hands of both 
Jenny and Jennifer unifies the temporally separate iterations of the narrating ‘I’ as a 
singular autobiographical narrator. The document itself, routinely shown in the possession 
of both Jenny and Jennifer, provides a dialogic link between the parallel past and present 
narratives within the oscillating structure of self-witness. The cinematic medium allows for 
both young Jenny and the adult Jennifer to occupy the ‘speaking’ position of the narrating 
‘I’ within the linear cinematic discourse, even though the child is simultaneously 
representative of both the narrated ‘I’ and the experiencing ‘I’ of the past within an 
autobiographical project. Consequently, the bilateral cinematic construction of the 
testimonial ‘I’ allows Fox to invite the viewer to empathise with herself as the real-world 
subject at multiple junctures along the timeline of experience, by presenting the 
perspective of the child as the events unfold, and additionally the evaluative narrating ‘I’ of 
the remembering adult who attempts to reconcile the two narratives as one coherent 
testimony.  
When Jennifer is again shown reading the essay, alone in her New York loft, the 
voiceover articulates the words as she reads them, situating her as the narrating ‘I’ of the 
diegetic present, and reframing the remembered Jenny as the narrated ‘I’ of Jennifer’s 
past: “I’d like to begin this story by telling you something so beautiful-”. The jump-cut to a 
 
16 See my analysis of Arirang for a more detailed definition of the “coaxer/coercer” (Smith and 
Watson: 2010: p. 64). 
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flashback of a teenaged Jenny (Jessica Sarah Flaum) is connected by the merging of 
their voices as Jenny takes up the voiceover. She reads:  
I’ve met two very special people whom I’ve come to love dearly. Imagine 
a woman who is married and a man who is divorced, sharing their lives in 
close friendship. Loving each other with all their souls, yet not being close 
with their bodies. Get this, I’m part of them both. I’m lucky enough to be 
able to share in their love. When I’m with them, the earth seems to shake 
and tremble- 
  (9:07-47)   
The young Jenny’s reading narrates an imagined vignette, which serves to introduce the 
viewer to Mrs G. (Elizabeth Debicki) and Bill (Jason Ritter), both of whom smile directly to 
the camera outside their respective houses, before running in sync through the woods, 
and ultimately gazing up at a beaming Jenny seated atop a horse (see Figure 2.1). The 
younger Jenny’s voice is replaced by Jennifer’s, as the wide shot shows the older woman 
lifting the essay’s first page, completing the sentence, “-and often I’m afraid I’ll fall off of it” 
(9:50). In this instance the flashback is representative of Jennifer’s idealised memory, 
untainted by the reality of her traumatic past and preserved as the preferred context for 
her exploratory essay. But, the essay is both the bridge between past and present, and 
the axis around which the transient self-witnessing narrative revolves – both in the film, 
and in the process of its construction. After reading the essay, Jennifer chooses to “sit 
with [her] own memories” (10:35), which eventually compels her to seek validation through 
the comparison of her own memories with those of others who were present in her past, 
just as Fox did. 
 
Figure 2.1: Jenny (Flaum) atop her horse with Mrs. G and Bill. 
As a child, Fox veiled her testimonial disclosure in a school assignment, which, as the film 
shows, prompted her teacher to speculate on the inspiration for her story: “If what you talk 
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about here were accurate I would say that you had been taken advantage of by older 
people. But, clearly you have a fine, full set of emotions blossoming into womanhood” 
(10:12-28). Though posited initially as a story crafted in response to an academic prompt, 
the essayistic purview of ‘The Tale’ is substantiated by Jenny’s “intellectual, emotional and 
physiological” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 276) reflections, as suggested by her 
teacher’s evaluation, which become more apparent as the film progresses. What becomes 
clear is testimony’s contingency upon both an explicit truth claim and an invited ethical 
witness; but, as a consequence of Jenny’s presentation of the story as fiction, the 
testimonial structure of witnessing was uninitiated in her past and the “traumatic truth” of 
testimony as “traced through the perverse interplay of fact and fiction” (Luckhurst, 2008: p. 
143) was effectively concealed. Jennifer’s memory installs the belief that the story is 
fiction, which motivates her dismissive behaviour in the present. However, contrary to 
Jennifer’s “defensive dissociation” (Luckhurst, 2008: p. 88), Fox’s persistent use of 
flashback foreshadows the forthcoming exploration of traumatic experience as a signal to 
the viewer that, in spite of Jennifer’s recalcitrance, her testimonial invitation manifests 
piecemeal through memory work, witnessing, and the viewer’s precedent acceptance of 
the film’s autobiographical register. 
For Fox, the process of self-witness became a relational exercise, necessitating the 
engagement of others as witnesses to events she had recalibrated in the story of her own 
history. This labour is represented in The Tale, as Jennifer traverses the country in an 
attempt to clarify the details of her childhood that are obscured by the conflict between the 
essay and her memories. Jennifer seeks to resolve this tension primarily by speaking with 
those who were present at Mrs. G’s farm. These adjacent witnesses provide vital context 
for Jennifer’s warped memories, as they remind her how her age and her character 
rendered her more vulnerable than she remembers. When visiting with Becky (Jodi Long), 
a former campmate at Mrs. G’s equestrian program, Jennifer is shown photographs of her 
time at Mrs. G’s farm, which confirm her memories of the other girls but, as she is not in 
any of the shots, leave a question mark over her remembered self. Becky tells her “You 
were such a tiny, little thing. So much smaller than Franny and I. […] you almost looked 
like a little boy. […] you were so afraid, you barely said two words” (16:02-12). Jennifer’s 
close-framed reaction registers her confusion, as the earlier flashback shows her as a 
lithe and developing young woman in her mind’s eye. The encounter with Becky drives 
Jennifer to pursue further confirmation, which she looks for in her mother’s photo albums. 
On finding a print that accords with her memory, the close-up reveals the young woman 
from Jennifer’s flashback pictured with her horse (17:00). However, Jennifer’s mother 
points out that the photo she has found is of her at age fifteen in 1975, redirecting her to a 
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photo from 1973 (17:15). The photo confirms Becky’s description, featuring a much 
younger and smaller Jenny (Isabelle Nélisse), whilst the reverse shot closely frames 
Jennifer’s failure to comprehend the discrepancy in her own memory. This encounter 
demonstrates the way that photographs “alter the ways that we conceive of our selves” 
(Anderst, 2013: p. 226), as the earlier flashback is then replayed, this time with the 
younger Jenny at the centre of the action. The way that Fox utilises photographs within 
the cinematic discourse is reminiscent of Caouette’s intertextual practice in Tarnation, 
whereby family snapshots are deployed as autobiographical artefacts within the curation 
process of the documentary project. The photos make it clear that Jenny is far more 
reserved and juvenile than Jennifer initially remembered, and as Jenny repeats the first 
line of the titular essay, the tone of the previously romanticised story shifts towards 
impropriety, lending credence to Nettie’s earlier reaction and forcing Jennifer to further 
question the context of the relationship she remembers so fondly. 
The revelation of Jenny’s prepubescent body alters both Jennifer’s and the viewer’s 
perception of the power relations between Jenny and her adult lovers, exposing the 
underlying issue of consent, and confirming the suspicions implied by Nettie early in the 
film. This adjustment unquestionably designates Jenny (and by extension, Fox) a 
“vulnerable subject” within the autobiographical discourse, by virtue of her status as a 
minor (Couser, 2004: p. xii). Consequently, the ethical imperative of bearing witness is 
redoubled for the viewer, as the implication of child sexual abuse irrevocably manifests. 
The substitution of the younger actress in the role of Jenny also prompts a shift in the 
viewer’s empathic engagement with the autobiographical narrative; when Jenny was 
depicted as a ‘blossoming teenager’, the relationship she described could be construed as 
her first foray into adult romance, as a recognisable heteronormative, coming-of-age 
experience. However, as the relationship is reframed as the abuse of an unwitting pre-
adolescent, the invitation to empathy functions on two different levels: “ambassadorial 
strategic empathy” (Keen, 2006: p. 215), which appeals to the viewer as witness on behalf 
of the child, and by extension, children like her who have experienced similar abuse; and 
“bounded strategic empathy”, which is contingent upon the “mutuality” of experience 
(Keen, 2006: p. 215) whereby viewers who may have experienced similar events in their 
own childhoods feel a kinship with Jenny (and simultaneously Fox) as fellow survivors. As 
the earlier flashback vignette is repeated, the young Jenny’s demeanour is markedly 
different; she is more reserved, less confident, and visibly in awe of Mrs. G, as she attests 
in the voiceover, “She was the most beautiful woman I had ever met. Every girl wanted to 
be just like her. Becky and Franny did. I did” (18:30-45). The extended flashback scene 
shows Jenny perceptibly unsure of herself in the company of the other girls at Mrs. G’s 
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camp – both of whom are physically more mature (18:43) – and eager to comply with Mrs. 
G’s stringent training regime, which includes cross-country running with Bill. Mrs. G’s 
introductory words are darkly prophetic: “Bill is an excellent coach. He will teach you to go 
beyond the complaints of your bodies” (18:59), as Bill rounds the corner in slow motion 
causing Jenny to stand bolt upright (19:06). As Bill introduces himself to the girls in turn, 
Jenny is submissive, a dynamic that is further installed by Bill’s directive during the 
cohort’s run: “I am Nouga, you are Neets. When I say Nouga, you say Neets!” (19:35-38). 
As the other girls drop back in exhaustion, Jenny forces herself to keep pace with Bill, 
continuing with the call and response chant “Nouga – Neets” (19:27-20:03) as she 
obediently follows him through the woods alone. By presenting Jenny as she was in 
contrast with the way Jennifer remembered her, Fox dispels any doubt regarding the 
nature of the relationship, which purposely prompts further inquiry as to the circumstances 
that led an introverted, but eager-to-please child to victimhood, and a seemingly content 
adult to repress the truth of her childhood exploitation. 
 
Figure 2.2: Jennifer speaks to Jenny (Nélisse) in the mirror. 
Seen through flashbacks, the relationship with Mrs. G and Bill becomes routine, with 
Jenny spending every weekend at Mrs. G’s ranch where she keeps her horse. But, when 
Bill eventually suggests that Jenny stay with him without Mrs G, Jenny is visibly stricken, 
although Mrs G. creates the illusion that the decision to stay is Jenny’s (47:17). In the 
voiceover Jennifer is heard asking “What did I say? I don’t remember” (47:29-35), 
highlighting the fallibility of traumatic memory. Jennifer looks to the essay as an aide 
memoire, searching the pages for an answer (47:46): “Did I say yes?” (47:50). From off 
screen Jennifer questions Jenny, who appears to be conversing with her older self 
through her reflection in the mirror (47:51-48:58) (see Figure 2.2), a strategy of filmic 
autobiography that for Leah Anderst “can reveal an autobiographer’s empathy with 
[herself] in the past” (Anderst, 2019: p. 82). This scene is representative of a specific 
empathetic “track” between the autobiographer and her narrating ‘I’, Jennifer, which 
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extends to the experiencing ‘I’, Jenny (see Anderst, 2015: p. 279) and to the viewer as 
willing witness. Jennifer’s reflection appears in the mirror next to Jenny’s, as she directs 
her to the essay as evidence that Jenny did not want to stay. Jenny, again, denounces the 
story as fiction, levelling the accusation that Jennifer has become “like all of them” (48:49) 
in trying to control her, before leaving Bill’s bathroom enraged. Intercut with close shots of 
Jennifer reading the essay, the flashback demonstrates the way Bill’s ‘relationship’ with 
Jenny crosses a vital line, as Jennifer – and likewise the viewer – are forced to look on, 
helpless to intervene. Essentially, both Jennifer and the viewer must bear witness to the 
traumatic memory, sharing the same empathic track that leads back to the experiencing ‘I’ 
of the child within the text. Concurrently, the viewer is engaged at an additional empathic 
level, through the emersive (Schmitt, 2017) reconciliation of Fox’s filmic counterparts with 
the living autobiographical subject outside of the text. The viewer simultaneously feels 
empathy for the multiple entities of the testimonial ‘I’ on screen – that is both the 
experiencing ‘I’ of the child as narrated and the narrating ‘I’ Jennifer as she remembers – 
both of whom are representative of the real-word self-witness, Fox. Bill asks Jenny to read 
provocative poetry aloud and when her nerves make her hands shake, he apologises that 
he left it too late to light the fire, fetching her a blanket instead. The subjective camera 
adopts the remembering Jennifer’s point-of-view, panning from Bill to the fireplace and 
back again. This subjective manoeuvre reveals that the fire that was burning just seconds 
before in the reconstructed memory, was in truth dead (50:44), a detail that frames Bill’s 
subsequent request to share the blanket as a deliberate ruse enabling him to get closer to 
Jenny. As the viewer shares Jennifer’s subjective perspective, they see the way she 
‘corrects’ the details of her memory, which simultaneously reframes Bill’s concern as 
coercion. Bill tactically manipulates Jenny, stating “I want to save you from all those stupid 
young boys out there. I think you are perfect” before asking “Jenny, would you do 
something for me? Would you let me see you? […] Do you want to take your shirt off?” 
(52:45-53:18). Though Jenny is visibly reluctant, she complies; however, Bill soon 
escalates beyond looking. Jenny’s complete submission is depicted just a few scenes 
later as Bill ‘coaches’ Jenny through his attempt to penetrate her: “Just breathe… It’s 
okay…Not yet…We have to keep stretching you open slowly. No young boy would ever 
do this for you” (1:01:02-1:01:45). Bill’s reassuring words are discordant with his violent 
actions, contributing to Jenny’s misapprehension of their inappropriate sexual contact as 
intimacy, which, as Jennifer confirms throughout the course of the filmic narrative, derails 
her natural, sexual awakening and robs her of the ability to form lasting relationships 
(1:07:20 and 1:26:30). A close shot of Jenny’s face intercut with a reverse shot of Bill on 
top of her illustrates her agonising resolve in response to her rape, as her voiceover 
explains: “I find that I trust him so much, I never realise where he’s leading me. Once 
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we’re that far, I don’t know how to say no. I love him. He loves me” (1:00:52-1:01:31). 
Jenny’s words drive home her childish misunderstanding of consent, forging the 
connection between what begins as the innocent trust in her running coach, whom she 
follows for miles through the woods, to her eventual manipulation into an exploitative cycle 
of abuse that she is unable to recognise or stop; this is the basis of Jennifer’s ongoing 
mischaracterisation of the relationship as complicit. After failing to enter Jenny, Bill places 
her hand under the blanket before pushing her head down (1:02:03-1:02:11), further 
emphasising the aspect of coercion, after which she lays next to him, abject as he sleeps. 
The dissonance of Jenny’s juvenile body beside her adult abuser resonates in the high-
angled shot, forcing the viewer to reflect on the horror of the experience that Jenny fails to 
comprehend. The sexual scenes between Jenny and Bill are purposely the most difficult 
to watch, as they unflinchingly represent the reality of child sexual abuse at the core of 
Fox’s self-witnessing project. In what is undeniably the pivotal revelation of the autofilmic 
testimony for both Jennifer and the viewer, Fox denounces the un-representability and 
unspeakability of trauma, bringing both into unambiguous, embodied focus. 
Fox felt strongly about including the explicit and sensitive sexual content in The Tale in 
order to preserve the integrity of traumatic experience within the testimonial act of self-
witness, stating “It was a deal breaker to take it out” (Fox in Galuppo, 2018). However, 
choosing to keep these scenes raised a number of creative and ethical concerns, further 
complicated by her multiple roles within the witnessing structure. Fox initially experienced 
resistance from financiers and cinematographers, all of whom deemed the sexual content 
too difficult to address (Galuppo, 2018). But, Fox persevered, exhausting her personal 
connections to amass the necessary financial and creative support for the film, leveraged 
by her own personal investment. As both the subject (self-witness) and filmmaker (witness 
to witnessing), Fox negotiates the ethical imperative of bearing witness from each 
perspective, both of which must contend with trauma’s innate resistance to representation 
(Caruth, 2016). In her coalescent roles of self-witness and autobiographical subject, Fox is 
compelled to represent her experience as accurately as she is able, in line with her 
personal, autofilmic testimonial agenda. Still, the necessary reenactment of the traumatic 
episode presents an ethical, representational dilemma. Fox resolves this issue by casting 
an adult body double to take the place of Nélisse, the actress in the role of young Jenny, 
in all scenes of a sexual nature, as confirmed by the disclaimer in the end credits 
(1:49:10), using arbitrary prompts to illicit Nélisse’s pained expressions for the close shots 
(Nicholson, 2018). As director, Fox ensures the substitution is imperceptible on screen (as 
in the rape scene described above) using the Kuleshov effect – an editing technique 
whereby separate images are strategically shown in sequence to produce meaning –  to 
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facilitate a credible representation of traumatic experience without destabilising the 
autobiographical integrity of the testimonial ‘I’, and further, protecting the young actress 
from an inappropriate situation on set. Consequently, remaining sensitive to the 
unavoidable consternation around representations of sexual violence, Fox successfully 
navigates the ethical imperative of bearing witness without compromising the moral or 
testimonial boundaries of representation. 
Fox acknowledged the affective power of the film and the potential impact that inviting the 
viewer to bear witness could have. Instead of issuing the film through theatres, Fox struck 
a worldwide deal with HBO that would bypass cinematic release and bring the film directly 
to the home-viewing arena, making The Tale more accessible for a broad range of 
viewers. Fox stated:  
It has always been my intent to find an engaged distribution partner who 
deeply understands the wide reach of the project, not just as a film but for 
the impact it can have on a larger global conversation […]. In a world in 
which stories like mine have often been pushed into the darkness, no one 
had been better at shining a light on storytelling and important issues than 
HBO. 
(Fox in Galuppo, 2018)   
This move also enabled Fox to authorise what are listed on the film’s website as “outreach 
screenings” by charitable organisations, academic institutions and activist groups 
throughout the world, from Stellenbosch to Seoul. Recognising the film’s affective 
potential, the screening list is preceded by the directive: 
THE TALE is a movie like none we’ve ever experienced on this topic. It 
opens our eyes, hearts, and minds. The film is particularly effective when 
watched and talked about in small or large groups, in the classroom, in 
the office, in screening rooms and with your colleagues, fellow students, 
and friends. We invite you to sign up to host free public screenings of THE 
TALE in your community. With our complimentary viewing guides and 
other materials, we are committed to supporting your discussions and 
your participation. Thank you for helping us change the conversation. 
(original capitals, bold and italics, 2018) 
The use of personal and collective pronouns encourages a sense of community action, 
which manifests as a metatextual extension of the testimonial invitation. With this 
guidance on, and perpetuation of, the invitation to bear witness, Fox assumes an 
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ambassadorial role that both enables self-witness and actively encourages ethical, 
empathic witnessing as an imperative cultural step. 
*** 
Dori Laub explains that trauma “invariably plays a decisive formative role in who one 
comes to be, and in how one comes to live one’s life”, even when the trauma is 
“repressed” (70). Fox’s self-witnessing project illuminates this traumatic legacy by bearing 
witness to her abusers’ strategies of coercion and the lasting impact of the indoctrination 
she experienced in the facilitation of her abuse. In The Tale, Mrs. G and Bill initially exploit 
to their advantage Jenny’s feelings of marginalisation within her family. When Jenny’s 
sister breaks her arm, her parents are unable to attend Jenny’s end-of-season riding 
event at Mrs. G’s ranch, leaving Bill as her sole source of support during the competition; 
after the event Mrs. G takes a stranded Jenny to meet him for dinner at a nearby diner. It 
is during this meeting that Mrs. G and Bill begin to groom Jenny by flattering her writing 
and athletic talents before sharing the details of their affair. Jenny’s voiceover reflects 
upon this moment in a passage taken from the essay:  
How did they know they could trust me with their secret, that I would 
never break their confidence? The other girls would have told on them, 
but I would never tell my parents or the other adults. It was like an 
unspoken oath, and I felt proud of it. 
(38:20-38) 
Jenny’s Montagnean introspection in the essay eschews the risk of secrecy, instead 
postulating an alliance of equals that further expresses her naïveté, which is all too clear 
to both Jennifer and the viewer. By bringing Jenny into their confidence the couple 
establish the “secret order” of victimhood (Laub, 1995: p. 67), which Laub explains is 
“lived as an unconscious alternate truth” long after the experience of trauma. When Jenny 
claims she feels invisible at home, Bill tells her: “They can’t see you the way we can” 
(46:03) as he offers an alternative ‘family’ “based on complete honesty and love. Hiding 
nothing, revealing everything, just the truth” (46:24-37). This truth is subtly levied by Mrs. 
G and Bill, who expedite Jenny’s ‘inclusion’ by positing their own ideals as enlightened 
when compared with her parents’ conventional principles (45:06-46-37). This alternate 
ideology persists into adulthood, evinced as Jennifer’s indifference to marriage and her 
promiscuity in the wake of her abuse. When Jennifer’s patient but concerned fiancé, 
Martin, learns of her systemic manipulation by reading the letters she exchanged with 
Mrs. G and Bill, he levels “That’s rape. That’s illegal” (54:16), but Jennifer’s riposte is one 
of acceptance and justification: “It was the seventies and people didn’t talk about it like 
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that” (54:24). The same rationale is offered by Iris (Gretchen Koerner), who is initially 
presented as another adjacent witness, the existence of whom Jennifer had effaced, in 
her attempt to make sense of her past. As Jennifer conducts what is essentially a 
documentary interview with Iris, the reason for Iris’ omission becomes clear: as Iris 
recounts her involvement with Bill and Mrs. G, Jennifer’s disclosure leads Iris to the 
realisation that she too was indoctrinated by the couple, transitioning from victim within the 
“secret order” to eventual co-conspirator, facts that she had similarly repressed (1:28:53-
1:30:15). Iris provides the missing detail that allows Jennifer to assimilate the truth of her 
past, explaining that Mrs. G was “the cat bringing the mouse to [Bill]” (1:30:28). As the 
recurrent flashback of the couple’s introductory vignettes is replayed once again, the gaps 
in Jenny’s story are filled by the acceptance that Mrs. G was the catalyst in the cycle of 
abuse. This realisation is substantiated by the inclusion of additional details in the 
flashback montage, such as Mrs. G’s suggestion that Jenny stable her horse at the ranch 
in the diner scene, Bill’s account of Mrs. G’s fantasies about Jenny whilst they’re in bed 
together, and Mrs. G’s involvement in the orchestration of the group encounter with Iris 
(1:30:46-1:31:50), all of which irrevocably reshape Jennifer’s perception of her past and 
the viewer’s understanding of the intricacies and depth of Fox’s systemic abuse. 
In their book Traumatic Affect (2013), Meera Atkinson and Michael Richardson aver: 
“being open to one’s own trauma is necessary in order to be open to that of another, and 
conversely opening to the trauma of others facilitates opening to one’s own” (p. 3). This 
assertion attests to the intersubjective exchange of testimonial witnessing as exhibited in 
Jennifer’s encounter with Iris, who is only able to acknowledge the true nature of past 
events by hearing Jennifer’s account and offering her own in return. Jennifer’s epiphanic 
realisation ultimately compels her to revisit Mrs. G in search of resolution. Though the 
elderly Mrs. G (Frances Conroy) denies Jennifer the acknowledgment she needs, refusing 
to engage in the reciprocal testimonial exchange Jennifer tentatively attempts to convene 
(1:16:30-1:19:45), Fox, through her autofilmic testimony, empathetically recognises Mrs. 
G as another of Bill’s victims. In an imagined documentary-style interview between 
Jennifer and the young Mrs. G (Debicki), Jennifer questions Mrs. G’s failure to ‘save’ her 
from off-screen: “I couldn’t ask for help. I was waiting for you to save me. Somehow in my 
mind it couldn’t be anybody else. It had to be you. Why didn’t you?” (1:39:36-49). As Mrs. 
G gazes directly into the camera lens with tears in her eyes, she simply states “no-one 
saved me” (1:39:50). Here, as she does elsewhere in the film, Fox hints at Mrs. G’s own 
abusive past, offering a possible rationale for both Mrs. G’s behaviour, and Jennifer’s 
apparent forgiveness. Fox’s filmic testimony withholds any kind of elaboration on the 
subject of Mrs. G’s implied traumatic past, but the subtext of cyclical trauma, coupled with 
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Fox’s empathetic portrayal of the elderly Mrs. G and her devotion to her ailing husband Dr. 
G (Grant James), suggest that Fox may have occupied the role of receiver of the real-
world Mrs. G’s testimony prior to her death and the film’s production.17  
Jennifer’s apparent compassion for Iris, and for Mrs. G in spite of her actions, is further 
evidence of the autobiographical “tracks” of empathy in Fox’s autofilmic testimony, much 
like those Leah Anderst identifies in literary autobiographies (2015). For Anderst, the 
tracks of empathy in autobiographical narratives manifest as “channels […] across which 
affective responses and empathetic engagement may travel between figures within and 
outside of the texts” (2015: p. 273). Autobiographical narratives demonstrate the subject’s 
empathy with “real others” as well as their empathy with the narrated or experiencing ‘I’ as 
representative of their self in the past (Anderst, 205: p. 274). These tracks effectively relay 
empathy between the autobiographer – as the real person and author of the text – and 
those represented within the narrative, and concurrently between the reader (or viewer) 
and those represented within the narrative, and back to the author-subject (Anderst, 2015: 
pp. 273-274). In The Tale, the empathic tracks within the narrative evince Fox’s empathy 
with those involved in her traumatic past and her process of self-witnessing. The 
exchange between Jennifer and Iris reveals Fox’s empathy with Iris as someone who was 
also subject to Bill and Mrs. G’s exploitation, positing Iris’s experience as akin to her own, 
whilst the stylised interview between Jennifer and the young Mrs. G subtly remarks upon 
the perpetuity of the secret order and its lasting impact. In so doing, Fox acknowledges 
the often unspoken and endemic nature of sexual exploitation, demonstrating the 
metonymic and representative responsibility of her autofilmic testimony, which she readily 
and rigorously accepts. 
Laub explains, “Survivors who do not tell their story become victims of a distorted memory 
[…], which causes an endless struggle with and of a delusion”; he goes on to avow “[t]he 
longer the story remains untold, the more distorted it becomes in the survivor’s conception 
of it, so much so that the survivor doubts the reality of the actual events” (1995: p. 64). As 
a mode of existential “repossession”, testimony “is a dialogical process of exploration and 
reconciliation of two worlds – the one that was brutally destroyed and the one that is” 
(Laub, 1995: p. 74). In the repression of the traumatic truth of her past for more than thirty 
years, Jennifer initially failed to recognise her childhood essay as self-witness from “within 
the experience” (Laub, 61), negating its healing potential. The repercussions of 
undisclosed traumatic experience are articulated onscreen in a stylised dialogue between 
 
17 Fox has stated in numerous publicly available interviews that she spoke with ‘Mrs. G’ 
during her time writing the screenplay, but that Mrs G died before the film was realised. 
82 
 
Jenny and Jennifer, which allows Fox to underscore the disparity between misinterpreted 
childhood trauma and the adult reclamation of memory that informs the belated realisation 
of abuse. Recognising that the truth had been hidden in plain sight the whole time, 
Jennifer challenges her younger self: Jenny walks through the school hallway gazing 
directly into the camera lens, when Jennifer’s voice from off screen accuses “You lied to 
me. You told me it was a good thing all these years” (1:41:24-28). Jenny repeats the 
doctrine against marriage and children – a view Jennifer has maintained into adulthood – 
resolute in her refusal of victimhood; but, her fear manifests when Jennifer tells her there 
were other victims and that she is planning to confront Bill in the present, which stops 
Jenny in her tracks as the school bell rings (1:43:00). Jennifer’s acceptance of the 
testimonial nature of the essay mobilises her belated act of self-witness through a 
symbolic confrontation with Bill (John Heard) as the ‘telling’ of her traumatic past secures 
her “liberation” (Laub, 70). However, Bill is not afforded the same empathetic portrayal as 
Mrs. G within the autofilmic testimony. Surrounded by revellers and former students, Bill 
delivers an egotistical acceptance speech for a prestigious award; an anxious Jennifer, 
after meeting Bill’s much younger wife, Margie (Jaqueline Fleming) (1:44:46), introduces 
herself to Bill, who has already begun to compliment her, going as far as touching her 
hair. When Bill attempts to kiss her on the cheek in recognition and greeting, Jennifer 
recoils, before mounting a verbal and increasingly public exposition of Bill’s past conduct. 
Bill initially pleads ignorance, but is ultimately exposed as an unremorseful, serial 
predator, blaming Jennifer for her lack of trust, as other female guests appear to identify 
with Jennifer’s account. As Bill is ushered from the room, Jennifer vaguely addresses the 
nearby witnesses: “What? Nobody else was coached by Bill?” (1:47:46) before retreating 
to the restroom to vomit as she did after every physical encounter with Bill as a child. 
Though she did not confront Bill as depicted in the film, Fox cites his reluctance to discuss 
and take responsibility for the past as the reason for the scene’s inclusion (Gray, 2018); 
however, this creative intervention also affords Jennifer the cathartic closure she needs, 
and Fox a definitive opportunity to articulate the specificity of her personal trauma. Like 
Kim’s mythical catharsis in Arirang, as discussed in Chapter One, Fox makes use of 
fiction to reconcile her traumatic past with her present as a form of narrative self-liberation. 
Ultimately, the production and commercial release of The Tale constitute Fox’s self-
witnessing testimony, with the viewer as ethical and empathic witness to both the product 
and the process. The final scene shows Jennifer and Jenny seated side-by-side on the 
restroom floor, united as the testimonial ‘I’, in a symbolic representation of the 
reconciliation of past with present, experiencing ‘I’ with narrating ‘I’, memory with 





The Tale’s testimonial status influenced the critical and commercial reception of the film, 
as Fox strategically managed both the release and distribution of the film in line with her 
own testimonial agenda (mentioned earlier). When the film premiered at the Sundance 
Film Festival in January 2018, the industry was besieged by the coalescing sociopolitical 
#TimesUp and #MeToo movements in response to widespread allegations of historical 
sexual assault and misogyny. In this context, Fox wanted to “break the picture” of what an 
abused woman looks like (Fox in Gray), to challenge public perceptions of belated 
disclosure and to address pervasive opinions around the perpetrators of historical sexual 
abuse. Fox’s representative awareness is further evinced in the deliberate “mediatization” 
(O’Loughlin, 2013) of The Tale. Ben O’ Loughlin explains: 
Mediatization refers to the manner in which a social event, process or 
practice becomes considered by those participating in it as a media 
phenomenon, and any media organisations involved are aware of 
themselves as integral to that phenomenon.  
(2013: p. 193) 
Fox’s public profile, coupled with the film’s personal and testimonial capital, inevitably 
drew significant media interest, but this interest was mobilised as activism, using the film’s 
press to draw attention to – and raise awareness of – the effects of childhood sexual 
trauma and the rationale for belated outcry in cases of historical sexual abuse. Jordan 
Hoffman’s five-star review in The Guardian dubbed The Tale “the mother of all #MeToo 
movies”, describing it as “an innovative, honest and important film” that made both him 
and his contemporaries “extremely uncomfortable” during the Sundance screening he 
attended (n.p.). Hoffman urges readers to see The Tale, essentially perpetuating Fox’s 
invitation to bear “witness to the process of witnessing itself” (Laub, 1995: p. 62). 
Moreover, by revealing her own experience of childhood trauma as filmic testimony within 
the public domain, Fox championed therapeutic engagement, creating an online presence 
for the film that included numerous resources for those who might have been affected by 
the issues raised in The Tale. The film’s website includes an index of links to support 
charities and organizations at the bottom of each page, all of which Fox has engaged with 
in the composition and dissemination of the film. The website remains active to this day, 
providing a paratextual platform beyond the viewing experience through which Fox is able 
to propagate the testimonial witnessing paradigm, offering an interactive outpost for 




Graphic Content: Representing Repression  
The animated Persepolis constitutes a powerful and ambassadorial autofilmic testimony 
that bears witness to a larger traumatic cultural issue, figuratively “unveiling” (Naghibi and 
O’Malley, 2005: p. 224) the experience of the traumatised collective in Iran through 
Satrapi’s own self-witnessing project. Where Fox consciously constructed the metatextual 
framing of The Tale to further propagate her testimonial invitation to witnessing, Satrapi’s 
testimonial advocacy is primarily perpetuated pedagogically, with her multimedial 
autobiographical portraiture afforded a surfeit of scholarly attention. The published comic 
is noteworthy for its reported “universality” (Naghabi and O’Malley, 2005: p. 226), 
marketed under numerous genre labels including “autobiography; children’s or young 
adult’s literature; graphic novel; middle east history; women’s studies” (Naghabi and 
O’Malley, 2002: p. 223) and heralded as a “timely and timeless story” (Publishers Weekly, 
2003). Often critically situated alongside the paradigmatic Pulitzer-Prize-winning comic 
memoir Maus (1980) by Art Spiegelman, the comic Persepolis is lauded as a canonical 
text within the burgeoning fields of comic studies and life writing, with the text’s critical 
intersections – autobiography and history, sequential art and subjectivity, childhood and 
war – inviting a broad spectrum of intellectual inquiry from feminist and post-colonial 
scholars alike. As a performative reenactment of the same testimonial labour, the 
animated Persepolis shares much of the comic’s notoriety, but furthermore, the cinematic 
medium renews and reinvigorates academic interest in Satrapi’s testimony, whilst it 
affords her invitation an extended, global platform.       
Although critically acclaimed as “a movie with an urgent new story to tell and an urgent 
new way of telling it” (Bradshaw, 2008), Satrapi’s autofilmic testimonial invitation was not 
universally accepted, as the film provides a less-than-favourable perspective on a 
contentious period of Iranian history. Prior to the film’s official screening at Cannes it was 
the subject of much controversy, with Satrapi the recipient of heavy criticism from cinema 
advocates in her native Iran, who claimed that the film provides “an unreal picture of the 
outcomes and achievements of the Islamic Revolution” (Rezadad in Jaafar, 2007). At the 
time, Satrapi refused to, in her own words, “nourish [the] dispute” (in Jaafar, 2007) by 
engaging with the Iranian press, stating only “I accept criticism” and “I believe in freedom 
of expression and speech” (ibid). In a recent interview, after the resurgence in the comic 
Persepolis’ popularity due to its inclusion in actress and feminist Emma Watson’s ‘Our 
Shared Shelf’ book club, Satrapi attests to the authenticity of her testimony, stating “I am a 
person who was born in a certain place, in a certain time, and I can be unsure about 
everything, but I am not unsure of what I have lived. I know it”. She goes on to explain that 
it is difficult to “identify with” a nation, but that a single person’s story is much easier to 
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relate to (in Watson, 2016). Much as Fox’s testimonial endeavour reveals the nuances of 
childhood sexual abuse, Satrapi’s autofilmic testimony demystifies cultural trauma, inviting 
the viewer to bear witness through a medium that offers a particularly pertinent form of 
empathic engagement. For Satrapi, “the cinema is a machine of empathy” as “there is no 
media in the world that can create as much empathy as cinema” (in Watson, 2016). The 
animated Persepolis’ executive producer, Kathleen Kennedy, further claims that through 
the film Satrapi “[opens] up a channel of communication” (in Jaafar, 2007), indicative of 
the intersubjective and empathic witnessing structure that the autofilmic testimony 
invokes. This channel persists beyond the film, in tandem with the comic, bearing witness 
to Satrapi’s personal trauma and the plight of the Iranian people, humanising the ordeal of 
the collective as graphically mediated experience. What becomes apparent then, is that 
Satrapi’s testimonial strategy is predicated upon “ambassadorial strategic empathy” 
(Keen, 2006: p. 2015), founded upon the notion of bearing witness to and for the 
repressed in a manner that evades state censorship and makes otherwise silenced voices 
heard.  
Satrapi’s ambassadorial invitation is further evinced by her decision to both write and 
release the comic and the film in French in the first instance, using the native language of 
her emancipatory home, which is also the lingua franca of her liberation – both before and 
after the revolution.18 Originally published in four volumes, the comic was translated into 
English as one volume and retitled The Complete Persepolis in 2003.19 The volume 
encompasses Satrapi’s childhood in Iran – which straddles the Islamic Revolution and the 
resultant Iraq-Iran war – along with a period of exile spent in Vienna as a teenager, her 
return to Iran, and her eventual permanent departure. A critical tension between East and 
West underpins Satrapi’s testimonial voice, with the interrogation of culture, politics, 
religion and identity all fundamental to the autobiographical discourse. In an introductory 
note that precedes the graphic narrative, Satrapi explains the political history of Iran, citing 
its “domination” by foreign “invaders” and the power struggles that ensued for control of its 
natural resources (2008: n.p). Satrapi concludes this overview with a statement of intent:  
Since [the Islamic revolution], this old and great civilization [Iran] has been 
discussed mostly in connection with fundamentalism, fanaticism, and 
terrorism. As an Iranian who has lived more than half my life in Iran, I 
know that this image is far from the truth. This is why writing Persepolis 
was so important to me. I believe that an entire nation should not be 
 
18 Satrapi was educated in a francophone school run by nuns before Islamic rule imposed 
segregation. 
19 I cite from the 2008 Vintage publication of Persepolis throughout. 
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judged by the wrongdoings of a few extremists. I also don’t want those 
Iranians who lost their lives in prisons defending freedom, who died in war 
against Iraq, who suffered under various regimes, or who were forced to 
leave their families and flee their homeland to be forgotten. 
One can forgive but one should never forget. 
(n.p.) 
The paratextual note refutes pervasive Western ideologies, and Satrapi articulates her 
testimonial agenda by pledging to bear witness, even before she issues the 
autobiographical invitation in the first graphic frame (p. 3). As Hilary Chute observes: 
“Persepolis is about the ethical verbal and visual practice of ‘not forgetting’” through “the 
political confluence of the everyday and the historical” (2008: p. 94), a practice that is 
transposed into the production of the animated film. For Chute, the comic demonstrates 
Satrapi’s command of visual media in an “exploration of extremity” (Chute, 2008: p. 92) 
that is able to both ‘show’ and ‘tell’ experience from a uniquely stylised perspective. 
Therefore, Satrapi’s comic autobiography is the precedent model for “visual and verbal 
witnessing” (Chute, 2008: p. 94) from which the animated Persepolis (2007) is produced, 
and consequently, the film retains the testimonial agenda of not forgetting inherent in the 
comic.  
The popular appeal of the source comic, along with the film’s collaborative production, 
inevitably invites scrutiny of the animated Persepolis as an adaptation, a critical 
perspective that does inform the forthcoming analysis as a presage to the discussion of 
auteurbiographical adaptations in Section Two. The transposition of the narrative from 
print comic to animated film highlights the shift in the mode of reading that the filmic 
narrative invites, primarily in terms of the animation’s elision of the gutters and captions 
that characterise comic forms. However, Satrapi’s approach to remediation has significant 
implications for her electively representative role within the broader context of her 
testimonial endeavour, as will become clear. As the animated Persepolis is posited in this 
chapter as the testimonial progeny of an individual author-subject, the effects of the 
adaptive process are foregrounded as Satrapi’s deliberate emphasis of the collective 
impact of cultural trauma as related to her autofilmic testimony’s ambassadorial 
testimonial agenda.20 Nevertheless, the retention of Satrapi’s original comic’s drawings, 
retraced at length in frame-by-frame animation in the film, preserves her distinctive 
graphic perspective, and the unique representational idiom of her autobiographical ‘I’, 
 
20The adaptation of autobiographical acts is addressed in more detail in Section Two. 
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placing her ‘in’ the film. Consequently, Satrapi expands upon her original performative 
testimony through her ‘hands-on’ supervision of the adaptive animation process, by citing 
herself within the filmic discourse to legitimate the remediated testimonial endeavour. 
Accordingly, the following analysis holds the autobiographical invitation of the autofilmic 
testimonial I/eye and the cognisant instantiation of the testimonial witnessing structure as 
its central focus.  
Much like Jennifer Fox in the production of The Tale, Satrapi’s autobiographical authority 
is asserted through her roles as both co-writer and co-director of the animated film.21 
Satrapi also retains the autobiographical inscription of the ‘real name’, which “signals to 
the reader an intended fidelity […] to a world of biographical reference beyond the text” 
(Eakin, 1992: p. 28), connecting the autobiographical ‘I’ of both the book and the film as 
referents for the real-world self-witness, Satrapi. Like The Tale, the animated Persepolis 
also adopts the narrative viewpoint of both the experiencing/narrated ‘I’ of the child, and 
the narrating ‘I’ of the adult in tandem to construct the testimonial ‘I’ of the autofilmic 
testimony. Unlike The Tale, however, Satrapi installs the narrating I’ as a “frame narrator” 
(Nixon, 2010: p. 94), who provides a temporally progressive and retrospective witnessing 
structure to which the remembered experience of autofilmic testimony is tethered, and 
which mimics the discursive narrative strategy of the caption box in the comic source. 
Whereas the memory work of Fox’s autofilmic testimony necessitates a dialogic 
relationship between past and present, experiencing ‘I’ and narrating ‘I’, in order to install 
a composite iteration of the testimonial ‘I’ and a true account of Fox’s experience for the 
viewer as witness, Satrapi’s testimonial agenda of not forgetting requires the assertion of 
separate – yet co-operative – incarnations of the experiencing ‘I’ and narrating ‘I’ in the 
assertion of a bilateral testimonial ‘I’ to build an accurate diachronic account. In the 
animated Persepolis, both the experiencing child ‘I’ and the narrating adult ‘I’ articulate 
Satrapi’s dynamic and developing testimonial ‘I’. The narrating ‘I’ as a frame narrator 
offers commentary through voiceover, providing connective context for the episodes 
involving the experiencing ‘I’ and the ways in which they constitute self-witnessing 
testimony within the invitational witnessing structure of autofilmic testimony, directly 
addressing the viewer as witness.  
Where Fox issues the testimonial invitation immediately through a disembodied, vocal 
assertion of testimonial truth without a visual anchor, Satrapi initially withholds the 
testimonial invitation, choosing instead to begin her autofilmic testimony with establishing 
shots of an airport with no dialogue. Though Marjane is identified as the empathic target 
 
21 Satrapi credits Vincent Paronnaud as co-writer and co-director. 
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through subjective framing and reverse-shot subjective perspective as she inspects the 
departures board (2:02), the narrating ‘I’’s first words are not uttered until over three 
minutes into the film. The withholding of Marjane’s narrative voice encourages the viewer 
to read the images instead, to piece together Marjane’s “emplacement” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 42), in terms of the cultural and contextual setting in which her narrative 
takes place, and the ways in which “subject position” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 42) is 
configured within these discourses. 22 The narrative present is coded by a muted colour 
palette, with the narrating ‘I’, the adult Marjane (voiced by Chiara Mastroianni), pictured in 
a red coat, and the narrated past is depicted in stark black and white, as the ten-year-old 
Marji (Amethyste Frezignac), the experiencing/narrated ‘I’, skips through the frame in 
which Marjane waits for her flight (2:52). Marjane’s voiceover describes the “uneventful, 
peaceful existence” (3:13) of her younger self, as the precocious child confidently 
addresses the adults in the flashback vignette, asserting her ability to assist with the 
luggage; but in the present Marjane is sombre, stoically donning her veil under the 
scrutiny of a red-haired woman in a restroom before smoking a solitary cigarette in the 
airport lounge. In these opening scenes, the viewer is introduced to the identity politics at 
play within the testimonial narrative, and the bilateral iteration of the testimonial ‘I’ that 
issues the autobiographical invitation. The airport setting, and Marjane’s nonverbal 
interactions with those around her, convey both her isolation and her otherness, as 
determined by her lack of communication and the visual markers of her cultural beliefs 
and ethnicity in contrast with those around her. Marjane is presented as geographically 
and temporally distant from her home and her childhood self, to establish the diegetic 
present of the narrating ‘I’ and frame narrator of the autofilmic testimony. The narrative’s 
retrospective and subjective scope is asserted through the statement “I remember” (3:11), 
heard as Marjane’s voiceover, which issues the autobiographical invitation to bear witness 
to the testimonial narrative that follows.  
Satrapi’s autofilmic testimony is comprised of three key sections: her childhood in Iran 
before, during and after the revolution; her adolescence as the new Islamic regime takes 
power and she is exiled to Europe; and early adulthood that sees her short-lived return to 
Iran before she leaves again. One of the major themes in the first act of Satrapi’s 
autofilmic testimony is the establishment and development of the subjective emplacement, 
as mentioned above, with particular reference to Marjane’s family history, ideology and 
politics. Throughout the animated Persepolis, Satrapi mobilises the testimonies of others 
as both context and evidence of the “cultural disorientation” (Sztompka, 2000: p. 453) that 
informs her “ideological ‘I’”, which refers to the social, institutional and historical 
 
22 A theoretical overview of positionality is given in Chapter One. 
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discourses within which a subject’s sense of self is developed (Smith and Watson, 2010: 
p. 76). In addition, the social framing (Schmitt, 2017) simultaneously propagates the 
relational fabric of testimony, often found in post-conflict documentary projects. As a 
minor, Marji’s ideology is shaped by the testimonies of “significant others” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 86), who, as explained in Chapter One, play a substantial role in the 
subject’s self-formation. Marji’s propensity for empathic witnessing is learned from her 
family, all of whom are active in their resolute resistance to the Shah’s regime and the 
changing political climate, and steadfast in their support of like-minded peers. In order to 
convey to the viewer the historical and ideological context of Satrapi’s testimony in the 
film, as described in the aforementioned paratextual note in the comic, Marji’s father 
(Sean Penn) explains to his wilful daughter the political facts of the Shah’s ascendancy in 
contrast with the preferred, and heretofore accepted, cultural history offered to her by her 
teachers – that the Shah was appointed by God (05:35-07:36). These contradictory 
narratives represent the “coexisting” and “competing ideological notions” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 77) that jockey for position in the development of Marji’s ideological ‘I’, 
and the relational framework and testimonial agenda of Satrapi’s autofilmic testimony. In 
both the comic and the film, Marji’s father offers this history with the authority of a living 
witness, delivered in the oral tradition with the accompanying images and dialogue 
adopting a somewhat pantomime tone on screen. Though condensed from the original 
comic, the cinematic narrative retains Marji’s playful, childlike perspective, with the 
characters in her imagined reenactment of her father’s story depicted on a curtained 
stage, with puppet-like, spasmodic movements at odds with the film’s standard, fluid 
animation (05:49-07:21). This imagined reenactment reflects Marji’s simplistic 
understanding of her history at this point in her childhood. Moreover, the dream sequence 
that follows her father’s story is indicative of young Marji’s crude conceptions of war and 
communism, with her inability to conceive of the storied atrocities brought into relief by the 
stark, black and faceless images of soldiers opposing a similarly anonymous but reticent 
lay public (07:55-08:50). Marji’s juvenile grasp of the concepts explained to her is further 
emphasised by her mispronunciation of communist as “comuniss” as she falls asleep 
(07:45). Marji’s youthful naiveté progressively dissolves as the narrative unfolds, as a 
consequence of bearing witness to the first-hand experience of numerous others through 
further oral testimonies. When family friend, Siamak, visits after a period of incarceration, 
he regales Marji and her family with a frank account of his own experience of torture under 
the Shah regime (10:34-11:33). A wide-eyed Marji is captivated as the man speaks, 
further enthralled by Siamak’s daughter’s pronouncement of her father as a hero, which 
both children accept unquestioningly in light of his pragmatic testimony. But, Marji’s 
misunderstanding of the circumstances of Siamak’s imprisonment manifests as a 
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reenactment of torture against a friend, Ramin, whose father is a Shah soldier, for which 
she is severely reprimanded by her mother (11:55-12:35). Marji’s haste to punish Ramin is 
indicative of the empathy she feels for Siamak as witness to his testimony, which is in turn 
witnessed by the viewer as vital historical insight. Seeking clarification, Marji converses 
with God, who tells her it is her duty to forgive those who commit murder in the Shah’s 
name and explains that the boy she tried to punish is not accountable for his father’s 
actions (13:00-18). But, when Marji attempts to offer her forgiveness, Ramin rejects her, 
denouncing communists in vocal support of his father’s beliefs, which only confounds 
Marji further (13:20-35). However, when Marji’s uncle, Anoosh (Iggy Pop) also visits the 
Satrapi household upon his release from prison, he forges a close relationship with Marji 
through his tales of ancestral resistance to the Shah regime and his own exile in the 
Soviet Union. Unlike the satire of the earlier reenactment that supplemented her father’s 
story, Anoosh’s testimony is authorised by a reenactment largely indistinguishable 
stylistically from the main narrative, which – when compared with the imagined pantomime 
and dream sequence mentioned earlier – denotes Marji’s improved understanding, the 
significance of the testimony within Satrapi’s autofilmic testimony, and its basis in lived 
reality. Anoosh explains: “The reason I’m telling you all this is because it’s important that 
you know the history of our family, that it should never be forgotten. Even if you don’t 
understand everything, and even if it’s painful for you”, to which Marji responds “Don’t 
worry Uncle Anoosh, I promise I’ll never forget” (17:36-17:48). The confluence of familial 
testimonies endows Marji – and the viewer – with a greater sense of her political heritage 
and cultural identity, and facilitates Marji’s ideological awakening, which shapes both the 
ideological ‘I’ and the testimonial agenda of her narrated autobiographical account. In 
relaying these testimonies through her own autofilmic testimony, Satrapi bears witness to 
witnessing through the lens of her own childhood experience, fortified by the testimonies 
of others, which serves to illuminate the origins of her unique ideological perspective and 
also her learned capacity for empathic witnessing and testimonial discourse.    
Satrapi’s testimonial perspective differs from Jennifer Fox’s in that the focal trauma at the 
centre of her testimony is cultural as well as personal, experienced as a member of a 
collective or community for which a progressive and irreversible social change occurs. 
Jeffrey C. Alexander asserts that cultural trauma leaves “indelible marks upon [the 
collective’s] group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their 
future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Alexander, 2004: p. 1). For Kai 
Erikson, “collective trauma” constitutes: 
A blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching 
people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality. The 
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collective trauma works its way slowly and even insidiously into the 
awareness of those who suffer from it, […] a gradual realization that the 
community no longer exists as an effective source of support and that an 
important part of the self has disappeared. 
(1976: p. 154) 
Satrapi’s animated Persepolis describes this gradual realisation as a result of both the 
Islamic Revolution and the war that ensues from both Marji’s, and subsequently Marjane’s 
position within the Iranian community, describing the shifting attitudes both as they occur 
within herself and in those around her over time. As a demonstrative act of testimonial 
witnessing, the narrating ‘I’ of the voiceover accompanies the monochrome images of 
conflict in the wake of the revolution, with a soundtrack of explosions to match the glowing 
light on the dark horizon and a melancholic instrumental ancillary over shadowy 
executions and civilians hiding in their homes: 
One year after the revolution, Iraq attacked Iran. Our country was weak 
and Saddam took the opportunity to strike. The revolution and massive 
purges from the army had left us extremely vulnerable. Under the 
pretence of fighting the foreign enemy, the Iranian government 
exterminated the domestic enemy. In other words, the former opponents 
of the Shah. Arrests and executions became common practice. Everyone 
was afraid. This reign of fear allowed the new government to introduce 
laws that were even more repressive. In just two years’ time our daily lives 
had changed drastically, and so had we.  
(my italics, 21:31-22:06) 
Marjane’s use of collective pronouns (italicised above) emphasises the progressive impact 
of the conflict on the collective, further asserting the metonymy of self-witness in Satrapi’s 
autofilmic testimony as a denunciation of the impact of cultural trauma on the collective, 
and the representative status of self-witness. Consequently, Satrapi’s testimonial invitation 
encompasses both “ambassadorial” and “bounded strategic empathy” (Keen, 2006: p. 
215) throughout, as her autofilmic testimony articulates her own personal experience as 
well as advocating the shared experience of the traumatised collective. As Stacey Weber-
Fève attests: “the literal or metaphorical or even metonymical focus on characters and 
their states of being and seeing transgresses the conventional boundaries of the narrative 
to heighten our emotional involvement with our emotional investment in the text” (2011: p. 
327). Satrapi shows, from her insider perspective, that the historical and irrevocable 
impact of cultural trauma for her and her compatriots cannot and must not be forgotten.   
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The lasting legacy of the Islamic Revolution is codified on screen through Satrapi’s 
foregrounding of the veil. The veil has come to signify “Eastern otherness from the 
Western perspective” (Klapcsik, 2016: p. 79) and Satrapi uses it throughout Persepolis as 
a dominant symbol of “cultural disorientation” – a symptom of cultural trauma that 
emerges “due to radically changed technological, economic, or political conditions” 
(Sztompka, 2000: p. 453) – with the first chapter of the comic named after the iconic 
object. The imposition of the veil by the new Islamic government marks a significant 
turning point in both Satrapi’s childhood and in the cohesion of the Iranian community at 
the onset of the Islamic revolution, and is the crucial point at which Marji’s graphic 
narrative begins. In the comic, Marji’s conflicted feelings about the veil are succinctly 
conveyed in one frame in particular, whereby the child is represented as split vertically 
down the middle, one half veiled and the other half not (p. 6). This image articulates the 
dichotomy of modernity versus religion, or the East/West cultural opposition, which 
summarises what Marji perceives as the inherent discord at the heart of Iran’s collective 
trauma, as two seemingly irreconcilable cultural characteristics. In the film, the same 
underlying dissonance is revealed piecemeal, with the veil’s significance foreshadowed in 
the opening scenes where the narrating ‘I’, the adult Marjane, reinstates her veil at the 
airport. The first scene in which the veil is worn collectively comes over twenty minutes 
into the film, only after Satrapi’s testimonial perspective has been firmly asserted: 
eighteen young women – some only partially visible – are shown beating their breasts to 
honour the fallen martyrs of the ongoing Iraq/Iran war (22: 06). Initially, it is difficult to 
identify Marji as each of the figures appears very similar, part of a sea of white, vacant 
faces set against an undefined black background in which the individuals’ veils seem to 
merge together, signifying the collective (see Figure 2.3). But, Marji’s central position in 
the frame proclaims her status as the empathic target of the autofilmic discourse, 
confirmed by an extreme close up of her face (21:54). Marji is further distinguished from 
her peers as the students return to the school building, when she breaks ranks to openly 
mock the practice of self-flagellation, rolling on the floor with her Nike high-tops visible, her 
sarcasm drawing the ire of her teacher (22:15-24). In the classroom, the teacher dictates 
the virtues of the veil to her sceptical students: “The veil is synonymous with freedom. A 
woman who’s virtuous is a woman who hides herself from the eyes of men. Those who 
reveal themselves are indulging in sin and will burn in hell” (22:28-41). As the teacher’s 
voice fades, it is replaced by Marji’s, as she and her classmates covertly compare their 
pop music tastes before they are interrupted by an air-raid siren and forced to file out of 
the lesson (22:50). This episode demonstrates the ways in which Marji simultaneously 
obeys and rejects the mandate of the new religious order – as though split – by wearing 
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the veil and observing the ritual, but without any real belief or conviction, and whilst 
flouting the ban on modernity – or ‘Western decadence’.  
 
Figure 2.3: Marji at the centre of her classmates and the merging of their veils.  
Marji’s ‘splitness’ is representative of the underlying tension within the community.  The 
adolescent preoccupations of ‘coming of age’, such as popular music and fashion, along 
with the indulgent recreations of a formerly avant-garde community, are demonised under 
Iran’s Islamic rule, which imposes a belief system largely at odds with that of the liberal, 
educated Satrapi family and their contemporaries. As formerly acceptable activities under 
the Shah, parties and alcohol consumption continue behind closed doors, primarily in 
domestic settings where the Satrapi women routinely discard their veils; in the voiceover, 
Marjane claims “Attending these parties was not without danger, but it was the only 
semblance of freedom we had left” (35:49). Fundamentally, both Marji and her family 
negotiate cultural disorientation by refusing to conform, or rather by electing to humour the 
restrictions of the Islamic regime, but only in a public setting. 
The covert enjoyment of prohibited ‘Western’ practices within the community further 
evinces the “disorganization, displacement, [and] incoherence” of cultural disorientation 
(Sztompka, 2000: p. 453), which occurs due to the conflicting ideologies of the collective 
and the new government’s patriarchal rules. As Satrapi shows, despite many Iranian 
women’s public commitment to conformity during the cultural shift, they are continually 
policed by vehement supporters of the Islamic regime in everyday life. As Marji and her 
mother leave the supermarket, for example, a bearded man yells to Marji’s mother “fix 
your scarf” (24:07), a phrase that recurs throughout the autofilmic testimony as a 
vocalised imperative of the Islamic regime’s strict expectation of female modesty. When 
Marji’s mother does not immediately respond, the man presses “you heard me woman!”, 
at which point Marji’s mother gently resists the man’s intervention with the reply “Sir, why 
don’t you try being more polite and say ma’am next time? I deserve a little more respect” 
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(24:13). The man is incensed, yelling menacing and misogynistic insults and physically 
intimidating her. Marji’s mother, accustomed to the liberty and freedom of speech she 
enjoyed prior to the Islamic Revolution, is visibly angry and upset, which causes her to 
lash out verbally during their drive home, breaking with her commitment to public 
conformity. Marji is witness to this altercation, which marks the beginning of the end of her 
childhood in Iran, whilst firmly installing the empathic track between Satrapi and her 
mother and further propagating the empathic invitation to testimonial witnessing for the 
viewer.  
As the narrative progresses, Satrapi depicts the increasing tension of cultural 
disorientation, as the viewer is invited to witness the subversive, yet seemingly minor 
infringements under the repressive regime. For example, Marji nonchalantly peruses the 
black market with money willingly given by her mother to purchase a contraband cassette; 
she embarks upon her shopping trip alone, wearing a punk jacket, high-tops, and a 
Michael Jackson badge, as well as the requisite veil. Marji’s attire attracts the attention of 
the female Guardians of the Revolution, who begin by reprimanding her for her clothing, 
then slighting the improper arrangement of her veil, yelling “Lower your scarf, you slut!” 
whilst physically pulling it down over her eyebrows (27:35). On this occasion, Marji avoids 
detainment with a series of lies about her home life, bursting into tears that eventually 
temper the Guardians’ outrage and secure her release. However, Marji’s adolescent 
disregard for the regime becomes righteous indignation after her uncle is hospitalised, and 
her friend is killed in a missile attack, events that are represented as increasingly 
“ordinary” (Chute, 2008: p. 105) within the worsening context of cultural trauma. Marji’s 
horror is replaced by anger when her teacher claims that there are no longer any political 
prisoners in Iran under the Islamic regime, which prompts Marji’s corrective interjection:  
Excuse me. My uncle was imprisoned under the Shah, but it was the new 
regime that had him executed. You say there is [sic] no political prisoners, 
but from 3,000 under the Shah we went to 300, 000. How dare you tell 
such big lies!  
(38:35-46)  
Marji’s outburst wins her a standing ovation from her classmates, but there are 
repercussions for her actions. The incident leads her mother to reflect upon Marji’s secular 
upbringing, concluding that she must send Marji away to save her from the potentially 
traumatic consequences of her inherited ideological convictions, which manifest as her 
uncontained resistance to the new order. Marji’s parents’ political principles, by which they 
stand, and of which they have deliberately apprised their daughter, pose a significant risk 
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to Marji’s safety under the strict Islamic regime; their definitive act of both love and 
defiance is to send Marji to Austria at the tender age of fourteen, to enable her escape 
from the watchful eye of state repression and allow her to embrace her innate 
independence. Consequently, Marji’s nomadism becomes literal, as she is forced into 
exile in Europe. The montage that shows Marji making her way through the airport fades 
to black as she witnesses her father carrying her mother – who has fainted – away from 
the departure gate. After the cut, the frame narrator Marjane is revealed in colour – still 
waiting in the airport – removing her veil in a symbolic act of remembrance and agency, 
indicative of the narrating ‘I’’s empathy with her remembered self. Leaving her parents in 
Iran, Marji arrives in Austria without her veil, seemingly liberated, but rendered both 
culturally and physically displaced as the ultimate consequence of cultural disorientation. 
Marji’s exile is a pivotal point in Satrapi’s autofilmic testimony as the second of the film’s 
three sections, whereby the story of a childhood transitions to the story of a return.23 Upon 
arrival in Austria, Marji becomes Marjane in the film, the child’s voice replaced by that of 
the narrating ‘I’ (Chiara Mastroianni) in a progressive, linear narrative that brings the 
narrating ‘I’ and the experiencing ‘I’ ever closer within the filmic discourse, towards the 
ultimate reconciliatory unification of the testimonial ‘I’. Marjane’s testimonial invitation is 
essentially reissued through the literal shift in both voice and narrative perspective. 
Furthermore, Marji’s physical departure from Iran denotes the abrupt dislocation from her 
collective identity as defined by the shared experience of cultural trauma, which prompts a 
dynamic period of personal development and comparatively introspective self-witnessing. 
Unlike her dialogic explication of collective trauma, which is couched in the relational and 
contextual testimonies of significant others, Satrapi’s reflections upon displacement in the 
second act of the animated Persepolis are largely monologic, unsupported by 
corroborating witnesses, and distinctly self-reflexive. Accordingly, Marjane’s time in 
Austria is characterised by the state of “in-betweenness” (Brun, 2015: p. 21), which 
manifests as her “[struggle] to establish the right to a place” (Brun, 2015: p. 21) as she 
attempts to assimilate to her newfound emancipation.  
The inbetweenness of the second act is both literal and metaphorical, as the juncture of 
the testimonial narrative that takes place between Marji’s erstwhile traumatic past and the 
reconciled future of the frame narrator Marjane (see Laub, 1995: p. 74). However, Satrapi 
condenses Marjane’s four years in Austria in the film in comparison with the comic source, 
to preserve the metonymic status of her autofilmic testimony. The comic contains nine 
chapters dedicated to what the comic Marjane calls her “Viennese misadventures” (p. 
 
23 These are the original subtitles for Persepolis 1 and 2. 
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259); this description both reveals and trivialises the trauma of displacement indicative of 
Satrapi’s testimonial priorities. In the comic, Satrapi explores the fragile relationships she 
develops as she navigates “the perilous territory of not belonging” (Said, 2000: p. 177) 
through several relocations, and the challenges imposed due to feelings of marginalisation 
and isolation during exile. However, the film hastens this personal narrative arc, eliding 
many peripheral relationships that emerge as a result of Marjane’s perpetual upheaval. 
Instead, the frame narrator light-heartedly describes Marjane’s multiple moves as her 
“apartment hopping days” (46:52), with a satirical montage accompanied by a curtailed 
description of each abode used to shift the narrative forward in time, simultaneously 
redacting the details of Satrapi’s fringe relationships with those outside of the “secret 
order” of collective trauma (Laub, 1995: p. 67). This ‘fast-forward’ narrative strategy is 
more than excision for adaptive economy; rather, Satrapi deliberately forfeits the right to 
autobiographical self-reflection in favour of the representation of collective experience, 
privileging her role as metonymic witness within and through the autofilmic testimony.  
Satrapi remains faithful to the collective testimonial agenda by offsetting Marjane’s 
experiences of displacement against the continuing collective trauma of home. As an 
example, Marjane’s solo visit to the well-stocked supermarket inspires awe and 
excitement (43:30), as the abundance of the Austrian store is posited in contrast with the 
sparseness of the Iranian supermarket in which her mother attempts to reprimand 
squabbling shoppers earlier in the film (23:49). Marjane’s modest pleasure foregrounds 
her transition from restriction and dearth under the repressive regime, which the viewer is 
prompted to remember, and the disparate freedom her exile grants. Moreover, Marjane’s 
inability to settle and forge lasting relationships in Austria emphasises the complex 
interconnections between place, community and identity. Marjane is forced into a 
perpetual state of “homelessness and placelessness” (Zetter and Boano, 2009: p. 207) 
after her mother’s “so-called best friend”, with whom it was arranged for Marjane to stay 
whilst in Vienna, offloads her to a boarding house that she tells Marjane will be “just the 
place” for her (41:10-41:23). Bereft of a collective identity so anchored in her sense of 
home and community, Marjane befriends a group of people from school whom she refers 
to as “outsiders” (43:05), in an attempt to forge a sense of belonging. But, as Marjane 
immerses herself in Vienna’s alternative scene, she fails to connect with her new 
associates and the nihilistic, anti-establishment views they promote, most evident in an 
outburst levelled at a particularly anarchic acquaintance: “Life’s not a game, it’s not 
pointless. There are people giving their lives for freedom, okay? Do you think my uncle 
gave his life just for fun? Pretentious prick!” (48:19-28). Marjane’s fury is caused by the 
collective sensibility of cultural trauma, the misunderstanding of which she feels keenly 
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and is compelled to counteract. In the voiceover, the frame narrator articulates the way 
her collective sensibility exacerbates the cultural disorientation that renders Marjane 
“maladjusted or ill-suited to [her] new environment” (Sztompka, 2000: p. 454):  
My despair was immense. Here I was living a sheltered, frivolous 
existence while my family and friends were steeped in the nightmare of 
war. The more I tried to rid myself of the guilt with distractions, the worse I 
felt. I wanted nothing more than to live the life of a normal teenager.  
(48:31-52) 
The narrating ‘I’ makes clear that the turmoil of displacement is inextricably linked to the 
anguish caused by Marjane’s separation from the traumatised collective, the combination 
of which precludes any semblance of normalcy. Hence, as Satrapi shows, the legacy of 
cultural trauma dictates that the parameters of ‘normal’ life are irrevocably altered, and 
even geographical displacement cannot depose the collective sensibility of cultural 
trauma, or supersede its lasting effect. 
*** 
The third and final section of Satrapi’s autofilmic testimony issues a distinctive, bilateral 
invitation to witnessing founded on Marjane’s subjective perspective as she returns from 
exile. This perspective is characterised by Marjane’s attempt to reconcile her dual subject 
position: as a member of the traumatised collective to which she returns, and as an 
outsider who comes to feel guilt over her short-lived liberation. Marjane attempts to 
readjust and “reconcile” the traumatic past with the traumatised present (see Laub, 1995) 
through the narrative, a process she negotiates as a witness to – and for – the collective. 
Marjane’s subjective perspective is shared by the viewer, with both unaware of the 
regime’s progression during her time in exile. As a veiled Marjane arrives at Teheran 
airport, she is questioned over “forbidden items”, including “alcohol, playing cards, music, 
films, cosmetics, pornography” and “pork products” (1:00:22-29), the extensive list of 
contraband items providing insight into the extent of the regime’s post-war control. The 
bearded official concludes his interrogation with the imperative “fix your headscarf, sister” 
(1:00:30), immediately reinstating the patriarchal authority of the Islamic regime and 
sanctioning Marjane’s symbolic repatriation into the collective. As Marjane readjusts to the 
familiar routine of her childhood home life, the narrating ‘I’ of the voiceover reflects 
“nothing had changed, but deep down I knew nothing would ever be the same again” 
(1:01:19). To confirm Marjane’s misgivings, Marjane’s father solemnly apprises his 
daughter – and the viewer – of the war’s impact upon the community in her absence in a 
protracted oration that echoes his earlier corrective history:  
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Sure, the war is over, it’s true. But it’s almost worse now in a way. People 
don’t even know why we were at war in the first place. The West sold 
weapons to both sides. Unfortunately, we were stupid enough to go along 
with their cynical game. Eight years of war, for nothing. One million dead, 
for nothing. The last days of the war were atrocious. A month before the 
armistice, Iraq started bombing Iran every day, as if they wanted to wipe it 
off the map. Right before the cease-fire the regime became alarmed 
because an opposition army had entered Iran through the Iraqi border. 
The government feared that the thousands of political prisoners would 
become a serious threat. So they came up with a solution that would 
solve their problem once and for all. The government gave the prisoners a 
choice. They could renounce their revolutionary ideals and pledge 
allegiance to the regime, in which case they’d serve their full prison 
sentence, or, they would be executed. The majority of prisoners chose the 
second option.  
(1:01:38-1:03:01) 
Stripped of the pantomime “child’s-eye rendition of trauma” (Chute, 2008: p. 98) that 
characterised his previous story, the images that accompany Marjane’s father’s testimony 
are desolate, depicting the numerous anonymous casualties from opposing sides pouring 
into a central fracture in the earth, and the many executed prisoners, blindfolded, toppling 
to the ground in turn, like limp bowling pins (1:01:38-1:03:01). Here, Satrapi reinstates the 
relational dynamic of testimonial witnessing within the narrative to emphasise her role as a 
collective witness through the narrative. As Marjane bears witness to the magnitude of the 
traumatic experience of the collective, she shares her role as receiving witness with the 
viewer to ensure that the pain and loss experienced by the collective in her absence is 
voiced. To re-establish this testimonial trajectory, Satrapi constructs a dynamic empathic 
track (Anderst, 2015) that demonstrates her own empathy with the real others of the 
collective through Marjane’s role as a willing witness, a role – and track – that the viewer 
is invited to share. Marjane’s subjective perspective ensures that the representation of the 
collective’s ongoing suffering takes precedence within her metonymic testimonial agenda 
of not forgetting, which simultaneously expresses her humility at the anguish she was 
spared.  
Satrapi’s autofilmic testimonial triptych concludes with a series of incidents that chart 
Marjane’s attempt to assert her agency and secure her permanent emancipation. Firstly, 
Marjane flouts the rules of the regime by wearing heavy make-up in public, drawing the 
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attention of the Guardians of the Revolution. She resorts to lying, as she did as a child, 
deciding to “put on ‘the poor defenceless woman’ act” (1:13:34) rather than face the 
repercussions of her defiant actions; but, on this occasion her lies have consequences for 
an innocent bystander who is hauled away by the officers as a result of her illusory 
fabrications (1:13:52). As she did in Austria, when Marjane denounced her heritage at a 
party to avoid affiliation with the regime (50:02), Marjane’s grandmother assumes the role 
of her moral compass, reminding her of how her family suffered whilst “defending the 
innocent” (1:14:23) and condemning her actions as “abominable” (1:14:03). Marjane’s 
grandmother completes her reprimand with the missive “in life, everyone always has a 
choice” (1:14:17), reiterating that Marjane must choose “integrity” (1:14:35) over acceding 
to fear. By taking advantage of the repressive regime’s tyranny to avoid their reproof, 
Marjane inadvertently sanctions their politics and dishonours her family memory, 
effectively ‘forgetting’ to remember the historical – and ongoing – plight of the collective.  
By way of remedial action, Marjane counters this transient act of forgetting by challenging 
the university board and their imposition of further, seemingly arbitrary restrictions on 
female students’ attire. She addresses the panel, informing them of the irrationality and 
impracticality of the new patriarchal standards, levelling:  
Is religion concerned with protecting our modesty or is it just opposed to 
fashion? Your criticism is always directed at women, but what about our 
brothers? They’re allowed to dress as they please. Sometimes they wear 
clothing so tight you can see their underwear. I just don’t understand why, 
as a woman, you don’t think I’d be affected by the sight of men in skin-
tight pants, yet you’re worried they’ll get turned on by a few less inches of 
veil?   
(1:16:38)  
Satrapi empowers Marjane with the language of the regime to counter their own illogical 
injunctions, conveying to the viewer the hypocrisy at the heart of the patriarchal structure. 
Marjane’s grandmother approves of her granddaughter’s public sedition and asks Marjane 
to “please take off that god-awful veil”, stating that it makes her feel “claustrophobic” 
(1:17:04). Marjane removes her veil, assenting “I’m so used to it I forget I’m wearing it” 
(1:17:10). Her grandmother’s response is a resolute affirmation of Satrapi’s testimonial 
agenda: “Don’t ever forget it. Fear is what lulls our mind to sleep and makes us lose our 
conscience. Fear is also what turns us into cowards” (1:17:12-20). Marjane’s reclamation 
of her grandmother’s approval is underpinned by her ideological realignment with the 
collective, characterised by the denunciation of the regime and the imperative to 
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remember the sacrifices of her forebears. Through Marjane’s relationship with her 
grandmother, Satrapi reveals how the ‘not forgetting’ of testimony allows her to “come to 
terms with her national as well as individual history” (Klapcsik, 2016: p. 80). Furthermore, 
the matriarch represents the resilience and resolution of the collective, through which the 
intra-textual empathic track (Anderst, 2015) between Marjane and her family is 
synonymous with the extra-textual channel between Satrapi and her compatriots.  
 
Figure 2.4: ‘Photos’ of Marjane at her wedding. 
Galvanised by her grandmother’s approval and a renewed sense of collective identity, 
Marjane begins to socialise with her like-minded peers, attending underground parties as 
she did with her parents as a child. It is at one of these parties that Marjane’s romantic 
relationship with Reza (Chris Mack) blossoms. However, Marjane’s attraction to Reza is 
revealing of her enduring ideological conflict. Unlike Reza, Marjane knows the trauma of 
displacement experienced as a result of exile, and still yearns for the fortification of 
collective identity afforded by remaining in Iran. Reza dismisses Marjane’s desire to stay 
as “nostalgic”, claiming “sooner or later you’ll get sick of people sticking their nose where it 
doesn’t belong all the time” (1:17:41-46). His statement is quickly validated, as the 
Guardians of the Revolution witness a modest gesture of intimacy between the couple 
(1:17:53), resulting in a fine, paid by Marjane’s father, to save her from corporal 
punishment (1:18:11). Marjane is demonstrably frustrated by the limitations imposed by 
Islamic Law, which forbids public courtship, remonstrating: “The situation is intolerable. 
We can’t go anywhere. We’re like caged animals. I feel like a prisoner. What is this? It’s 
no life!” (1:18:51-58). Reza’s pragmatic solution is marriage, which, as the montage that 
follows depicts, is a solution that incites further conflict for Marjane. As the camera pans 
images of the wedding, which are framed like still photographs – autobiographical 
artefacts of memory as seen in Tarnation and The Tale – Marjane’s apposite, posed 
expressions of joy are belied by the interspersed, candid shots of her dismay, which 
reveal her underlying uncertainty at the hasty union (see Figure 2.4). Marjane’s misgivings 
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are echoed by her mother, for whom Marjane’s marriage equates to her own failure to 
secure her daughter’s freedom from the repressive regime: “All I wanted was for you to be 
independent, educated, cultivated. And you go and get married at 21! I want you to leave 
Iran! I want you to be happy, and emancipated!” (1:19:32-43). However, Marjane’s 
emancipation proves to be deferred by marriage rather than denied, as the relationship 
that was supposed to flourish once free of the repressive regime’s scrutiny buckles due to 
its precipitate intensity. As the “One year later” title card indicates (1:19:49), after just 
twelve months of marriage the couple appear indifferent to one another, but marriage is 
essentially an extension of the regime’s patriarchal control, as the prospect of divorce is 
posited as an equally undesirable alternative. Marjane’s friend cites her sister’s 
experience as a cautionary tale, claiming she was constantly propositioned after her 
divorce, further advising “unless your life is a nightmare, stay with your husband” (1:21:18-
25). Seemingly trapped, Marjane seeks counsel from her grandmother once more, who 
trivialises her marital problems and reassures Marjane that divorce need not define her 
existence, offering her own experience as proof. Marjane’s grandmother concludes 
“You’re crying because you made a mistake. It’s always hard to admit it when you’re 
wrong” (1:21:56-1:22:44). Though reassured by her grandmother’s pragmatism, the 
deciding factor in Marjane’s ultimate emancipation is the death of a friend who falls from 
the roof fleeing an underground party that is raided by Guardians of the Revolution. 
Reminiscent of earlier scenes of imagined conflict, the male revellers are represented by 
faceless shadows as they leap from one building to another to escape the soldiers; the 
final figure hesitates before jumping, but the fall occurs off screen as the camera pans up 
to the moon before the screen fades to black. Although she was unable to actually see the 
circumstances surrounding Nima’s death – on screen Marjane is detained in the 
apartment below – Satrapi chooses to bear witness to the event in the same manner that 
she portrays other significant traumatic incidents throughout the autofilmic testimony, 
through austere imagery and minimal commentary that at once acknowledges the 
“unrepresentability” of trauma (Caruth, 2016: p. 131) whilst simultaneously repudiating the 
same. Significantly, Nima’s death, like the revolution and the war that preceded it, 
irrevocably alters Marjane’s sense of belonging, and permanently dissolves her capacity 
to conform. Despondent after the senseless loss of another close friend at the hands of 
the regime, Marjane returns home where she bluntly states “It’s over, Reza” (1:25:38). 
Confirming Marjane’s inability to withstand the ongoing repression of the Islamic Regime, 
the narrating ‘I’ attests in the voiceover: “The time had come for me to leave” (1:25:44). 
Subsequently, after paying her respects to her country and her family, Marjane divorces 






Figure 2.5: Marjane leaves the airport as the unified testimonial ‘I’. 
To confirm the autobiographical subject’s posttraumatic “reconciliation” through the 
articulation of traumatic experience (Laub, 1995: p. 74), the autofilmic testimony 
concludes with the experiencing ‘I’ and the narrating ‘I’ converging as the unified, 
embodied testimonial ‘I’ on screen: the picture shifts from black and white to colour 
outside the Orly Sud airport in Paris, and the frame narrator, Marjane, is driven away in a 
taxi (see Figure 2.5). As the narrated past meets the diegetic present, the film’s status as 
testimony is authorised by the narrating ‘I’’s occupation of both the frame and the narrative 
as the experiencing ‘I’ of self-witness. Whereas Jennifer and Jenny share the final scene 
of The Tale as the unified iteration of the cooperative testimonial ‘I’, Satrapi depicts 
Marjane as a singular entity, emphasising the “repossession” (Laub, 1995: p. 70) of 
identity enabled by her permanent emancipation from Iran. The film closes with a 
disembodied exchange between Marji and her grandmother, which references a scene 
from earlier in the film: the night before Marji leaves Iran the first time, her grandmother 
stays with her, and the frame narrator remarks upon the jasmine flowers the elder woman 
keeps in her bra (38:45-39:03). This repetitious, symbolic coda of not forgetting 
underscores Satrapi’s autofilmic testimonial agenda. By commemorating her beloved 
grandmother, who died just over a year after she left (Persepolis: p. 343), Satrapi 
acknowledges the relational construction of her own identity as a member of the 
traumatised collective. She also offers up a final, relatable empathic track that 
demonstrates for the viewer both the magnitude of her loss, and the liberating labour of 
testimonial not forgetting. 
*** 
Both The Tale and the animated Persepolis draw attention to their cinematic mediation in 
a way that inscribes the vocational creative practices of their respective author-subjects. 
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As a result, each film is recognisable as autobiographical portraiture, which encompasses 
each subject’s unique mode of performative testimony in the propagation of self-witness. 
Underscored by the retention of the real name, both Fox’s and Satrapi’s autofilmic 
testimonies are boldly self-referential, attesting to autobiographical experience, each with 
a profound and personal perspective on trauma, to which they invite the viewer to bear 
witness.  
The subjective perspective, generated through recognisably autofilmic conventions that 
adopt both the subjects’ literal and ideological points of view, issues the testimonial 
invitation to cinematic I-witnessing, fortified by the relational tracks of empathy constructed 
through intra- and extra-textual narrative strategies. According to Dominick La Capra:  
The importance of testimonies becomes more apparent when they are 
related to the way they provide something other than purely documentary 
knowledge […] in the attempt to understand experience and its aftermath, 
including the role of memory and its lapses, in coming to terms with – or 
denying and repressing – the past.    
(2014: pp. 86-7)  
For both Fox and Satrapi, self-witnessing entails empathic ‘show and tell’, with cinematic 
media utilised to trace the subjective labour of remembering and not forgetting as part of a 
greater testimonial agenda. In bringing the “unrepresentability” (Caruth, 2016: p. 131) of 
trauma to the screen as autofilmic testimony, each of the women installs the viewer as 
both “the immediate receiver” of testimony and the willing witness to witnessing (Laub, 
1995: p. 61-2) within a broader cultural context. In the acceptance of the inevitable 
responsibility of metonymy, or “representativeness” (Gilmore, 2001), both Fox and Satrapi 
recognise the ethical imperative of bearing witness to endemic traumas that are inherently 
unspeakable and resistant to representation. Using relational and invitational strategies to 
trace the tracks of empathy within self-witnessing testimony, the films reach beyond their 
cinematic narratives to the audience, seeking intersubjective engagement beyond the 
experience of the individual. As a result, both Fox and Satrapi use testimony as “a form of 
action” (Laub, 1995: p. 70), as both a personal processing tool that enables existential 
“reconciliation” (Laub, 1995: p. 74) and a valiant, visible vindication for those they feel they 
represent. Ultimately, within the continuum of Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing, 
these autofilmic testimonies in the form of narrative films provide an ethical and empathic 
representation of experience that bears witness to the impact and investigation of trauma, 










Section Two: Auteurbiography  
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All it takes is for the filmmakers to have enough visual imagination to create the cinematic 
equivalent of the style of the original, and for the critic to have the eyes to see it.  
Andre Bazin 
We are seen from the outside by our neighbors; but we remain always at the back of our 
eyes and our senses, situated in our bodies, like a driver in the front seat of a car seeing 
the other cars coming toward him. A single person . . . is one consciousness within one 
machine, confronting all the other traffic. 
Stephen Spender      
 
3. Auteurbiography as Secondary Testimony: Adapting Self-Witness in The Diving 
Bell and the Butterfly 
The conception of autofilmic testimony advanced in Section One determines that the 
subjective perspective that can convey autobiographical experience on film is predicated 
on the recognisable conventions of the first-person mode of address. The use of specific 
narrative and framing techniques identify the autobiographical subject as the self-witness 
and empathic target of the film narrative, to instantiate an intersubjective pact between the 
autobiographical subject and the viewer that is tantamount to testimonial witnessing. The 
ways in which a film narrative can issue the autobiographical invitation are inevitably 
defined by the representation of an embodied autobiographical subject, and their 
authoritative enunciation of the self-referential ‘I’ within the filmic discourse. 
Fundamentally, autofilmic testimony is self-made and self-referential, but as Chapter Two 
demonstrates, the embodied subject on screen is not always necessarily the subject 
themselves. The substitution of an actor or drawn character in the subject position signals 
the interstitial distance between the autobiographical subject and their narrated ‘I’; 
however, the filmmaker-subject encodes the autobiographical subjective perspective in 
the filmic discourse, which is then authorised by the inscription of the real name. 
Consequently, the autobiographical ‘I’ of self-witness is preserved, and the 
autobiographical invitation to testimonial witnessing remains intact. To expand the scope 
of Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing in Section Two, I ask: how can films that are not 
self-reflexive invite viewers to bear witness to subjective truth? How is the 
autobiographical invitation adapted? And what are the parameters for a viewership pact 
that can elide the increased distance between the subject and their autobiographical 
narrative? 
The Diving Bell and the Butterfly is a memoir by Jean-Dominique Bauby, in which he 
offers a personal account of his experience of Locked-In Syndrome: a rare neurological 
condition that rendered him almost entirely paralysed after a stroke. Bauby’s cognitive 
function remained intact, and, in spite of his physical debility, he was able to communicate 
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using a system introduced by his therapists in hospital, whereby a series of letters would 
be read aloud to him and he would construct words and sentences by blinking his 
functioning left eye to indicate a specific letter at a time. Using this method, Bauby was 
able to dictate his memoir in only two months whilst receiving medical care at Berck-sur-
Mer in his native France, with the manuscript achieving publication just two days prior to 
his death. Bauby’s memoir constitutes literary self-witnessing, on the basis of his self-
referential account of personal trauma and autobiographical experience. The unique 
method used by Bauby to construct his memoir foregrounds the emissary process, which 
helps to illustrate the ethical and empathic approach to adaptation that I theorise in this 
chapter.  
My analysis of Bauby’s memoir, and the process by which it was adapted to film develops 
the cinematic I-witnessing approach that underpins this study, bringing to the fore the 
ethics of secondary witnessing in the process of adaptation, and the necessary pactual 
integrity at the heart of the transmedial endeavour. The analysis considers the cinematic 
rendering of autobiographical experience in terms of embodiment, empathy, and the 
subjective point of view, to explicate the degrees of separation throughout the adaptive 
process in an introductory exploration of auteurbiography. The analysis encompasses 
each of the three constitutive discoursal levels of the filmic adaptation of The Diving Bell 
and the Butterfly (Schnabel, 2007): the source memoir, the screenplay, and the film text, 
to consider the collective responsibility of the auteurial équipe in the cinematic 
preservation of the autobiographical invitation to bear witness.  
Adaptation as Auteurbiography 
Adaptation theory navigates the vexed question of fidelity, contending with the “implicit 
assumption that the literary ‘original’ is better than the screen adaptation” (original italics, 
Baker 2009: p. 6). Notions of ‘successful’ transpositions from page to screen are often 
conceived on the basis that the film must accurately “capture what we see as the 
fundamental narrative thematic, and aesthetic features of its literary source” (Stam, 2005: 
p. 3), which privileges logocentric prejudices and a staunch comparative perspective. 
Such views place the source text and the adapted text in opposition, overlooking the ways 
in which the transmedial transposition of a narrative can potentially enrich and expand 
upon an author’s existing literary vision. As Robert Stam acknowledges, “filmic adaptation 
is automatically different and original due to the change of medium” (original italics, 2005: 
p. 17); but, different and original does not automatically equate to worse, nor to better. 
The difference must account for the requisite, representational alterations that take place 
in the reconfiguration of narrative from words on a page to audiovisual imagery on screen, 
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and originality encapsulates the creative labour and resultant, reformulated product of that 
reinterpretation (Hutcheon, 2013: p. 18). For Andre Bazin, “what matters is the 
equivalence in meaning of the forms” (original italics, 2000: p. 20), a concept that this 
chapter will explore within the testimonial scope of cinematic I-witnessing. 
According to Linda Hutcheon, an adapted text is derived from a source text without being 
derivative, functioning instead as “its own palimpsestic thing” (2013: p. 9) in that it carries 
the residual traces of the source text(s) from which it is adapted without an assertion of 
absolute replication. With this in mind, Hutcheon’s parameters for adaptation propose that 
an adapted text should be: 
 An acknowledged transposition of a recognisable other 
work or works 
 A creative and an interpretive act of appropriation/salvaging 
 An extended intertextual engagement with the adapted work 
 
(original italics, Hutcheon, 2013: p. 8) 
Hutcheon’s approach determines the process by which an adapted text reinscribes the 
source material, but also implicates the adapter as both reader and subsequently auteur 
within this process. These roles are particularly pertinent to the adaptation of 
autobiographical narratives as a form of secondary witnessing, as will become clear in the 
following case study. The ‘creative’ and ‘interpretive’ aspects of the adaptation process 
complicate the contractual understanding of the autobiographical ‘I’ and its inherently 
unilateral construction as the coincidence of author, narrator and protagonist (Lejeune, 
1989), as the adaptive process often encompasses the many-handed input of cinematic 
production. Conversely, adaptation offers a way out of this impasse, as the prospect of 
‘appropriation or salvaging’ implies that the adapter can and should reclaim and retrieve 
as much of the source text as possible in an ‘acknowledged transposition’ that should 
make explicit the ‘adapted work’ from whence said material came. Within the testimonial 
context of cinematic I-witnessing, filmic adaptations carry the ethical and empathic 
responsibility of representing – and re-presenting – the autobiographical invitation in a 
way that is indicative of the adapter’s own willing engagement with the subject’s literary 
testimony, and which retraces and reinvites emersive engagement for the viewer to 
preserve the subjective “truth value” (Bruss, 1980) of the literary source.  
The empathic invitation that manifests through a willing engagement with a literary 
autobiography as testimony can be reissued by a cinematic adaptation that privileges the 
experiential reality of the autobiographical subject. Schmitt explains: “the affects and 
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percepts generated by a narrative, be it a film or a book, are not linked to what it describes 
but to the experience it creates” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 120); it is the engagement with, and the 
transposition of, this narratively created experience that is the goal of the adapted film. 
Consequently, the adapters’ ability to ‘feel with’ the autobiographical subject is dependent 
upon the intimacy and empathic relation facilitated through the reading of their narrative. 
The testimonial goad of the adaptive endeavour, then, is to preserve and transcode the 
same intersubjective invitation that the author achieves in the literary source, so as to 
prompt a cognate mode of viewership.  
*** 
With an amanuensis at his disposal, Jean-Dominique Bauby was able to produce his 139-
page illness memoir, The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (1997) (hereafter The Diving Bell), 
letter by letter, in a matter of months, whilst in a state of almost total paralysis following a 
stroke. Bauby’s intimate account articulates his subsequent experience of Locked-In 
syndrome, an account characterised by introspection, imagination and nostalgia, in an 
acute, testimonial exploration of embodied, vulnerable subjectivity. The Diving Bell was 
adapted into a film of the same name in 2007, directed by artist Julian Schnabel, with a 
screenplay by Ron Harwood. This chapter maps the ways in which Bauby’s unique 
experience of vulnerable subjectivity is captured, first in print, and then, through the 
multiple discourse levels of adaptation, as a testimonial film that preserves Bauby’s 
experiential reality. The analysis considers the privileging of fidelity in adapting 
autobiographical self-witness, with a critical focus on vulnerable subjectivity, to develop 
the cinematic I-witnessing approach that underpins this thesis. I explore the relationship 
between ethical and empathic engagement with testimonial narratives as bearing witness, 
and the necessary pactual integrity of adaptive practices towards the preservation of the 
subject’s autobiographical invitation. The following analysis identifies the ways in which a 
cinematic adaptation of literary self-witness retains the “resonance [of] autobiography as 
an echo of physical experience” (2017: p. 22), to emphasise the ethical and empathic 
obligations to fidelity within a testimonial context.  
The chapter begins with an overview of what constitutes a narrative of witness in the 
context of vulnerable subjectivity to frame the analysis of Bauby’s memoir as literary self-
witnessing, with emphasis upon embodied subjectivity, authorship, and the reclamation of 
agency. Then, an examination of the filmic adaptation, encompassing both the product 
and the process, reveals the parameters of cinematic secondary witnessing, designated 
auteurbiography within the continuum of Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing, as an 
ethical and biographical endeavour that encompasses the preservation and propagation 
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of the autobiographical invitation by recognisably referential cinematic means. The 
chapter demonstrates that an auteurbiographical adaptation can, and must, privilege the 
lived experience of the autobiographical subject within the filmic narrative – and 
throughout the adaptive process – to instantiate the ethical and empathic intersubjective 
witnessing structure of cinematic I-witnessing.     
Vulnerable Subjectivity and Embodied Witnessing 
Illness and injury can hamper a potential autobiographer, with life-limiting conditions and 
disabilities making the physical labour of writing difficult or even impossible. Ironically, the 
circumstances and causes of such incapacity can often be the impetus for self-life writing, 
particularly in those with previous experience of writing, as Arthur Frank notes in The 
Wounded Storyteller (2013). In his book, Frank identifies three types of “wounded 
storytelling”. Firstly, the restitution narrative, which follows a reflective and somewhat 
optimistic narrative pattern: “yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but tomorrow I’ll be 
healthy again” (p. 77). Secondly, the chaos narrative, which “imagines life never getting 
better” (p. 97) with the narrative characterised by a particularly pessimistic inflection. And 
finally, the quest narrative, which includes “memoirs”, as narratives of retrospect and re-
evaluation prompted by illness; “manifestos”, as resistant and defiant calls to social action, 
whereby the subject aims to “use [their] suffering to move others forward with them” (p. 
121);  and “automythology” (p. 119), in which the subject philosophises survival as rebirth 
and renewal. Each narrative type sees an author exploring their experience of illness 
through self-reflexive storytelling, but with differing perspectives, and Frank acknowledges 
what he describes as the kaleidoscopic overlap of these types in any illness narrative, 
noting that the focus will inevitably shift over the course of the self-story (p. 76).  
G. Thomas Couser would include wounded storytellers under the designation “vulnerable 
subjects”, which he defines as “people with disadvantaging or stigmatizing conditions” and 
those “who may be vulnerable to misrepresentation and exploitation” (2004: p. 14) as a 
consequence. The will to write, coupled with the risks and restrictions of wounded and/or 
vulnerable subjectivity can mean that undertaking the act of autobiographical self-
witnessing becomes a complex physical and psychological negotiation of authorial 
agency. The vulnerable subject’s compulsion to assert their own autobiographical voice 
accords with Frank’s description of “postmodern illness” as “an experience, a reflection on 
body, self, and the destination that life’s map leads to”, which leaves vulnerable subjects 
“feeling a need for a voice they can recognise as their own” (Frank, 2013: p. 7). Contrary 
to modernist medicine’s preoccupation with control and eradication, “postmodern illness 
culture”, Frank argues, “recognises a need to accept suffering as an intractable part of the 
human condition” (2013: p. 146), with autobiographical accounts of this suffering 
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considered “embodied witnessing” (Frank, 2013: p. 142). Similarly, for Arnaud Schmitt, 
“autobiography is an embodied textual experience” (2017: p. 22), which “focuses on the 
reality of one person” (2017: p. 122). Accordingly, autobiographical accounts of vulnerable 
subjectivity constitute embodied self-witness, as a testimonial assertion of personal 
experience and agency. 
‘The Dream’ chapter of The Diving Bell epitomises the passivity that Bauby feels as a 
consequence of his condition, metaphorically describing his experience of Locked-In 
Syndrome. In his description of his dream, Bauby is “petrified, mummified, vitrified” (p. 60) 
and unable to assert bodily autonomy in order to stop drinking or avoid being carried 
against his will. In his dream, Bauby is a “hostage of a mysterious cult”, afraid that his 
loved ones “will fall into the same trap” from which he is unable to escape (p. 60). He 
concludes that his fate is the consequence of his silence: “my dream conforms perfectly 
with reality. I am unable to utter a word” (p. 60). Bauby’s reflections on his dream, though 
not representative of real life events, encompasses the limiting reality of his experience as 
confined to largely incommunicable inertia, whilst illustrating the potential liberation that 
communicability can offer. Schmitt disavows the “deep misconception of what 
autobiography is about”, noting that “[autobiography] has never been about truth (although 
veracity is one of its most prominent features), it has always been about reality, about 
experience” (original italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 43). Bauby’s condition leaves him feeling 
contained, both literally and intellectually, which is the definitive, traumatic inflection of his 
experiential reality that characterises his testimonial perspective.  
Bauby’s paralysis severely limits his ability to communicate, which exacerbates the 
feelings of containment and isolation that define the “struggle” to process and articulate 
traumatic experience (Laub, 1995). In the chapter entitled ‘Guardian Angel’, Bauby 
describes at length the value of “the communication code without which [he] would be cut 
off from the world” (p. 47), for which he credits his speech therapist, Sandrine, as the 
chapter’s titular guardian angel. Bauby claims that the implementation of the dictation 
system makes “the invisible and eternally imprisoning cocoon” of Locked-In Syndrome 
“less oppressive” (p. 48), but expresses disdain at the ongoing limitations to his 
communicative capacity, and his inability to embellish conversations with his characteristic 
wit:  
[M]y communication system disqualifies repartee: the keenest rapier 
grows dull and falls flat when it takes several minutes to thrust it home. By 
the time you strike, even you no longer understand what had seemed so 
witty before you started to dictate it […]. It deprives conversation of its 
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sparkle […] and I count this forced lack of humour one of the great 
drawbacks of my condition.  
(pp. 78-9)  
Bauby identifies his reduced communicability as existentially limiting, and it is this 
fundamental limitation that renders him contained in the metaphorical diving bell of his 
body. Frank observes, “[s]eriously ill people are wounded not just in body but in voice”, 
and as such “[t]heir injuries become the source of the potency of their story” (2013: p. xii). 
Consequently, self-referential narratives that bear witness to vulnerable subjectivity “do 
not simply describe the self; they are the self’s medium of being” (Frank, 2013: p. 53). In 
Bauby’s case, the communication code enables the necessary articulation of his traumatic 
experience, and the potential for the narrative assertion and reconciliation of selfhood.  
For Bauby, his unique, physically debilitating circumstances endow him with both the 
content and the catalyst for his self-reflexive narrative; the authorship of his memoir 
provides him with an outlet for his experiential testimony as the creative reassertion of lost 
agency. As a writer and Editor-in-Chief of the French magazine Elle prior to his stroke, 
Bauby is predisposed to the narrative impulse, making a literary testimony a natural 
choice. According to psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, when “involved in an 
expressive activity we feel in touch with our real self” (1990: p. 188); the reconciliation of 
selfhood through self-witnessing, as explained in Section One, allows autobiographical 
subjects to “work through” – or write through – traumatic experience (LaCapra, 2014; 
Henke, 1998). In The Diving Bell, Bauby is able to reassimilate and reassert the agency 
he felt he had foregone as a result of his physical incapacity. It is the code implemented 
by his speech therapist that eventually grants Bauby the “symbolic form” (Gray, 1982: p. 
33) with which he is able to give voice to his ineluctably embodied autobiographical 
experience in his own words, which concurrently gives him a sense of purpose:  
My main task now is to compose the first of these bedridden travel notes 
so that I shall be ready when my publisher’s emissary arrives to take my 
dictation, letter by letter. In my head I churn over every sentence ten 
times, delete a word, add an adjective, and learn my text by heart, 
paragraph by paragraph.  
(p. 13)  
Bauby’s final days and weeks were dominated by the construction and dictation of his 
testimonial narrative, as a creative preoccupation that reconfigured and reasserted 
agency and voice. 
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Bauby’s best-selling memoir is notable for its unconventional authorship, with much critical 
focus on the practicalities of its production. Undeniably, the actual writing process is 
central to Bauby’s self-referential narrative, which documents the practice as fundamental 
to the reclamation of agency. According to Monika Fludernik: 
Experientiality in narrative of personal experience consists in the dynamic 
interrelation between the description of personal experience on the one 
hand (the setting-plus-incidence core of the narrative episode) and the 
evaluative and rememorative transformation of this experience in the 
storytelling process: tellability and point of the story dialectically constitute 
each other. The narrative is narrative, not because it tells a story, but 
because the story that it tells is reportable and has been reinterpreted by 
the narrating I, the personal storyteller […]. A complex organic unity is 
established which balances experience in the raw and the storyteller’s re-
evaluation of it.  
(1996: p. 70) 
Bauby’s memoir is an unmistakable re-evaluation of his experience, which manifests a 
metaphorical dichotomy between the ‘diving bell’ of Locked-In Syndrome and the 
‘butterfly’ of his nostalgic imagination. Bauby affirms this re-evaluative ideal, questioning 
“does it take the glare of disaster to show a person’s true nature?” (p. 91). He refers to the 
compassion of others when he makes this observation in the memoir, but his inquiry is 
inherently introspective within the context of his self-referential “quest narrative” (Frank, 
2013: p. 119). The question is ambiguous, indicative of the re-evaluation that 
characterises Bauby’s self-witnessing introspection; in questioning the ‘true nature’ of 
others, Bauby also invites the same scrutiny of himself. 
In the penultimate chapter, ‘A Day in the Life’ – the title graphologically foregrounded by 
the use of quotation marks, signposting its significance from the outset – Bauby concedes 
that the chapter’s content is representative of the intersection between tellability and the 
point of the story in his testimonial narrative, remarking “Ever since beginning this book I 
have intended to describe my last moments as a perfectly functioning earthling” (p. 127): 
the day he suffered his stroke. Bauby first mentions the date ‘Friday, 8 December’ (p. 11) 
on the first page of the prologue, but does not bring it up again until he describes it as 
“that disastrous Friday, 8 December 1995” (p. 127) over 100 pages later. What follows in 
the penultimate chapter is the detailed record of his memory of that day, willingly 
suppressed until this belated point of disclosure, to provide the narrative reconciliation of 
the traumatic experience that defines his self-witnessing testimony. The narrative is 
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effectively bookended by the narrating ‘I’’s reference to the date he was rendered a 
vulnerable subject, which highlights the incident’s significance, as the traumatic moment 
that underwrites his self-witnessing narrative. What fills the pages between is “the setting-
plus-incidence core of the narrative” (Fludernik, 1996: p. 70), which delimits the 
experiential prism through which Bauby navigates the five dimensions of autobiographical 
subjectivity – memory, experience, identity, embodiment and agency (Smith and Watson 
2010: p. 49). Each vignette provides insight into Bauby’s inescapable, embodied 
experience of his illness, and the reconciliatory perspective he gains through telling and 
re-evaluation in the construction of his memoir. Schmitt explains that “[b]eing an 
autobiographer is a very specific facet of our subjective lives […]. It is part and parcel of 
the autobiographical mode since it involves a complex formalization of our narrative” 
(2017: p. 68). In formalising and structuring his experiential narrative as testimony, Bauby 
evaluates and bears witness to his altered subjectivity, whilst simultaneously asserting his 
authorial agency as an autobiographical subject. 
Secondary Witnessing: The Amanuensis and The Auteurial Équipe 
Where illness or physical impediment precludes a traditional, autonomous 
autobiographical act, the requisite involvement of an amanuensis can be thought to 
threaten a project’s autobiographical integrity. Terms such as ghost-writer and 
amanuensis carry with them allusions as to the degree of creative influence a co-author 
exercises; how is such assistance measured, and what qualifies as permissible for 
autobiographical acts to remain authentic “self-stories” (Frank, 2013: p. xii)? Or, as 
Couser asks, “What sorts of relationships, if any, confer surrogacy in life writing?” (2004: 
p. xi). According to Couser: 
The closer the relationship between writer and subject, and the greater 
the vulnerability or dependency of the subject, the higher the ethical 
stakes, and the more urgent the need for ethical scrutiny.  
(2004: p. xii) 
The notion of an autobiographical amanuensis, or surrogate, is complex, specifically in 
autobiographical and testimonial accounts of vulnerable subjectivity. The autobiographical 
amanuensis is tasked with capturing and expediting the authorial autonomy of the 
vulnerable subject, in a way that is distinctly and recognisably theirs, indicative of their 
unique circumstances, experiences, and individualistic perspective. The autobiographical 
amanuensis, then, must convey the multidimensional autobiographical ‘I’ with the same 
rigour as the autobiographical subject might achieve independently, whilst relinquishing 
creative control.  
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With such high ethical stakes, it would be naïve to think of an autobiographer’s 
amanuensis as a simple scribe. The narrative relationship with the vulnerable subject 
requires an empathic, phenomenological connection during the emissary process as the 
subject makes sense of their condition and potential recovery through the act of literary 
self-witnessing (see Frank, 2013; Lea Gaydos, 2005; Coulehan, 2003). The vulnerable 
subject and their experience are intimately represented in their narrative, and the 
amanuensis must assimilate both from an impartial yet empathic locus. The amanuensis, 
then, is first cast as willing witness to self-witnessing – as the immediate receiver of 
testimony (see Laub, 1992) – before occupying the role of secondary witness and 
advocate for the vulnerable subject’s testimonial narrative. When ‘writing for’ respectfully 
encompasses ‘feeling with’, the amanuensis is primarily a proxy rather than a co-author, 
as an advocate relaying rather than rewriting the author’s experience, which effectively 
leaves the autobiographical pact intact. This role of the amanuensis as witness and 
emissary informs the critical perspective from which pactual integrity is developed, as the 
conscious foregrounding of the subject’s first-person perspective is imperative to the 
ethical and empathic adaptation of the autobiographical invitation. 
Though unaccredited on the dust jacket, Claude Mendibil learned the dictation system 
from Bauby’s therapists, and served as his authorial proxy in the production of The Diving 
Bell. Bauby’s gratitude is evident in the memoir’s paratextual framing, as Mendibil is 
second only to his children on the dedication page of the book. Though Bauby formally 
acknowledges Mendibil’s “all-important contribution” (p. 5), his paratextual accreditation as 
author-subject, and Mendibil’s absence as co-author, serve as a declaration of singular 
creative construction, installing Bauby as the Autobiographical ‘I’ of Lejeune’s pact as 
author, narrator and protagonist of the text. The memoir, as self-witnessing testimony, 
provides detailed insight into Bauby’s experience of Locked-In Syndrome, and consequent 
vulnerable subjectivity, part of which entails describing the process of the memoir’s 
construction as intrinsic to its testimonial efficacy. However, The Diving Bell is a literal and 
literary record of Bauby “[calling] himself as witness to himself” (Gusdorf, 1980: p. 29), 
which asserts a particularly individualistic and masculine autobiographical and testimonial 
agenda. Consequently, the important relationship between the vulnerable subject and his 
amanuensis is reframed as ethical and empathic secondary witnessing, as the reception 
and reproduction of self-witness. 
Shelley Cobb observes: “Western culture’s masculine version of individual authorship as 
the signifier of originality, authority, and ownership is troubled by adaptation and its threat 
of multiple authors” (2012: p. 113); but, adapting self-witness requires an ethical and 
empathic approach, which is predicated on the transposition of the autobiographical 
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subject’s experiential reality and the remediation of their testimonial narrative. Mendibil’s 
role in the production of the memoir is a simplified conception of how the auteurial équipe 
function in the process of auteurbiographical adaptation, as the collective responsible for 
reissuing the subject’s autobiographical invitation to bear witness in an adapted filmic 
form. In the adaptation of The Diving Bell, the auteurial équipe comprises: director, Julian 
Schnabel; screenwriter, Ron Harwood; cinematographer, Janusz Kamiński; editor, Juliette 
Welfling; camera/man, Berto,24 as well as the producers (Kathleen Kennedy and Jon 
Kilik), remaining technical crew and performance cast. Prior to undertaking the creative 
remediation of Bauby’s autobiographical experience, the auteurial équipe engaged with 
the source memoir as self-witnessing testimony, remaining mindful to return to the memoir 
throughout the auteurbiographical process to ensure they did not “lose sight” (original 
italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 97) of the subject’s experiential reality. In addition to an emersive 
reading of the source memoir, the auteurbiographical process entailed supplementary 
metacritical research, whereby the auteurial équipe conducted their own contextual 
investigations through literal engagement with the real-world context of the memoir’s 
construction. This research included interviews with Bauby’s friends and family, traveling 
to relevant locations, and learning as much as possible about the subject in order to bring 
additional contextual detail into the cinematic frame, effectively reducing the referential 
labour for the viewer. Much like the unobtrusive, emissary role of the amanuensis, the 
auteurbiographical adaptation process is tantamount to secondary witnessing, which 
encompasses engaging with the subject’s testimony and then relaying the testimony on 
their behalf by way of remediation. In other words, the auteurial équipe must first bear 
witness, before extending the subject’s invitation to the viewer through the film in a way 
that captures the tone and intimacy of self-witness, as witnesses to witnessing, with the 
requisite pactual integrity.  
*** 
According to Nancy Snow, in fictional texts empathy’s corresponding affect potential is 
dependent “on the author’s ability to portray the character in believable terms”; this 
authorial ability “is at the heart of a description’s power to elicit our empathy” (2000: pp. 
69-71). The pact that underwrites the testimonial witnessing structure holds that ethical 
and empathic engagement with the autobiographical invitation is founded on the 
willingness to bear witness to the subjective truth of autobiographical experience, as 
established in Section One. Therefore, the assumption of the self-witnessing narrative’s 
 
24 ‘Berto’, as he is known professionally, is referred to as ‘camera/man’ as he was the lead 
camera operator for Jean-Do’s point of view shots in the film and consequently parts of 
his anatomy are shown on screen as Jean-Do’s. 
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‘believability’ is implicit in the acceptance of the autobiographical invitation. Nevertheless, 
as Schmitt explains: 
We, as readers, are all aware that textual empathy is dissimilar from 
empathy based on proximity […]. [T]he creation of an intimate space is 
one of the most efficient ways to bridge the gap between these two types, 
albeit one that requires narrative/aesthetic skills.  
(original italics, p. 121) 
The intimacy of the testimonial narrative “corresponds to what is very personal and 
private”, which Schmitt describes as “proximity transformed into a deeper emotional 
experience” (2017: p. 151). Similarly, Robert S. Gerstein likens the “experience of 
intimacy” to “an experience of a relationship” that is “so intense that it wholly shapes our 
consciousness and action” (1978: p. 76-7). In the memoir, Bauby institutes the ethical and 
empathic testimonial witnessing structure by divulging the details of his medical condition 
in the first two pages, reflecting on his “brutal introduction” to the condition that “snuffed 
out” (pp. 1-2) his former life. The intimacy of the early disclosure of Locked-In Syndrome 
and its medical implications shapes the way that the reader engages with the narrative as 
distinctly embodied self-witnessing testimony, as the autobiographical invitation is 
produced by the testimonial tone, and the subject’s willingness to share the personal and 
private details of his condition, and his narrative attempt to come to terms with it. 
Together, tone and intimacy hasten the perceived “closeness” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 151) 
necessary for empathic relation, which in turn enables the reader to “acknowledge that the 
narrative tells the author’s experience” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 90) from the vulnerable 
subjective perspective of self-witnessing testimony.  
Bauby’s memoir, as a source text, is punctuated by intimate descriptive and narrative 
cues that characterise the testimonial tone of his narrative of embodied self-witness. 
Schmitt defines the tone of an autobiographical text as “the overall impression created by 
the author’s strategy of exposing facts and events, of narrating [him or] herself”, further 
asserting that “tone constantly influences our relation to an autobiography, during and 
after reading it” to determine “our connection with it (or lack thereof)” and “how close we 
feel to it” (2017: p. 145). The intimate tone of The Diving Bell is largely characterised by 
Bauby’s self-effacing descriptions of his embodied paralysis, which establish the corporeal 
claustrophobia of his condition. The limitations of Locked-In Syndrome manifest as a 
feeling of physical weight for Bauby: “My heels hurt, my head weighs a ton, and 
something like a giant invisible diving-bell holds my body prisoner” (p. 11); he also likens 
himself to “a hermit crab dug into his rock” (p. 11), further emphasising the physical 
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trappings and isolation of his paralysis. Though the experience of Locked-In Syndrome 
that Bauby describes is both rare, and very personal, his metaphorical descriptions are 
framed as the “universalizing representations” characteristic of “broadcast strategic 
empathy” (Keen, 2006: p. 215), thus intended to make his experience of vulnerable 
subjectivity relatable. As with Jarman’s bodily descriptions in Chapter One, Bauby offers 
insight into the profound inertia of his condition with powerful phenomenological triggers, 
and his metaphorical descriptions provide a referential framework that defines the 
testimonial tone of his narrative of self-witness. Schmitt specifies 
autobiography should be redefined as a personal account of how I 
experienced real events, and not simply a personal account of real 
events. The distance between the two is where the aesthetic margin 
comes in and where the tone of the text happens.  
(original italics, 2017: pp. 146-7) 
The ‘aesthetic margin’ of Bauby’s vivid, descriptive narrative of physical experience, then, 
can solicit “[a]n echo of a cerebral effort that would have been necessary to perform the 
actual action” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 85), or, to perceive the limitations of inaction in Bauby’s 
case. This notion of resonance is strongly implicated in the phenomenological empathic 
engagement with the autobiographical invitation, in that the distinctive narrative 
description of real, lived experience, of explaining ‘what it is to be me’, carries with it a 
unique resonance potential. Schmitt confirms that narratives “have a bodily residue” that 
can “strongly influence […] the whole idea of realism and verisimilitude” as “embedded in 
the words we use” (2017: p. 85). Bauby avers the specificities of his embodied experience 
even before divulging the cause and prognostic details of the condition, which privileges 
his experience, along with the resultant resonance, over the medical facts of his 
circumstances. The tone of the text determines the testimonial tenor of the 
autobiographical invitation that Bauby’s narrative issues.  
Acknowledging experience as distinctly personal is integral to Schmitt’s notion of 
autobiography as “an embodied textual experience” that can incorporate “the concept of 
resonance […] as an echo of physical experience” (2017: p. 22). For Schmitt “the idea of 
resonance” is contingent upon the notion that the experiential narrative “constantly brings 
us back to who we are as minds but also as bodies” (p. 123). Recognising the otherness 
of Bauby’s material body, and of his exclusively embodied static state elicits “embodied 
cognition”, which Schmitt avers “can be used to imagine the body of the other, its 
experience and, possibly, its suffering” (2017: p. 126). Schmitt goes on to define this kind 
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of embodied resonance for the reader as: “a very pragmatic kind of transcendence”, which 
involves:  
meeting someone halfway, putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes 
while reducing the ‘self level’ as much as possible; also converting 
cognitive phenomena like ‘bodily residue’ or more general forms of 
resonance into echoes of what it is to be someone else.  
(pp. 129-30) 
However, this kind of feeling with the subjective, embodied experience of illness and 
disability is ethically contentious. The inherent tension in bearing witness to vulnerable 
subjectivity with the kind of bodily empathy Schmitt describes means that the reader is at 
risk of effacing the very otherness that Bauby's narrative inevitably submits. Robert 
Eaglestone describes the “paradoxical ‘doubleness’” inherent in testimonial narratives, 
which, by their very nature, invite “identification” whilst they simultaneously “prohibit” the 
same (2002: pp. 118-9). But, reading autobiography as self-witnessing testimony 
designates the reader’s ethical approach, whereby the reader as testimonial witness 
acknowledges the necessary epistemological distance that the textual boundary installs 
against identification. Arguably, bearing witness entails the referential recognition of 
embodied cognition as a “‘wish feeling’” (Ahmed, 2004: p. 30), which Sara Ahmed 
describes as feeling “something other than what another feels in the very moment of 
imagining they could feel what another feels” (2004, p. 30) as opposed to conceptions of 
empathy as material understanding. Unlike identification, empathy, as Plantinga explains, 
is better understood as a congruent response (1999: p. 245). In The Diving Bell, empathic 
relation is predicated on the “intimacy” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 151) that manifests between the 
reader and the subject as embodied witness, as facilitated by Bauby’s narrative strategies 
for inviting empathy and the text’s testimonial tone. Consequently, the ethical and 
empathic witnessing of Bauby’s narrative of self-witness entails that the reader 
acknowledges the experience of resonance as a willingness to engage the textual 
empathy characterised by the intimacy of Bauby’s candid and vivid descriptions of his 
embodied autobiographical experience.  
Fundamentally, the contingent transposition of Bauby’s autobiographical invitation to bear 
witness hinges upon the faithful and testimonial adaptation of tone and intimacy, and the 
resultant structure of empathic relation that characterises his memoir as embodied self-
witness. The engagement with and subsequent remediation of the embodied, testimonial 
perspective of self-witness is integral to the fidelity-based notion of pactual integrity upon 
which the prospect of an auteurbiographical adaptation of autobiography relies. Adapting 
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the characteristic first-person interiority of Bauby’s testimonial narrative for the screen was 
the foremost challenge for screenwriter, Ron Harwood, who admitted that he initially 
struggled to conceive of a way to do so. He came to the realisation that, in order to 
expedite an essentially intimate interpretation of Bauby’s memoir, he had to “put the 
audience in the place of the man” (‘Behind the Camera’, 2013: 6:19) in order to facilitate 
the equivalent autodiegetic (Genette, 1980: p. 245) narration. As a result, Harwood’s 
screenplay narrative is conveyed from Jean-Do’s static, embodied perspective, with his 
point of view established on the first page:  
 INT. JEAN-DO'S ROOM, NAVAL HOSPITAL - DAY  
 
Blackness. Silence.  
 
The blackness slowly, very slowly, begins to lighten.  
 
As if at a distance THE SOUND OF TWO VOICES, a man's 
and a woman's chatting, little more than intermittent murmurs.  
 
Then, suddenly close: 
[…] 
Like a flickering eyelid a picture begins to take shape: a small bare 
hospital Room, the faces of the NURSES either side of a bed, both 
looking down expectantly, directly into CAMERA. 
 
THE CAMERA IS JEAN-DOMINIQUE BAUBY, KNOWN AS 
JEAN-DO. 
 
As his eyes open he sees first the foot of his bed, the curled, 
paralysed hands on the yellow sheets, the IV pole hanging over 




(Harwood, p. 1) 
 
Harwood establishes Jean-Do’s embodied perspective through the configuration of the 
subjective camera, which is a recognised, first-person convention of autobiographical films 
that allows the viewer to see what the subject sees (Gernalzick, 2006). Following Daniel 
Dennett’s conception of “heterophenomenology” (1991: p. 72), Schmitt asserts that the 
empathic engagement with autobiography as a subjective account of real experience is a 
phenomenological encounter galvanised by “the capacity of putting yourself in somebody 
else’s place” (original italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 74). Dennett defines heterophenomenology 
as “a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most 
private and ineffable subjective experience while never abandoning the methodological 
scruples of science” (1991: p. 72), which Schmitt further describes as requiring “great 
intellectual effort” (2017: p. 74). Schmitt’s notion of “experiencing” autobiography as real 
takes heterophenomenology as “one of the keys, if not the main key” that can “open the 
door leading to the experience of otherness” (2017: p. 74). Placing the reader within the 
confines of Jean-Do’s body from the outset is a heterophenomenological gesture meant to 
recreate the ‘intimate space’ of Bauby’s source narrative, locating his embodied 
experience in the foreground prior to any kind of causal, exterior explication. 
Consequently, Harwood initiates engagement with Bauby’s autobiographical invitation in 
the screenplay through the literal advent of embodied perspective taking.  
The film makes use of the recognisable first-person convention of subjective perspective 
with accompanying voiceover, as explained in Section One, to convey Jean-Do’s narrating 
‘I’. In the opening scenes, as Jean-Do awakens from his coma, the swing and tilt lens 
settles in and out of focus; the effect of blinking is created by black, block edits and by the 
camera/man (Berto) closing and reopening his fingers over the lens. The framing of the 
fixed shot indicates Jean-Do’s bedbound stasis, as the figures of two nurses – one 
female, one male – become clearer, briefly, as the camera eye ‘blinks’, with pink roses 
visible in the foreground to the right edge of the frame. The nurses notice Jean-Do’s 
awakening, instructing him to keep his eyes open, and the female nurse looms invasively 
into extreme, but blurred close up as she informs him “You’ve been asleep for a long time. 
Now you’re waking up” (1:50-2:30). The doctor arrives at Jean-Do’s room, his head 
initially cut out of the frame due to the low angle of the camera’s perspective, and the 
viewer hears Jean-Do’s voice as he recognises and remarks upon the hospital setting 
(2:31). The doctor leans in to extreme close-up, his eye dominating the frame, and he 
repeats the instruction: “Mr. Bauby, open your eyes wide. Try to keep them open” (2:35). 
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Jean-Do can be heard groaning as the doctor’s eye is replaced by a white-blue pen light 
that all but floods the frame; the fixed gaze of the camera fails to follow it as it tracks 
across the screen from left to right and out of shot before it returns, accompanied by Jean-
Do’s weak protest of “no, no” in the voiceover (2:40-2:55). It is quickly established that the 
camera eye is Jean-Do’s, and the viewer sees what he sees with the same limited 
capacity. As Jean-Do’s environment is revealed piecemeal at the periphery of his blurred 
vision, the shot is never reversed to reveal the source of the point of view, as is the usual 
convention (see Carroll, 1999), deliberately withholding the image of the body and 
restricting the viewer’s gaze to his limited perspective. The effect of this extreme interiority 
and limited first-person point of view is a heterophenomenological rendering of embodied 
vulnerable subjectivity, that reproduces the invitation of embodied self-witness by placing 
the viewer within the intimate, embodied position of the narrating ‘I’.  
Reproducing the “textual surface” and “site of autobiographical knowledge” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 37) that is Bauby’s body is crucial to the film adaptation, not only 
visually, but also in terms of the narrative’s heterophenomenological potential for 
resonance, in line with Bauby’s literary source. The embodied resonance that 
accompanies viewership (much like the embodied cognition mentioned above) relates to 
the precognitive faculty of our brains, which permits a kind of neurological mimesis for the 
actions witnessed and read (see Freedberg and Galese, 2007: p. 202, and Iacoboni, 
2008: pp. 94-5). Reading and experiencing Jean-Do’s body in the film, both through the 
story and as the story of his experience, expedites “the resonance of another life” 
(Schmitt, 2017: p. 30) at the core of autobiographical telling. Schmitt explains that 
“resonance can be recycled to read what being someone else actually is” and that 
“memories of my pain can help me measure to some extent the pain suffered by someone 
else” (2017: pp. 129-30). This works on the understanding that autobiography requires 
“collaborative work and shared re-enactment” (pp.129-30) towards feeling with the unique 
experience of the autobiographical other; this includes the embodied ‘echo’ of stasis and 
containment as described by Jean-Dominique Bauby. According to Smith and Watson, 
autobiographical acts in visual media “can palpably push the autobiographical to the very 
interior of the body” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 175). The effect of this interiority in the 
memoir is such that the reader is given access to Bauby’s confined, physical experience 
of Locked-in Syndrome through candid, affective description. In the memoir, Bauby 
describes the stitching closed of his failing right eye:  
When I came to that late-January morning, the hospital ophthalmologist 
was leaning over me and sewing my right eyelid shut with a needle and 
thread, just as if he were darning a sock. Irrational terror swept over me. 
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What if this man got carried away and sewed up my left eye as well, my 
only link to the outside world, the only window to my cell, the one tiny 
opening of my cocoon?  
(p. 61) 
Bauby experiences this ordeal from within his body, his eye the metaphorical porthole in 
his bodily diving bell. This scene is viscerally recreated on screen, with Jean-Do’s 
voiceover narrating the panic that accompanies the camera’s prosthetic ‘eyelid’ slowly 
closing one stitch at a time: “Stay away from me. Please, I’m begging you […]. Please 
don’t close my eyes. Please” (15:30-15:42). The frame gradually shrinks to mimic the 
closing lid, obscuring the vision of the camera eye with the resultant darkness as the 
needle repeatedly pierces the substitute skin (15:35-16:10) (see Figure 3.1). Though 
Bauby’s eye was, in reality, already failing, in the film, the sealing of the eye is symbolic of 
Jean-Do’s retreat into the cerebral world of Locked-In Syndrome, creating a physical 
barrier between him and the outside world. This moment in the memoir signifies a chaotic 
shift in the narrative (see Frank, 2013), as Bauby is unable to see, both physically and 
metaphorically, an end to his physical containment. The correspondent scene in the film 
concludes with the first reverse shot of Jean-Do as a vulnerable subject, yet it shows 
nothing more than his eyes – first his working left eye, panning to the sealed right eye – in 
order to verify the reality of the sutures and the fragility of the remaining ocular connection 
between the subject and his environment (16:17-16:20). The heterophenomenological 
transposition of this visceral experience enables the viewer to empathise with Jean-Do’s – 
and referentially, Bauby’s – embodied experience of vulnerable subjectivity, and the 
material and psychological effects of the condition. 
 
Figure 3.1: The stitching closed of Jean-Do’s eye from his subjective perspective.  
Adopting the literal perspective of the subject not only invokes the documentary invitation 
that prompts viewers’ expectations of truth-telling (Plantinga, 2010), but also places the 
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viewer within the inert body of the vulnerable subject with an authenticating effect. In her 
article ‘Mediated Immediacy: Constructing Authentic Testimony in Audio-Visual Media’ 
(2017), Sara Jones avers “the body of the witness testifies to the authenticity of his or her 
experience” (p. 146) in the context of mediated testimony. Likewise, Couser argues for the 
realistic representation of the embodied subject in graphic somatography, as the 
necessary visibility and acknowledgement of the “embodied experience of impairment” 
(2018: p. 350) in an otherwise liberal, visual autobiographical mode. As established in 
Section One, the material body of the autobiographical subject – and empathic target – is 
a requisite referential anchor within the filmic autobiographical mode of bearing witness. 
However, the complete physical figure of Jean-Do’s narrated ‘I’, the ‘locked-in’ body of 
Jean-Do as situated in the film’s temporal present, is only revealed after he engages with 
the communication code that re-establishes his link to the outside world. Prior to the 
implementation of the communication code, the physical figure of the narrating ‘I’ of self-
witness is withheld: Jean-Do is spoken to, and about, but his speaking voice is heard as 
remote and characterised as interior monologue through voiceover. The viewer is initially 
denied a complete visual of Jean-Do’s physical body – aside from an opaque reflection of 
his face as he is wheeled down the corridor (17:12-17:31) – the withholding of which 
challenges the viewer’s emersive reconciliation of the empathic target on screen as a real 
person. But, although Jean-Do’s body in its entirety remains concealed from the viewer, 
his ‘whole’ is metonymically envisaged as a consequence of the embodied perspective, as 
“hidden parts of objects are visually experienced because they are present in absence” 
(Gray and Tanesini, 2010: p. 721). The effect of withholding the visual of Jean-Do’s 
material body patents the depicted experience as uniquely his, by limiting the exterior, 
omniscient point of view and gaze of the orthodox cinematic repertoire, to reinforce the 
exclusive, embodied, self-witnessing intimacy of Bauby’s autobiographical invitation.  
Although actor Mathieu Amalric personified Jean-Dominique Bauby for the purposes of 
the film, he was not always physically present in each scene during filming. In order to 
replicate the interiority of Bauby’s narrating ‘I’ in the moment, Schnabel kept Amalric 
separate from the filmed action in shots where Jean-Do’s body is unseen in its entirety; it 
was often unnecessary for him to be in situ as the camera provided the focal substitute for 
Jean-Do for the other actors. Jean-Do’s reactions, by way of interior monologue, were 
created by placing Amalric in a sound booth with a monitor, so that he was able to react to 
exactly what the camera was seeing, and equally, the camera/man wore an earpiece so 
that he could react to Amalric’s dialogue accordingly, as the camera eye surveyed the 
hospital setting and attendant staff. These organic and connected reactions to action, in 
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line with Bauby’s experience, conceal the bilateral façade of camera/man and Amalric, 
achieving a seemingly unified reenactment of Bauby’s autobiographical ‘I’. 
Harwood describes the deployment of Jean-Do’s point of view in his narrative transcription 
as “a washing line” on which he could “hang anything” (Harwood in MovieWeb, 2010: 
0:33). This metaphor is useful in as much as it describes Jean-Do’s point of view in terms 
of a narrative support structure that also provides a platform on which the multiplicity of 
autobiographical subjectivity can be arranged. The five dimensions of autobiographical 
subjectivity – memory, experience, identity, embodiment and agency (Smith and Watson 
2010: p. 49) – can be assembled and assimilated as a result of this individualised and 
interior perspective. Using Jean-Do’s contained point of view permits the essential 
spatiotemporal shifts necessary to convey these dimensions effectively, by also providing 
the inner, creative space of his imagination as a narrative resource: the butterfly of the 
memoir’s title. In one such butterfly scene in Harwood’s screenplay, Jean-Do asserts the 
tractability this consciousness affords him: 
JEAN-DO'S VOICE (cont'd) 
- I can imagine anything, anything at all.  
 
Sudden silence.  
 
CLOSER - THE SKIER - JEAN-DO  
 
He's wearing goggles with orange lenses and a ski cap. He 
smiles with exhilaration as he makes the descent.  
 
JEAN-DO'S VOICE (cont'd)  
And now I want to remember myself as I  
was. Handsome, debonair, glamorous.  
And devilishly attractive -  
 
He swerves to a halt, raising snow. He pushes his glasses on to his  
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forehead and pulls off his ski cap. He smiles while he catches 
his breath.  
 
VERY CLOSE - JEAN-DO  
As he was, aged 42, at his peak, splendid, fit, tanned.  
 
(Harwood, p. 39) 
In this scene from the screenplay, John-Do announces his capacity for cerebral 
gymnastics, signalling changes in narrative direction from imagination to memory at will. 
Furthermore, this scene offers some insight into the identity, embodiment and agency of 
“the ‘real’ or historical ‘I’” as the “flesh-and-blood person” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 
72); Jean-Do is presented as a strong and capable masculine subject (Connell and 
Messerschmidt, 2005), in line with Bauby’s descriptions of himself and his past, pre-stroke 
life in the memoir.  
Bauby’s imaginative flexibility grants the auteurial équipe the same scope and creative 
freedom to represent the comprehensive prism of autobiographical subjectivity in the 
cinematic adaptation, which director, Julian Schnabel confirms:  
as a filmmaker […] you could put anything you want into this movie, 
whatever comes to this guy’s mind is possible, and so that would vary the 
structure […]. It gave me absolute freedom to do whatever I wanted.  
(PathéUK, 2007: 2:04)  
The freedom to which Schnabel gestures speaks to the “incorrigibility of first-person 
reports of mental states” (Rorty, 1970: p. 399), which for Robert B. Brandom constitutes 
the “perfect epistemic accessibility” of the mind: “it is the realm where error and ignorance 
are impossible – what’s happening in one’s mind is exactly whatever one thinks is going 
on” (original italics, 2000: p. 157). Bauby’s literary testimony is an episodic collage of 
reminiscence on past relationships, dreams, and philosophical musings on life and 
literature, given context by the day-to-day reportage of his contrasting experience of 
vulnerable subjectivity. The film transposes the meandering episodic structure of the 




In the film, the scene that corresponds with Harwood’s, as above, is expanded to illustrate 
the scope of Jean-Do’s imagination. Through voiceover, Jean-Do announces: “other than 
my eye, there are two things that aren’t paralysed. My imagination and my memory. 
They’re the only two ways I can escape from my diving bell. I can imagine anything, 
anybody, anywhere” (39:30). As he speaks, layered, superimposed close-up images of 
butterflies on flowers fade into wide, sweeping aerial shots of coastal cliffs, snow-capped 
mountains and Martinique Island, before cutting to a point-of-view shot of Jean-Do’s 
girlfriend Inès (Agathe de la Fontaine), semi-naked and returning the camera’s gaze 
provocatively (40:42). After the cut, Jean-Do and Inès roll on the beach in a passionate 
embrace, shown from multiple, mid-close angles. In the voiceover, Jean-do then signals 
the shift from imagination to memory: “Now I’ll remember myself as I was. Handsome, 
debonair, glamorous” (41:19), but the photographic images on screen are of Marlon 
Brando, prompting Jean-Do’s assertions “That’s Marlon Brando, not me!”. The rapid jump-
cut reveals an aerial shot of a male skier, dressed in orange, descending a pristine slope, 
over which Jean-Do states “That’s me” (41:29). The imagined ‘showreel’ concludes with a 
home-video style vignette of an apres-ski gathering that freezes on a smiling Jean-Do, 
with a passport photo inserted on the left, offering a comparative perspective. A montage 
of snapshots of Jean-Do (Amalric) in various poses, with different people, across the 
stages of his life fills the screen, before the jump-cut reveals Jean-Do as he is in the 
diegetic present, seated in his wheelchair, inert, in a hat and glasses with his right eye 
taped closed. The imagined introspection, lasting approximately two and a half minutes, 
demonstrates the narrative and cognitive freedom that imagination grants Jean-Do, 
reflecting Bauby’s incorrigible autobiographical narrative. Schmitt claims “autobiography 
has a major drawback: It is claustrophobically anchored in the autobiographer’s mind” 
(2017: p. 144); however, as Schnabel claims in an interview, “reality” in the film, as it is in 
Bauby’s memoir, “is whatever is going on in [Jean-Dominique Bauby’s] head” as “his brain 
became his [..] landscape” (in Movieweb, 2010: 4:47-5:06). It is precisely Bauby’s mind, in 
his capacity as a vulnerable subject, that mobilises his autobiographical subjectivity: the 
‘butterfly’ of his imagination liberates his testimony from the ‘diving bell’ of his diminished 
body. By observing literary autobiography’s proclivity for imaginative interiority and 
replicating the autodiegetic point of view of Bauby’s embodied self-witness, the auteurial 
équipe have the capacity to address multiple dimensions of Jean-Dominique Bauby’s 
subjectivity simultaneously, adhering to the epistemic reality of Bauby’s imagination within 
the testimonial scope of pactual integrity.     
In their collective role as secondary witness, the auteurial équipe are charged with the 
preservation of Bauby’s autobiographical invitation, whilst they are paradoxically liberated 
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by his narrative’s characteristic incorrigibility. Schnabel exercises the freedom afforded by 
Bauby’s cerebral narrative to stretch the “subjective perimeter” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 67) of 
the literary source text, using the flexibility of Jean-Do’s imagination and the cinematic 
medium to redeploy his own artistic visions within the testimonial film.25 The falling glaciers 
(37:15) as emblematic of physical deterioration, and the stylised shot of Josephine’s 
flickering hair during the journey to Lourdes in the convertible (108:30) are both examples 
of Schnabel’s artistic intervention that do not feature in either the screenplay or the 
memoir. However, these images do not conflict with the tone and intimacy of Bauby’s 
testimonial narrative, functioning as cinematic “emotion markers” (Smith, 1999: p. 118) 
that support sustained empathic engagement rather than drive it, as complementary 
rather than contradictory contributions that demonstrate the latitude of Jean-Do’s memory 
and consciousness. Schmitt recognises the potentially limited, partial perspective afforded 
readers of literary autobiography, stating: 
We often refer to “the truth of the person”, the fact of having access to this 
truth meaning knowing the person more or better than someone else. […] 
[W]e should not talk about truth but about the scope of the person, the 
subjective perimeter we have access to. In a text, this perimeter is limited 
for obvious reasons 
(Schmitt, 2017: p. 67)  
But, the audiovisual remit of cinema and the necessarily interpretive aspect of adaptation 
expand upon the limited representational capacity of literary autobiography. Schnabel’s 
auteurist flourishes align with Schmitt’s idea of scope, as representative of Bauby’s 
unbounded intellect depicted in contrast with the finitude of his physical condition. This 
critical tension, which underlies Bauby’s testimonial account, coupled with the notion of 
auteurbiography as secondary witnessing, nullifies any threat to pactual integrity, as 
Schnabel’s actions do not deviate from the first-person rhetoric of cinematic I-witnessing.    
 
 
25 Schnabel wrote a screenplay for Patrick Süskind’s novel Perfume and saw parallels 
between the protagonist, Jean-Baptiste Grenouille and Bauby; the screenplay was 
rejected, and the film was eventually realised with Tom Tykwer as co-writer and director, 




Figure 3.2: Jean-Dominique Bauby at Berck-sur-Mer in Assigné à Résidence (Beineix, 
1997). 
In addition to point of view oriented cinematic devices, Schnabel embeds additional 
referential and intertextual anchors in support of the veracity of the adapted cinematic 
narrative. Through his preparatory research, Schnabel flew to France and found that staff 
at the Berck-sur-Mer hospital who had cared for Bauby were able to describe the 
physicality of his condition, right down to the placement of his hands to assist with 
Amalric’s reenactment (Schnabel in ‘Behind the Camera’, 2013: 18:40-19:56). The need 
for realistic characterisation is key to the auteurbiographical commitment to secondary 
witnessing. Accordingly, Schnabel’s extratextual, biographical research efforts were 
buttressed by Jean-Jacque Beineix’s documentary Assigné à Résidence (1997), which 
contains actual footage of Jean-Dominique Bauby in his Locked-In state in an established 
testimonial medium (See Figure 3.2). The documentary project observes Bauby working 
with his therapist, and shows the reality of his day-to-day life at Berck-sur-Mer whilst 
writing the memoir. The inevitable intertextual links between the documentary and the film 
are most pertinent in Amalric’s “salvaged” (Hutcheon, 2013) portrayal of the body, visually 
replicating the physicality of Jean-Dominique Bauby’s embodied experience of Locked-In 
Syndrome, as seen in the comparison between Figure 3.2, and the still from Schnabel’s 
film in Figure 3.3. Mathieu Amalric claims that the role of Jean-Do “was a very physical 
part” (‘Submerged’, 2008: 8:18), explaining the concerted effort required to embody a 
person with Locked-In syndrome: “I prepared myself like a sportsman […] not to move 
when you can move demands all the muscles, because you have to tense all the muscles 
not to move” (‘Submerged’, 2008: 8:20). Amalric, when interviewed, acknowledged the 
importance of his own extratextual research process, citing the Beineix film as a 
referential source and further claiming “those 26 minutes helped me a lot, because you 
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see him [Bauby]” (Amalric in Movieweb, 2010: 1:20-23). Amalric also confirms that those 
who knew Bauby were his “mirror”, feeding back on the precision of his physical 
reenactment of Bauby’s material body (2:50-3:08), as witnesses helping him to be 
“believable” (2:45). The accuracy of Amalric’s incarnation as a biographical and 
testimonial act, visually validates the witnessing agenda of the film narrative by providing 
the body as the referent “site” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 37) that can “make 
embodiment visible” (Smith and Watson. 2010: p. 75) for the viewer as witness.  
 
Figure 3.3: Mathieu Amalric as Jean-Do in The Diving Bell and the Butterfly 
(Schnabel, 2007). 
In addition to the authentic reenactment of the bodily ‘site’, location is also integral to the 
cinematic adaptation of The Diving Bell as Bauby’s environment at the time of writing was 
intrinsic to his experience as the material context for the narrative. Accordingly, Schnabel 
as director felt it important to situate the cinematic adaptation of Bauby’s narrative in the 
same setting, claiming that anything otherwise would have been “fake” (PathéUk, 2007: 
5:18). In spite of the typically cautious disclaimer of ‘based on a true story’ that adorns the 
DVD cover, Schnabel’s commitment to fidelity, to the reality of Bauby’s experience, is 
such that he shot the film on location at the hospital in Berck-sur-Mer where Bauby was 
treated. Bauby’s narrative descriptions of his surroundings are authentically transposed as 
a result, and in many of the external establishing shots in the film, Bauby’s ‘Cinecittà’ is 
reimagined: 
Cinecittà is the perpetually deserted terrace of Sorrel ward. Facing south, 
its vast balconies open onto a landscape heavy with the poetic and 
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slightly offbeat charm of a movie set. The suburbs of Berck look like a 
model train layout. A handful of buildings at the foot of the sand-dunes 
give the illusion of a Western ghost town. As for the sea, it foams such an 
incandescent white that it might be the product of the special-effects 
department.  
(p. 37)  
As Bauby’s narrative is contingent upon his embodied perspective, his environment and 
its landscape are prevalent in his introspective reflections: the Berck-sur-Mer hospital is 
the sea to his diving bell. In What We See When We Read (2014), Peter Mendelsund 
asserts that “much of our reading imagination comprises visual free association […] 
untethered from the author’s text” (p. 294) meaning that “what we do not see is what the 
author pictured when writing a particular book” (original italics, p. 207). However, by 
filming the cinematic text in the exact setting Bauby refers to in his memoir, Schnabel 
embeds the same images Bauby saw as autobiographical artefacts, just as they were 
described from Bauby’s perspective. If heterophenomenological engagement with 
autobiography is “the capacity of putting yourself in somebody else’s place” (original 
italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 74), then Schnabel’s faithful cinematic transposition of Bauby’s 
environment incites this heterophenomenological faculty by virtue of his carefully 
replicated surroundings, which function as a watermark of pactual integrity throughout the 
adaptation. 
In/Fidelity: Empathy and Ethics  
As established, adapting autobiographical accounts of embodied experience requires a 
sensitive and ethical approach that can privilege the reality of vulnerable subjectivity, 
without inviting overdetermined empathic relation. However, autobiographies also contain 
partial representations of relational others with whom the subject lives, works, and 
interacts, specifically those who provide significant context for their experiential narrative. 
The research required as part of the adaptive auteurbiographical process recognises that 
as “life is experienced socially […] narrating one's life necessitates narrating the lives of 
others” (Lee, 2014: p. 1256), and the auteurial équipe engage the subject’s related others 
to expand the autobiographical scope of the cinematic narrative (as evinced above), but 
also to ensure that those represented are afforded the appropriate referential respect. As 
Jean-Dominique Bauby’s relationships were an integral part of his life, and his literary 
testimony, those same relationships become important within the testimonial context of 
the adapted film as secondary testimony. Paul John Eakin attests:  
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growing acceptance of a relational model of identity is conditioning us to 
accept an increasingly large component of ‘we’ -experience in the ‘I’ -
narratives we associate with autobiography.  
 
(1999: pp. 74-75)  
It is inevitable that each self-referential narrative will carry the residue of identity’s 
relational model as the subject is constructed socially (Schmitt, 2017: p. 11). Ultimately, 
the auteurial équipe have a referential responsibility to the related others represented in 
the source narrative in addition to the autobiographical subject, as they too are real people 
who exist in the real world. This aspect of auteurbiography is developed further in the 
following chapter’s discussion of auto/biography; however, the testimonial context of 
vulnerable subjectivity invites a particularly nuanced evaluation of subjective focus and 
referential responsibility.  
For Couser, referential responsibility in life-writing equates to “respect for autonomy”, 
which extends to offering “some degree of control over what happens to [others’] stories, 
including secrets and private information” (2004: p. 19). However, the degree of control is 
further determined by the kinds of relationships in which the writer and related others are 
engaged: “The ethical stakes are proportionate to the centrality (and vulnerability) of the 
figure involved and the intimacy and interdependence between the writer and the subject” 
(2004: p. 19). Couser’s claim concerns the ethics of explicitly relational life-writing, but can 
be extended to accommodate the politics of auteurbiographical adaptations, as testimonial 
and ethical acts of representation, and the self-witnessing testimonies of vulnerable 
subjects who represent others within their testimonial narratives. 
*** 
Bauby’s loss of agency permeates his experience throughout the memoir as he strives to 
reconcile his newly vulnerable subjectivity with his former identity through distinctly 
nostalgic and relational episodes. In ‘The Photo’ chapter, Bauby catalogues a memory of 
shaving his father on the last occasion that they met prior to Bauby suffering his stroke, in 
a retrospective reflection typical of the quest narrative (Frank, 2013: p. 119). Bauby goes 
to great lengths to describe the elder man and his surroundings in a sentimental and 
almost tangible apprehension of the paternal encounter:  
The scene has remained engraved in my memory. Hunched in the red-
upholstered armchair where he sifts through the day’s newspapers, my 
dad bravely endures the rasp of the razor attacking his loose skin. I wrap 
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a big towel around his shrivelled neck, daub thick lather over his face, and 
do my best not to irritate his skin, dotted here and there with small dilated 
capillaries. From age and fatigue, his eyes have sunk deep into their 
sockets and his nose looks too prominent for his emaciated features. But, 
still flaunting the plume of hair – now snow white – that has always 
crowned his tall frame, he has lost none of his splendour. All around us, a 
lifetime’s clutter has accumulated; […] a confusion of ancient magazines, 
records no longer played, miscellaneous objects. Photos from all the ages 
of man have been stuck into the frame of a large mirror.  
(pp. 51-2) 
The lyrical description of this scene is visually rich, littered with precise observations of 
colour and texture that summon not only images, but also the materiality/material precarity 
of the man and his environment in a phenomenological rendering of nostalgic and 
relational empathy. This cinematic description is carried through to the filmic adaptation in 
detail (see Figure 3.4) , right down to John-Do’s (Mathieu Amalric) use of a live blade for 
the shave to ensure that appropriate levels of care and bodily tension were achieved, with 
the authentic sound of steel scraping stubbly skin a particularly resonant 
phenomenological prompt. Bauby’s descriptions of his father – affectionately referred to 
as Papinou in the film – are fastidiously realised in Max von Sydow’s cinematic 
performance, from the aesthetic to the characterisation. Von Sydow himself said “it was 
not difficult to do this character. It was all in the text” (von Sydow in ‘Submerged’, 2008: 
7:00-7:05), and the chemistry between von Sydow and Amalric is authentically fraternal 
on screen.  
 
Figure 3.4: Jean-Do shaves Papinou. 
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The film provides one significant and unambiguous addendum: the addition of a 
contemporary photograph of Jean-Do,26 which appears in a close shot alongside the elder 
man’s reflection in the mirror (55:01). This Lacanian moment carries with it a critical 
tension, which foreshadows an evaluation that Papinou makes in a later scene that 
cinematically reappropriates Bauby’s assessment of the simultaneity of his and his 
father’s plights. In the memoir, Bauby observes:  
I cannot quit my seaside confinement. And he [Papinou] can no longer 
descend the magnificent staircase of his apartment building on his ninety-
two-year-old legs. We are both locked-in cases, each in his own way: my 
self in my carcass, my father in his fourth-floor apartment.  
(pp. 52-3)   
Though the embodied experience of Locked-In Syndrome is beyond the comprehension 
for the majority of Bauby’s readers, a cultural assumption regarding the often physical 
limitations of age allows the simile to foster empathic proximity, which is further buttressed 
by the relational empathic “channel” (Anderst, 2015) of the tender filial relationship. 
Anderst explains that autobiographical narratives can make use of intra-textual empathic 
“tracks” between the subject and the related others represented in their texts to incite and 
encourage the empathic engagement of their readers. Bauby’s assertion of empathy for 
his elderly and isolated father is mobilised by the observation of their similarity, which 
invites the reader to share in his empathic connection and invest in the validity of his 
evaluation of their equivalency. However, as Schmitt asserts “when the experience 
narrated is so fundamentally different from anything you have experienced in your own 
life, your empathy towards the autobiographer is more an act of good will than a serious 
form of re-enactment” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 110). Evidently, the assertion of similarity 
between a debilitating neurological disorder and the limitations of an ageing body is a 
simplistic and metaphorical comparison in the memoir. But, Bauby’s very personal 
evaluation of his and his father’s immobility and consequent isolation as equivalent 
cultivates empathic proximity, by making the otherwise unrelatable, embodied experience 
of Locked-In Syndrome comprehensible rather than accessible. By drawing on the familiar 
physical limitations of ageing, Bauby articulates his experience in knowable terms, whilst 
his autobiographical invitation simultaneously entreats empathy from the reader/viewer 
that is analogous to his feeling with his father in comparable conditions.    
 
26 The memoir references a photograph of Bauby as a child on a visit to Berck as 




Bauby’s kinship with his father is particularly poignant on screen as the film reiterates 
John-Do and Papinou’s equivalence with both sensitivity and pathos. Bauby’s written 
reflection, as detailed above, becomes Papinou’s distraught observation on screen, 
whereby Papinou paraphrases Bauby’s literary realisation of their similitude during an 
emotional telephone call between the two men:  
I’ve had a thought about us. We’re in the same boat. I’m stuck in this 
apartment, unable to use the stairs. You try four flights of stairs when 
you’re 92! You see, we’re both locked-in. You in your body, me in my 
apartment.  
(1:18:35-59) 
The conversation is constructed using details from ‘The Photo’ chapter’s aforementioned 
introspection, but Bauby’s words become Papinou’s in the cinematic interchange. 
However, the reciprocity of the empathic channel between the two men mitigates the 
infidelity of the reattributed dialogue, supported by an emotionally-charged shot-reverse-
shot dynamic that closely frames the facial affect of both men (1:17:26-1:18:30). This 
mirrored “scene of empathy” (Plantinga, 1999) is emphatic and complex, intensified by the 
close shots of Jean-Do as the empathic target within the testimonial discourse, and 
Papinou’s tearful resignation, driven home by Jean-Do’s amanuensis Claude’s (Anne 
Consigny) empathic tears as she both expedites and bears witness to the encounter. In 
the memoir, the chapter culminates with Bauby considering how difficult his condition and 
the resultant separation from his father must be for the elder man, assigning his own pain 
to his father as reflected in this passage:  
Every now and then he calls, and I listen to his affectionate voice, which 
quivers a little in the receiver they hold to my ear. It cannot be easy for 
him to speak to a son who, as he well knows, will never reply.  
(p. 53) 
In the film, the telephone conversation is depicted using Bauby’s reflective intuitions in the 
memoir as a blueprint: Papinou communicates with Jean-Do, with Claude acting as Jean-
Do’s interpreter; Papinou expresses his frustrations in the same ways that Bauby 
identifies them in the memoir, but Bauby’s voice – as the referential anchor of embodied 
subjectivity – is conspicuous by its absence. The unavoidable delays caused by Jean-
Do’s dictated communication via Claude exacerbate Papinou’s confusion – represented 
as symptomatic of his age in the film, though he is represented as lucid in the memoir –
causing him to lose his train of thought and exclaim “It’s impossible to talk like this” 
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(1:18:13). The sensation of physical and emotional distance is more acute as a 
consequence of the parallel depiction of communicative difficulties for each of the men, 
which also reinscribes Bauby’s own frustrations in the memoir, echoing his sense of 
bereavement when unable to play and joke with his own son (pp. 78-79). When Jean-Do 
implores his father not to cry, Papinou replies “that’s easy for you to say. You’re my son, 
for God’s sake!” (1:19:39), the irony of his words resonating in the emotional tenor of the 
exchange. The autobiographical invitation to empathic relation functions at both an intra-
textual and an extra-textual level in this scene, as Papinou expresses the relational 
empathy described by Bauby in the source text, whilst simultaneously triggering the 
audience to feel with Jean-Do and Papinou as their shared affect is physically rendered. 
The empathic relation Bauby’s memoir elicits endures the adaptive process in spite of the 
slight shift of perspective from the narrating ‘I’ to the character Papinou, as they remain 
projected in parallel in the film, as they are in the memoir. This correspondence is 
essential for the preservation of subjective truth at the heart of self-witness, and the 
transmedial interpretation retains the empathic dynamic between father and son as an 
adaptive gesture of pactual integrity. 
Retaining the relational empathy demonstrated in an autobiographical narrative of self-
witness is particularly pertinent in cases where the vulnerable subject is unable to approve 
or verify the details to be adapted. In auteurbiographical adaptations, the consequences of 
creative deviation can be detrimental to an adapted text’s pactual integrity, but also, have 
ethical implications. However, Harwood admits that the scene he is “proudest of” is one of 
his own invention (Harwood in Movieweb, 2010: 2:26-2:23), with no corresponding 
moment referred to in Bauby’s original memoir. The scene in question is a short episode 
that depicts the mother of Bauby’s children, Sylvie, at Jean-Do’s bedside, whereby she 
agrees to interpret for Jean-Do when his lover calls his room in the absence of his 
therapist. The screenplay does not name Jean-Do’s lover, identifying her only as “A 
Woman’s Voice” and then “The Woman’s Voice”, with Sylvie informing Jean-Do simply 
“it’s her”. Sylvie and Jean-Do’s unnamed lover are involved in a terse exchange that 
foregrounds Sylvie’s emotional pain and sense of betrayal, before Sylvie selflessly agrees 
to leave the room to allow the caller to address Jean-Do directly; in the screenplay 
Harwood writes that Sylvie “may or may not be listening”. Sylvie re-enters the room when 
the caller mentions her regret that she and Jean-Do did not have a child together, but the 
call concludes with Sylvie’s supposedly intuitive intervention: “he does want to say 
something. He wants to say, 'I love you’, but he doesn't want to say it in front of me” (pp. 
104-8). Harwood’s scene is undeniably affecting, as the innate tension and discomfiture of 
the exchange is underpinned by his conception of a love triangle between a man, his 
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former partner, and the woman he left her for. Nevertheless, Harwood overlooks his 
auteurbiographical obligation to preserve Jean-Do’s narrative of self-witness, and there is 
a palpable shift in focus that temporarily displaces him as the empathic target, instead 
foregrounding Sylvie’s emotional conflict.  
This scene is indicative of Harwood’s external creative input, as informed by the research 
he undertook in preparation for the adaptation, rather than being conversant with the 
source text. It is likely that Harwood’s limited contextual research affected the invention of 
the telephone scene, as Harwood explained in an interview that he spoke only to the 
mother of Bauby’s children and one of his physiotherapists prior to writing the screenplay. 
Harwood also admits that he is “a little nervous of talking to real people” when writing an 
adapted screenplay, as he finds it creatively inhibiting, further claiming he “wanted to be 
able to invent and not be too bound” (in Movieweb, 2010: 3:01-3:23) by other people’s 
input. However, Sylvie de la Rochefoucauld claims: 
Ron Harwood asked me lots of personal questions. It really was like a 
torture session at times, but I had to go through with it. There were many 
things I'd never addressed since Jean-Do's death, not even with my 
children. Ron brought them all out. He was brilliant. He wanted to know 
everything. I ended up being completely honest. Honesty is the goal of a 
great film, even though it is hard at times. 
(de la Rochefoucauld in Allen, 2008) 
The honesty to which de la Rochefoucauld refers is her own, partial truth, which may 
account for the way Harwood foregrounds her distress in the screenplay scene described 
above. Harwood’s limited research efforts, and the consequent expression of empathy 
with Sylvie in his invented scene, jeopardises the testimonial endeavour of 
auteurbiography, creating a brief disruption to the autobiographical invitation at the 
adaptive discourse level of the screenplay by skewing the referential focus from Bauby’s 
experiential truth to Sylvie’s.  
For auteurbiography to maintain the ethical and empathic agenda of secondary 
witnessing, the cinematic adaptation must remain focused on the autobiographical subject 
as self-witness and empathic target. Although Harwood’s tonally deviant, triangulated 
telephone scene, described above, was retained in the cinematic adaptation, Schnabel 
made some subtle amendments using his own extensive research process to inform the 
changes. Unlike Harwood, Schnabel engaged in a substantial and ongoing investigative 
exercise that involved talking with Bauby’s closest friends throughout production, 
oscillating between the memoir and its testimonial and relational context. Bauby’s memoir 
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makes it clear that his lover, Florence Ben Sadoun was a loyal companion, and someone 
with whom he was in regular communication: “Sweet Florence refuses to speak to me 
unless I first breathe noisily into the receiver that Sandrine holds glued to my ear” (p. 49). 
In the film, Schnabel abridges and reinterprets Harwood’s telephone conversation, and 
gives Ben Sadoun’s cinematic counterpart the name Inès (Agathe de la Fontaine), who is 
also included in Jean-Do’s imagined memory montage earlier in the film (described 
earlier). Schnabel also condenses Sylvie’s input to diminish the shift in empathic focus, 
renaming her Céline (Emmanuelle Seigner). Though Inès is still characterised as afraid to 
visit Jean-Do, and the tension of Céline’s presence during the exchange remains, 
Schnabel goes some way towards redressing both the testimonial empathic focus and the 
scarcity of Ben Sadoun’s representation in the film. Firstly, Céline’s dialogue is less 
hostile, and she quickly places Inès on speakerphone so that Jean-Do can hear her voice. 
Schnabel includes the phrase “each day I wait” (1:28:41) in the dictated dialogue – 
relayed by Céline – between Jean-Do and Inès, as a direct confirmation of Jean-Do’s 
feelings for Inès, and a coded acknowledgement of Ben Sadoun’s relationship with Bauby 
based on information provided during preparatory interviews (‘Submerged’, 2008). The 
reciprocal affection between Inès and Jean-Do is apparent, and this phrase not only pulls 
empathic focus back to Jean-Do and the heartache of separation inflicted by his condition 
through a literal reassertion of the ‘I’, it also signifies and reinstates the primacy of the 
autobiographer’s experience, whilst respecting the subject’s relational context as 
inextricable from autobiographical narratives. This act of auteurial authority mitigates 
Harwood’s deviation in the screenplay, to reaffirm the film’s testimonial commitment, and 
to underscore the primacy of pactual integrity in auteurbiographical adaptations as a form 
of secondary witnessing. 
The impact of de la Rochefoucauld’s input manifests in other ways throughout both the 
screenplay and the film, most pertinent in the ubiquity of her onscreen counterpart, Céline 
(Emmanuelle Seigner), who appears prominently in promotional material and on the DVD 
cover, and the relative absence of Inès, as representative of Bauby’s lover Florence Ben 
Sadoun. In a published interview, de la Rochefoucauld was reported as saying: “I was at 
[Bauby’s] bedside day after day. I never abandoned him. I was never aware of Jean-Do's 
girlfriend visiting him in hospital” (in Allen, 2008).27 Contrary to de la Rochefoucauld’s 
claim, she herself is mentioned only fleetingly in one chapter of Bauby’s memoir, ‘Through 
a Glass, Darkly’ (p. 77), which depicts a Father’s Day visit from his children and where he 
refers to Sylvie by name only twice (p. 82), leaving their shared parental responsibilities 
 
27 Beth Arnold’s article, ‘The truth about “The Diving Bell and the Butterfly”’ (2008) for 
Salon.com states that de la Rochefoucauld denies having said this. 
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implicit. The record of interaction between Bauby and de la Rochefoucauld is limited to: 
“Sylvie and I remain alone and silent, her hand squeezing my inert fingers. Behind dark 
glasses that reflect a flawless sky, she softly weeps over our shattered lives (p. 82)”. Here, 
Bauby refers to their individually ‘shattered lives’ as plural, rather than a collective 
shattered life, marking them as separate, albeit inevitably connected by their past and 
their children. By contrast, Bauby’s references to Ben Sadoun in the memoir are indictive 
of her regular and protective presence. He describes her as a “[member] of the personal 
bodyguard that sprang up immediately after the disaster” (p. 120) and includes her in his 
remembered account of the day of his stroke (p. 127). De la Rochefoucauld’s presence as 
Céline in numerous scenes in the film serves to further highlight Florence Ben Sadoun’s 
effacement, and raises further questions as to the ethical implications of de la 
Rochefoucauld’s involvement in the adaptive process and the potential impact on the 
broader witnessing agenda. 
The relational context of an autobiographical subject’s testimonial narrative can act as a 
scaffold for their subjective truth; however, the textual portrait within the cinematic frame 
of secondary witnessing must remain that of the autobiographical subject, with the focus 
on their testimonial truth. The auteurbiographical research process must be conducted 
within the testimonial agenda of pactual integrity, especially when the autobiographical 
subject is unable to verify the contributary accounts of relational others. In the case of The 
Diving Bell’s adaptation, Bauby was deceased by the time the rights were sold, and 
control of the memoir passed to his heirs, who were minors at the time of his death. This 
may explain de la Rochefoucauld’s prevailing influence upon the final film product, as she 
retained droit moral – the moral rights – for Bauby’s memoir on behalf of his children. 
According to Michel M. Walter, droit moral can vary from one legislature to another; 
however, under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, “the most important prerogatives of 
droit moral [are] the right of paternity and the right of integrity” (2019: p. 319). Walter 
explains that paternity is “the right to claim authorship”, whilst integrity “confers on the 
author the right to object to any changes to his or her work that may harm the author’s 
reputation” (2019: p. 319). Furthermore, unlike economic rights, droit moral cannot be 
transferred, with French copyright law designating droit moral “everlasting, inalienable, 
and exempt from the statute of limitations” (Walter, 2019: p. 320); this means that under 
French law, droit moral is retained even when the economic rights are sold or transferred. 
The economic rights were initially sold to Dreamworks, then to Universal, before finally 
being acquired by Kathleen Kennedy at Pathé who made and released the film. But, 
journalist Beth Arnold alleges that de la Rochefoucauld, who was initially involved in the 
sale of the economic rights for the memoir’s adaptation, brought a lawsuit against the 
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publishers prior to production, asserting control of droit moral and arguing for increased 
royalties, all on behalf of her children (Arnold, 2008). De la Rochefoucauld won the 
lawsuit, and became friends with Kathleen Kennedy, whom she considers “the 
godmother” of the adapted film (de la Rochefoucauld in Arnold, 2008). De la 
Rouchefoucauld’s actions, coupled with the film’s apparent deviations from Bauby’s 
source memoir, suggest that her involvement in the adaptation process was self-
motivated, rather than supportive of the auteurbiographical, testimonial agenda. The 
evidence of de la Rochefoucauld’s input is particularly problematic in the context of 
vulnerable subjectivity, as it compromises the testimonial project of auteurbiography and 
risks the referential reality of the subjective truth. 
*** 
The creative and interpretive aspects of auteurbiographical adaptation inevitably leave 
traces of the auteurial équipe’s input on the finished product as they undertake the 
crossmodal transposition of a testimonial source text into a new intersubjective form. 
Bearing witness to self-witnessing requires an ethical and empathic commitment to the 
experiential truth of the autobiographical subject, along with the will and the wherewithal to 
transmit their testimonial invitation. Harwood’s realisation of point of view is the 
masterstroke that underpins The Diving Bell and the Butterfly’s pactual integrity, as the 
vehicle for the multidimensional representation of Bauby’s embodied experience; 
however, Harwood’s metatextual research was minimal, and the consequent deviations 
compromise the auteurbiographical subjective focus of secondary testimony, jeopardising 
the testimonial project’s commitment to the transmission of the autobiographical invitation. 
Nevertheless, it is Julian Schnabel who claims both the ultimate responsibility and the 
overall recognition for the cinematic rendering of Bauby’s narrative of self-witness. In spite 
of minor departures from the source, such as the casting of three children instead of two 
to play Bauby’s offspring (a decision sanctioned by de la Rochefoucauld), and the 
changing of a few names with no real impact, Schnabel largely maintained the tone of 
Bauby’s memoir throughout, steering the narrative – and the viewer – “back to life” 
(original italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 117) through cognisant, empathic and testimonial 
resolutions.  
Schnabel’s artistic and creative additions to the film are complimentary, and mindful of the 
tone, embodiment and relational context of the reality of the vulnerable subject. For 
example, Schnabel includes found anatomical images as the backdrop for the film’s 
opening titles, all of which were salvaged from a house located close to the Berck hospital 
where Bauby was treated, which was formerly owned by a doctor who worked there. The 
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song in Jean-Do’s head as he awakens from his coma is a drinking song performed by 
one of Bauby’s closest friends and recorded in a hallway to give the sound a contained 
quality. Furthermore, the first person that Jean-Do, and the viewer, sees in the film is one 
of the nurses who actually tended Bauby, and the physiotherapist who cradles Jean-Do in 
the pool scene (1:14:00) was Bauby’s physiotherapist during his time at Berck-sur-Mer 
(Schnabel in ‘Behind the Camera’, 2013: 19:40-19:56). Schnabel insisted that the film be 
shot entirely in French, on location at the same hospital, to ensure that the French 
sensibility and setting of the narrative and its subject was honoured. Schnabel extends the 
notion of pactual integrity, going to great lengths to endow the cinematic adaptation with 
auxiliary layers of authentic representation to provide a multisensory, and “multilaminated” 
(Hutcheon, 2013: p. 21) testimony on behalf of the late Jean-Dominique Bauby.    
As with literary autobiographies, and the autofilmic testimonies explored in Section One, 
auteurbiographical adaptations are fundamentally concerned with the autobiographical 
truth of a life; this truth is subjective, embodied, and characterised by individual 
experience, all of which is reflected in the manner and means of testimonial telling. 
Schmitt reasons: “If you suspect the author of tampering from time to time with the facts, 
but you feel that this tampering remains reasonable, the autobiographical pact remains 
valid” (2017: p. 67); this rationale extends to the auteurbiographical labour of cinematic 
secondary witnessing. The caveat of the auteurbiographical pact is that artistic license is 
permitted, and sometimes necessary, provided the empathic target is explicitly 
represented, the tone and intimacy of the source text are ethically preserved, and the 
autobiographical invitation transcends the auteurial impulse for creativity and invention. 
The overriding occupation and shared ambition of the auteurial équipe is to achieve 
pactual integrity, to perpetuate empathic engagement, and to ensure that the subject’s 







a person’s life can appear through someone else’s narrative  
Philippe Lejeune 
4. Adapting Auto/Biography: Approaching the Limits of Auteurbiography in Being 
Flynn and Julie & Julia 
Previous chapters have advanced the prospect of a single autobiographical subject as 
self-witness, with whom the viewer is invited to engage within the testimonial witnessing 
structure of Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing. Chapter Three introduced the concept 
of auteurbiography, in which literary autobiography is adapted to produce a faithful and 
ethical secondary testimony by cinematic means. To do this, the auteurial équipe must 
first bear witness to autobiographical experience through an emersive reading of the text 
and the context, before transposing and perpetuating the autobiographical invitation for 
the viewer through the film adaptation. Auteurbiography privileges the autobiographical 
subject’s experience as real, representing, and re-presenting the subjective truth of a life. 
However, as becomes clear in each of the preceding chapters, the notion of selfhood is 
constructed discursively within a "social frame” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 11), which manifests as 
a result of the intersubjective relationships that shape experience and identity. Though 
autobiographical writing is inevitably partial, cinematic discourse enables a broader 
perception of the communities, both real and imagined, in which stories of the self are 
fashioned, and by which the notion of relationality in life writing is reproduced. For those 
who undertake autobiographical acts, the specificity of experience often encompasses the 
stories of significant and/or proximate others, which permeate the narrative, indicative of 
the relational propensity of self-reflection and self-understanding as ‘auto/biographical’. 
Accordingly, this chapter explores the ways in which the relational structure of literary 
auto/biography can be adapted, addressing the complexities of narrative authority and 
representation, and the ways in which relationality is configured and conveyed within the 
testimonial context. The analysis considers the resilience of the autobiographical invitation 
as a testimonial plea for a willing witness, and the referential responsibility of adapting 
self-witness that incorporates the biography of a related other.  
In addition, this chapter expands the scope of cinematic I-witnessing to evaluate cinematic 
adaptations of auto/biographical source texts within a mainstream – Hollywood and 
commercial – context, reflecting further on concepts of narrative authority and the role of 
the auteur within the testimonial agenda of auteurbiography. Using Being Flynn (Weitz, 
2012) and Julie & Julia (Ephron, 2009), I critique notions of film authorship and ownership 
to highlight the potential implications of multiple ‘signatures’ in auteurbiographical 
adaptations of relational, auto/biographical narratives. By considering the hierarchies of 
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authorship and representation, I interrogate the ethical and empathic transmission of the 
autobiographical invitation and its inherent – and imperative – claim to subjective truth. 
Ultimately, this chapter tests and reveals the limits of auteurbiography, to demonstrate the 
inevitable limits of cinematic I-witnessing and films’ capacity to instantiate the testimonial 
witnessing structure as an ethical, empathic and testimonial mode. 
*** 
Nick Flynn’s memoir, Another Bullshit Night in Suck City (2004) (hereafter Suck City) 
documents his work in a homeless shelter alongside his struggles with drug and alcohol 
addictions, with reference to the impact of his mother’s suicide and his father’s absence 
throughout his formative years. In the cinematic adaptation of Flynn’s memoir, entitled 
Being Flynn (2012), screenwriter-director, Paul Weitz remediates the parallel conversion 
narrative of Flynn and his father, Jonathan, with a subtext of heredity that holds the filial 
relationship as both an unbreakable bond and an unshakeable responsibility that shapes 
the life narratives of both men. Being Flynn focuses on the relationship that develops 
between Nick Flynn and his long-estranged father as the circumstance of the elder man’s 
homelessness serendipitously brings them together.  
Paul Weitz spent seven years developing the screenplay, with his original draft altered 
multiple times and reportedly passed over by two studios before going into production with 
Focus (Flynn, 2013: p. 81). Focus greenlit the version that ultimately became Being Flynn, 
which closely resembles Weitz’s original draft, a text that made Nick Flynn “weep” when 
he read it (Flynn, 2013: p. 81). Weitz has extensive, previous experience with cinematic 
adaptations. He co-wrote and co-directed About a Boy (2002), which was based on Nick 
Hornby’s coming-of-age novel of the same name (1998), and for which he received an 
Oscar nomination for Best Adapted Screenplay. Weitz also contributed to the Amazon 
series Mozart in the Jungle (2014-2018), adapted from Blair Tindall’s 2005 memoir. His 
forthcoming film Fatherhood (2020) is another memoir-to-film adaptation based on 
Matthew Logelin’s Two Kisses for Maddy: A Memoir of Loss and Love (2011). Weitz’s 
other notable works include In Good Company, (2004), which he wrote, directed and co-
produced, and the screenplay for Little Fockers (2010), both of which depict complex 
masculine and paternal relationships. Weitz’s body of work demonstrates a particular 
proclivity for relational and autobiographical narratives, and he states that the “central 
question” in Being Flynn is “how much am I my parent?” (in ‘Manny the Movie Guy’, 2012: 
1:25), which he claims is a reflection on his own relationship with his father. 
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Julie Powell’s memoir Julie and Julia: 365 Days, 524 Recipes, 1 Tiny Apartment Kitchen: 
How One Girl Risked Her Marriage, Her Job and Her Sanity to Master the Art of Living28 
(2005) is the literary adaptation of a year-long blog project undertaken between 2002-3, 
whereby she cooked her way through Julia Child’s Mastering the Art of French Cooking 
(Child, Bertholle and Beck, 1961) as a diversion from the anxieties of ageing and 
existential discontent. In the memoir, Powell posits biographical insights into Julia Child’s 
time spent in France whilst writing the cookbook around which Powell’s project was built, 
in homage to the celebrity chef’s influence upon her combined culinary and literary 
endeavour. The late Nora Ephron wrote and directed the cinematic adaptation Julie & 
Julia (2009), which presents a parallel depiction of Powell and Child, and their respective 
experiments with French cuisine and writing, which take place fifty years and thousands of 
miles apart. Ephron’s adaptation draws on Powell’s blog and subsequent memoir, and 
Child’s autobiography My Life in France (2006), supplemented by a metacritical 
engagement with Child’s many literary and televisual texts.  
Nora Ephron is one of the select few female filmmakers to attain auteurial acclaim in the 
Hollywood arena, recognised and commended for her cinematic contributions to the 
contentious ‘chick flick’29 genre (You’ve Got Mail, 1998; Sleepless in Seattle, 1993; When 
Harry Met Sally, 1989; Heartburn, 1986; et al.). Furthermore, Ephron wrote and published 
widely on issues affecting women, in essays and self-reflexive pieces that reflect her own 
experience of ageing, relationships, and the filmmaking industry (The Most of Nora 
Ephron, 2013; I Remember Nothing: And Other Reflections, 2010; I Feel Bad About My 
Neck: And Other Thoughts on Being A Woman, 2006; Heartburn, 1983; Scribble Scribble: 
Notes on the Media, 1978; Crazy Salad: Some Things About Women, 1975; Wallflower at 
the Orgy, 1970). The biographical documentary film Everything Is Copy: Nora Ephron: 
Scripted and Unscripted (2016), an ode to Ephron’s life and work, won the Audience Prize 
for Documentary Feature at the Palm Springs International Film Festival, with the Tribeca 
Film Festival issuing an annual prize in Ephron’s name as testament to her status and 
contribution to cinema. Ephron’s enthusiasm for Julie & Julia30 was borne of her 
 
28 Subsequent prints retitled Powell’s memoir Julie and Julia: My Year of Cooking 
Dangerously. 
29 Though it divided critics and scholars alike, the term chick flick gained currency around 
the time of Julie & Julia’s production, primarily as a simplistic descriptor for “commercial 
films that appeal to women” (Ferris and Young, 2008: p. 2), the type of film for which 
Ephron is well known.      
30 Ephron wanted to write and direct Julie and Julia from the start, but originally there was 
another screenwriter on board, who eventually pulled out (TimesTalks Interview, 2012). 
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experience with female-led texts and her belief in the overlapping concerns of the real 
women to be depicted, of which she said:  
It’s not that Julie Powell and Julia Child are alike, but that their lives 
followed a kind of deliciously similar pattern. I knew that I had stories that 
were gonna [sic] kind of interlock with one another.  
(‘Secret Ingredients’: 3:44-4:03) 
Ephron’s statement is indicative of the relational framework that underpins her adaptive 
process, and her assertion of the separate subjectivities of the women depicted. 
*** 
At first glance, the adaptations under scrutiny in this chapter share numerous 
equivalencies: both films present two subjects of the same sex in a relational model, and 
each is written and directed by an auteur of the corresponding gender. Furthermore, as 
each adaptation combines the roles of screenwriter and director within the auteurial 
équipe, the perceived distance between the discoursal levels of screenplay and cinematic 
production is elided. Both source texts are fundamentally “conversion narratives”, which 
“[develop] through a linear pattern—descent into darkness, struggle, moment of crisis, 
conversion to new beliefs and worldview, and consolidation of a new communal identity” 
(Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 91). In addition, each film features an actor who might be 
considered a ‘Hollywood heavyweight’ in a lead role, with Robert De Niro in Being Flynn, 
and Meryl Streep in Julie & Julia, both actors who have enjoyed long and illustrious 
cinematic careers, with a history of iconic roles. However, in both films studied here, these 
actors play supporting roles within a relational model, as the secondary, embedded 
subjects of auto/biographical narratives. As a comparative case study, this chapter 
illustrates the ways in which the previously identified characteristics of auteurbiography 
are consistently observed, whilst exploring the impact of gender, genre, casting, and the 
shared subjective focus of relationality upon pactual integrity and the testimonial rhetoric 
of cinematic I-witnessing. The comparative approach is a deliberately critical gesture, 
through which I address the ways in which the autobiographical invitation works in 
different auto/biographical and testimonial contexts. The analysis illustrates the ways in 
which cinematic adaptations of self-reflexive and relational narratives of witness can 
achieve the necessary pactual integrity, but also reveals the limits of auteurbiography as 





Auto/Biography and Relationality 
Autobiographical acts are largely accepted as the individual record of a person’s unique 
experience; however, it is also argued that as the notion of selfhood is constructed socially 
(Schmitt, 2017; Smith and Watson, 2010; Miller, 2002; Eakin, 2008 and 1999; et al.); the 
relationships in which we engage throughout our lives affect the ways in which we come 
to understand, and narrate, our selves. Self-reflexive writing inevitably encompasses the 
stories of others, in a discursive formation that constitutes ‘relationality’. Smith and 
Watson explain:  
In life writing, actors may be situated discursively vis-à-vis others who are 
present explicitly, as is the host to the traveler, or implicitly, as is the 
warden in a prison […]. In such narratives, negotiations occur across 
boundaries – differences of rank, nation, ethnicity, religion, and gender – 
that are both constructed and redefined in such an encounter. As critics 
attend to these spaces of the self, their dynamics, and the fluctuating 
positions actors take up within them, they may assign more specific 
coordinates to what has often been discussed as “relationality” in life 
writing. That is, they can explore how a subject’s narration of her or his life 
is implicated in and impinges on the lives of others and may encapsulate 
their biographies.  
(Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 44) 
Relational actors, and their explicit and implicit roles in shaping our lives, infiltrate the 
narrative of the self, and subsequently become “embedded within the context of an 
autobiographical narrative” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 86). When an autobiographical 
narrative foregrounds relationality, it “signals the interrelatedness of autobiographical 
narrative and biography” as “a mode of the autobiographical that inserts biography/ies 
within an autobiography” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 256). Family members, commonly 
parents and siblings, as well as romantic partners and spouses often figure heavily in self-
life writing due to their emotional connections and proximity to the subject. These 
“significant others” provide context for autobiographical narratives as “those whose stories 
are deeply implicated in the narrator’s and through whom the narrator understands her or 
his own self-formation” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 86), as explained in my analysis of 
Tarnation in Chapter One. The stories of these significant others emerge in tandem with 
the autobiographical subject’s own, interlocking with the autobiographical narrative as a 
consequence of their embeddedness within the author’s notion of self, bringing to the fore 




Historically, relationality in life writing was considered a characteristic of female self-record 
(Benstock, 1988; Friedman, 1988; Chodorow, 1978; Rowbotham, 1973; et al.). Feminist 
autobiography scholar, Nancy Chodorow, identifies the “complex relational constellation” 
(Chodorow, 1978: p. 169) of women’s identity formation, arguing that “feminine personality 
comes to include a fundamental definition of self in relationship” (Chodorow, 1978: p. 
169). In the seminal collection The Private Self (1988), edited by Shari Benstock, Susan 
Stanford Friedman and her contemporaries assert that women’s life writing does not share 
the “endemically Western” and “individualistic paradigms” (Friedman, 1988: p. 35 and p. 
38) of masculine autobiographical acts,31 as advanced by Georges Gusdorf, James 
Olney, et al., positing that “identification, interdependence, and community […] are key 
elements in the development of a woman’s identity” (original italics, Friedman, 1988: p. 
38). However, more recently life-writing scholars have acknowledged the fundamental 
“relational model of identity” (Eakin, 2008: p. 11), professing the interconnectedness of 
human experience as inherent in all life writing (Schmitt, 2017; Eakin, 2017, 2008, and 
1999; Lee, 2014; Smith and Watson, 2010; Miller, 2007; et al.) with relationality 
considered “a founding condition of our psychic life, our narrative accounts, and our 
humanity” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 217).  
Nancy K. Miller confirms that “in autobiography the relational is not optional. 
Autobiography’s story is about the web of entanglement in which we find ourselves, one 
that we sometimes choose” (Miller, 2007: p. 544). Miller’s assertion emphasises 
relationality as ontological and incontrovertible, yet it is possible for the threads of the 
relational ‘web’ to be manipulated in self-life writing, as Smith and Watson attest: “In some 
autobiographies a narrator reads his or her “I” as having engaged such figures as models 
or ideals” (2010: p. 86). These ‘models’ and ‘ideals’ can be people the autobiographer 
knows and respects, or people the autobiographer does not know personally or directly, 
but with whom they feel a kinship or similarity, and/or they aspire to be like. Smith and 
Watson acknowledge that autobiographers may consciously position biographical 
accounts within their autobiographical narratives, which affords a narrative construction of 
relationality to reflect the “historical” other’s role as aspirational or influential, in the 
provision of a “generic [model] of identity” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 86) for the 
autobiographical subject. Whether the autobiographical subject constructs a discursive 
relationship with an unknown other, or simply recites the parallel mapping of shared 
 
31 As mentioned with reference to Arirang in Chapter One and The Diving Bell in Chapter Three. 
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experience, the narrative proximity of auto/biographical subjects implies a meaningful 
connection, a sense of relationality, which we, as readers, are invited to ascertain.  
The perceived vectors of relationality contribute to the autobiographical subject’s 
contextual configuration of identity within an autobiographical text. Self-reflexive narratives 
convey “a subject in context (historical, social, geographical)” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 
218), offering insight into the unique perspective of “the ideological ‘I’” (p. 76). Through the 
context provided by “[h]istorical and ideological notions of the person” we are afforded 
“cultural ways of understanding” identity formation, which encompass:  
the material location of subjectivity; the relationship of the person to 
particular others and to a collectivity of others; the nature of time and life 
course; the importance of social location [and] the motivations for human 
actions.  
(Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 76) 
Fundamentally, the relational model of auto/biography incorporates the stories of 
significant others dialogically within the autobiographical subject’s narrative as an outlet 
for self-articulation against the schema of a collective context. The biography/ies that 
emerge within autobiographical acts are indicative of the way the subject understands 
him/herself within a particular historical, ideological, and socio-political prism, which 
accordingly brings into relief the subject’s unique worldview and the parameters for their 
subjective and testimonial truth. The auto/biographical narratives under scrutiny in this 
chapter foreground the tension between the traditional, ontological model of relationality 
and the epistemic engagement of and with the other in the construction of a subjective 
autobiographical invitation. 
Adapting Auto/Biography 
As explored in the previous chapter, auteurbiographical adaptations engender a complex 
ethical obligation, which reframes the adapted film as secondary testimony. The auteur, 
and by extension, the auteurial équipe, must facilitate the transposition of the experiential 
reality of the autobiographer, as told, in an ethical and empathic, intertextual engagement 
with the autobiographical source and its testimonial context. “Referentiality entails 
responsibility” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 108) according to Arnaud Schmitt, but the adaptation of 
an auto/biographical source effectively doubles the charge. Auto/biography’s relational 
model complicates the auteurbiographical commitment to pactual integrity: not only must 
the auteurial équipe preserve the autobiographical invitation to instantiate the testimonial 
witnessing structure, they must also consider their referential responsibility to an 
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embedded, related other. Auteurbiography presupposes a focal hierarchy, which is 
particularly important within the testimonial context of cinematic I-witnessing. The 
representation of the embedded subject should be configured according to their ‘role’ 
within the autobiographical subject’s narrative, to reflect the ways in which they “explicitly” 
and/or “implicitly” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 44) contribute to the subject’s self-
understanding. But, the inherent, ethical duty to depict the embedded other as the 
representation of a real person can conflict with both the testimonial commitment to 
subjective truth and the auteurial impulse. Therefore, the ethics of representation must 
also be considered in relation to the person – or persons – whose story is interwoven 
within the autobiographical subject’s narrative, within the remit of pactual integrity. 
Essentially, the auteur must ensure that the authorial subject is given primacy within the 
cinematic narrative, whilst also representing the experience of the embedded other with 
comparable, principled discretion. Consequently, the auteurbiographical adaptation of 
auto/biography necessitates both subjective emphasis and referential restraint to ensure 
that the autobiographer’s autobiographical invitation, and its inherent testimonial plea for a 
willing witness, is preserved, whilst the relationality of the narrative is perceptively 
conveyed.   
As well as examining the representational hierarchy of auteurbiographical adaptations, it 
is necessary to consider the hierarchical operations of authorship and narrative authority 
throughout the adaptive process. As with The Diving Bell and the Butterfly in Chapter 
Three, auteurial artistic input must also be considered, with questions of film ownership 
and artistic authority particularly pertinent to the critique of commercial, studio adaptations 
in the Hollywood arena. Founding theories of auteurism conceive of the director as the 
author of a film: “The film-maker/author writes with his camera as a writer writes with his 
pen” (Astruc, 1968: p. 17), overlooking the input of the screenwriter within the 
collaborative, creative process of filmmaking. Assurances of the artistic authority of the 
auteur gain traction when the roles of screenwriter and director are fulfilled by the same 
person, as they are in the two films under scrutiny here. However, the perceived authority 
of the auteur is complicated by the expectations and limitations that the Hollywood context 
imposes on film production, especially adaptations. In her chapter entitled ‘Film 
Authorship and Adaption’, Shelley Cobb (following Bordwell, 1999) explains that “the 
Hollywood auteur exerts originality, authority, and ownership in spite of an oppressive 
system that, nevertheless, he remains firmly within, expressing his individuality within the 
codes of the classical norm” (2012: p. 113). She highlights the potential implications of 
genre and the associated commercial appeal, and the effects these factors have on an 
auteur’s adaptive production. However, as mentioned in Chapter Three, Western 
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conceptions of authorship are rooted in notions of individuality and originality, which are 
complicated by adaptations’ necessarily collaborative industry (Cobb, 2012: p. 113). In 
Hollywood adaptations, then, the auteur must balance the assertion of their own artistic 
authority with the generic and commercial expectations of the system, along with the 
necessary acknowledgement of the originary author of their source material. This tension 
is further exacerbated by the ethical and empathic demands of auteurbiography, and the 
additional consideration of multiple subjective referents in auto/biography. Contained 
within these considerations, attention must also be paid to issues of casting and gender, 
and the ways in which they potentially influence viewer engagement and challenge 
notions of authorship and ownership. Consequently, this chapter demonstrates the ways 
in which adapted auto/biographies function within the dialogic cinematic I-witnessing 
framework by asking: How is ‘ownership’ of the auto/biographical narrative asserted on 
screen? How are authorial and referential hierarchies established and preserved? And, do 
auteurbiographical adaptations delimit the autobiographical invitation?   
As seen in Section One, the testimonial scope of a self-witnessing narrative often includes 
references to a subject’s “social frame” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 11), as necessary context for 
autobiographical experience. Auto/biographical narratives, however, specifically 
emphasise significant relationships, which means that the broader social frame is 
narrower, to ensure subjective focus. As a result, auteurbiographical adaptations tend to 
include only those who contribute to or advance the subject’s narrative in meaningful 
ways. Auteurial decisions relating to the inclusion and exclusion of people and 
circumstances that contextualise the source memoir can be crucial to the preservation of 
the testimonial “tone” (Schmitt. 2017), and the ways in which autobiographical acts 
constitute self-witness: the autobiographer’s “willingness to communicate” and “share 
[their] own subjectivity” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 150) within the context of cinematic I-
witnessing. As secondary testimony, the narrative focus of auteurbiography remains the 
subject’s self-narrative act, their autobiographical experience, and the process by which 
the subject achieves self-understanding through auto/biographical reflections. In the 
adaptation of auto/biographical narratives, pactual integrity means that the film must retain 
the tone of the subject’s testimonial truth, whilst adequately demonstrating the relational 
dynamic inherent in the source. 
Being Flynn: Explicitly Embedded Auto/Biographical Testimony 
Autobiographical narratives are characterised by their self-reflexive and communicative 
mode of address, which manifests, for the reader, as a distinctive, subjective ‘voice’. 
Smith and Watson contend: 
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we have an impression of a subject’s interiority, its intimacy and rhythms 
of self-reflexivity […]. Voice as an attribute of the narrating “I,” then, is a 
metaphor for the reader’s felt experience of the narrator’s personhood, 
and a marker of the relationship between a narrating “I” and his or her 
experiential history.  
(2010: p. 79) 
What Smith and Watson describe is the rhetorical voice that asserts narrative authority, 
and the reader’s perception of the autobiographer as a speaking subject. Furthermore, as 
explained with reference to autofilmic testimony in Section One, “orally performing an 
autobiographical act”, as Smith and Watson argue, “minimizes the distances between the 
narrator and the narratee” (2010: p. 97) as the direct articulation of the narrating ‘I’ that 
issues the autobiographical invitation. As evinced in earlier chapters, voiceover is the 
most proficient manner by which to proclaim self-reflexive narrative authority in film, as it 
constitutes the subject addressing the viewer directly in a recognisably first-person 
expression of the narrating ‘I’. Voiceover permits the narrating “I” to claim narrative 
primacy within the cinematic frame, whilst also introducing the viewer to their explicit 
narrative voice as the referential anchor for the embodied subject. Even when they are not 
present on screen, the voice of the subject encourages the viewer’s referential labour, and 
reminds us of the subjective and retrospective assertion that the narrative makes. Voice 
mobilises the autobiographical claim to the narrated experience, whilst also framing the 
experience of others within their self-story. In literary auto/biography: 
The voices of literal others may be incorporated through citation of 
dialogue or the use of free indirect discourse (in which the narrating “I” 
projects another’s subjectivity by imagining his or her interiority of thought 
and affect). The narrating “I” can embed, for instance, an imagined 
interiority in the voice of a parent or sibling.  
(Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 80) 
Graphological and contextual markers can be used to enable the reader to distinguish the 
narrating ‘I’ from the embedded voices of others in print; but, in film, the voices of others 
inevitably emerge as their own, as performed within the cinematic narrative. 
Consequently, it is the job of the auteur to effectively convey embeddedness and/or 
citation of a related other’s voice, as distinct from the subject’s, but also as refracted 




The opening of Being Flynn immediately installs the first-person voiceover convention to 
establish the subjective perspective of the film narrative, beginning with an introduction to 
Jonathan Flynn (Robert De Niro). As the scene fades in from black, a male voice asserts: 
“America has produced only three classic writers, Mark Twain, J. D. Salinger, and me” 
(0:37); use of the first-person pronoun ‘me’ connects the voiceover with the subject in the 
cinematic frame to reconcile the narrating ‘I’ of the voiceover with the narrated ‘I’ of the 
filmic discourse from the outset. In the opening scene, the camera follows Jonathan as he 
approaches a twenty-four-hour parking garage to prepare for a night shift driving a cab, 
whilst the voiceover continues: “I am Jonathan Flynn. Everything I write is a masterpiece, 
and soon, very soon, I shall be known” (0:42). Within the first minute of the film, Jonathan 
is established as the narrating ‘I’, narrated subject, and protagonist of the film narrative, as 
the cinematic equivalent of the autobiographical ‘I’, with his narrative authority 
underscored by the “proper name” (Lejeune, 1989). Jonathan’s self-assured proclamation 
of authorial greatness is foregrounded as ironic, with the action on screen confirming his 
unreliability as a narrator as he pours vodka into an orange juice carton before driving the 
taxi out of the parking garage. But, as soon as it is installed, Jonathan’s narrative authority 
is quickly subverted, as not only is he missing from the next frame, but his voiceover is 
usurped by another male voice after the jump cut: “This isn’t his [Jonathan Flynn’s] story. 
Well it is, but he’s not telling it. I am. I’m Nick Flynn, his son, and I’m sort of trying to be a 
writer” (01:23-35). Nick’s (Paul Dano) assertion of authorship immediately displaces 
Jonathan’s narrating ‘I’ and reorients the subjective perspective of the narrative to reclaim 
narrative authority. Nick’s authorial and narrative primacy is verified by the fact that he is 
shown handwriting the words spoken in his voiceover; the visual and narrative congruity is 
indicative of the synchronicity between his autobiographical authorship and his narrative 
voice as an authoritative, and more credible, declaration of autobiographical subjectivity. 
As a result, the cinematic narrative is reframed, with Nick as the autobiographical ‘I’ and 
Jonathan as the embedded relational other of Nick’s auto/biography. Nick’s assertion of 
the narrating ‘I’, and the diegetic cues that reliably reconcile the narrating ‘I’ with the 
autobiographical subject, make clear that Jonathan’s narrative is depicted in chorus with 
Nick’s, but from Nick’s partial and evaluative perspective.   
For Nancy Miller, “The challenge that faces autobiographers is to invent themselves 
despite the weight of their family history, and autobiographical singularity emerges in 
negotiation with this legacy” (Miller, 2007: p 543); this is the critical tension underlying 
Suck City, which is reflected in the relational structure and narrative strategies in the 
adapted film. Being Flynn’s narrative construction is faithfully transposed from the source 
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text, in which Nick Flynn affirms that he is the author/narrator of what is described in the 
book’s subtitle as ‘a memoir’, and that his father’s story is articulated through him:  
the only book being written about my father (the greatest writer America 
has yet produced), the only book ever written about or by him, as far as I 
can tell, is the book in your hands. The book that somehow fell to me, the 
son, to write. My father’s uncredited, noncompliant ghostwriter.  
(original italics, Suck City, p. 322)  
In this extract, Flynn acknowledges the responsibility he assumes for including his father’s 
story in his own memoir, foregrounding his father’s ‘voice’ in italics (as above). In addition, 
Flynn includes a list of citations from the letters he received from his father throughout his 
life towards the end of the volume, inserted as artefacts that evince the authenticity of 
Jonathan’s voice (p. 298-9). Suck City contains both Jonathan Flynn’s and Nick Flynn’s 
voices, made distinct at the simplest level by graphology. For Smith and Watson, voice is 
“distinctive in its emphasis and tone, its rhythms and syntax, its lexicon and affect” (Smith 
and Watson, 2010: p. 79); in the memoir, Jonathan’s voice is preserved as distinct, whilst 
it is embedded within Nick Flynn’s self-reflexive prose as a ‘real’, referential anchor. The 
ways in which Nick Flynn captures his father’s voice in the memoir through direct citation 
are effectively replicated in the film, with Jonathan’s voice and its distinguishing features 
articulated by him, whilst it is simultaneously sanctioned and framed by Nick’s 
auto/biographical narrative authority. Being Flynn cinematically transposes the proxy 
dynamic by retroactively reclaiming Jonathan’s dialogue as the content of Nick’s on-
screen autobiographical act, with Jonathan’s performative self-aggrandisement 
characteristic of the real Jonathan Flynn’s communiqué as included in the source memoir 
(p. 320, p. 322, and p. 298). Accordingly, Jonathan’s voice in the film is posited as Nick’s 
citation of it, included as embedded, relational context for his own autobiographical 
exploration of selfhood.  
Being Flynn initially assumes an oscillating, parallel structure, whereby the cinematic 
focus switches between father and son to posit separate, subjective narrative trajectories, 
but with the Flynn men’s similarities suggested by corresponding scenes. The opening 
scene, mentioned above, articulates the familial link, and informs the viewer that both of 
the Flynn men write. But, their similarities are advanced as hereditary equivalencies in the 
subtext; their shared behaviours imply an innate connectedness, in spite of their 
estrangement. Jonathan engages in a sexual tryst with a female passenger that he has 
collected in his cab; his use of “buttercup” in place of his companion’s name suggests that 
they are not well acquainted, as does the manner in which the woman enquires about his 
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photographs, and the way she flees Jonathan’s apartment in response to his violent 
outburst (8:56). In the scenes that immediately follow, Nick’s relationship with Denise 
(Olivia Thirlby) quickly becomes sexual, accelerating from barroom acquaintances to 
bedfellows in the jump cut (9:26). Pausing their amorous exploits, Denise proclaims “I’m 
not interested in a relationship”, to which Nick replies “Okay, I can cope”; their mutual lack 
of commitment does not preclude their subsequent consummation of the casual 
relationship (9:38). Along with the exposure of his infidelity in an earlier scene, Nick’s 
carnal encounter with Denise, when presented in tandem with Jonathan’s brief liaison, 
implies a hereditary link between the Flynns’ personalities and behaviour that is depicted 
as innate. This mirroring perpetuates the relational narrative structure established in the 
opening scenes and summarises the similarities that Flynn observes in Suck City; Nick 
Flynn’s underlying anxieties with regards to becoming like his father are a recurrent theme 
in his auto/biography, and an important facet of his self-formation through the inclusion of 
his father’s biography. However, the events depicted in the film have no direct referential 
basis in Flynn’s memoir, which renders these scenes an auteurial addition to the film 
narrative. But, Nick Flynn’s involvement in the adaptation process affords the auteurial 
adjustment a certain level of authenticity, as he approved each of Weitz’s many drafts of 
the screenplay (Reenactments, p. 81) prior to production. Furthermore, as the comparable 
episodes in the film advance one of the core concerns in Flynn’s memoir, they serve to 
buttress the explicit relational structure of the auteurbiographical narrative to further 
inscribe the testimonial register of the source.  
This explicit relational configuration develops when the film’s parallel structure is thwarted 
by a phone call Nick receives from Jonathan, in which the two men communicate for the 
first time, and symbolically, share their first scene. The film reenacts a telephone call that 
Flynn describes only briefly in the Suck City, first, as reported by Jonathan at the end of 
the ‘Silver Key’ chapter (p. 193), and then again at the beginning of the ‘Inside Out’ 
chapter from his own point of view (p. 194): 
 Nick: This is Nick 
 Jonathan: Is this Nicholas Flynn?  
 Nick: Yes 
 Jonathan: Nicholas, this is your father, Jonathan Flynn. 
 Nick: It is? 
 Jonathan: It is. I have a question for you. Do you have a truck? 
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 Nick: Yeah, as a matter of fact I do. 
 […] 
Jonathan: Good. Now I want you to get in your truck and drive over here. 
 Nick: What? Now you say you’re my father? 
Jonathan: That is correct. I was evicted and I need you to get 
over here and help me move my stuff, Nicholas. 
Nick: How did you get this number? 
Jonathan: Information. Now listen to me carefully –  
(10:03-11:06) 
In the film, Nick’s perspective is preserved throughout the pragmatic exchange, his face 
closely framed to make visible the shock and incredulity he is feeling. The close shot 
emphasises Nick’s subjective position as the empathic target, inviting the viewer to ‘feel 
with’ him in an extended “scene of empathy” that focuses on his facial affect to align the 
viewer with his experience (Plantinga, 1999) of the exchange.32 Conversely, Jonathan is 
rendered a disembodied voice at the end of the line, off screen until he begins to matter-
of-factly describe his circumstances, at which point the cut reveals a close shot of 
Jonathan in a bathrobe (11:05). Nick is visibly unsettled to hear from his father after 
eighteen years, his confusion noticeably deepening as a result of Jonathan’s direct and 
immediate demands, which are levied as his parental right. Though the dialogue is not 
expressly reported in the source memoir, the pivotal phone call articulates the primacy of 
self-witness, and foreshadows Nick and Jonathan meeting for the first time within the film 
to mark the point at which their separate narratives begin to interlock. The conversation 
ratifies the heretofore-arbitrary paternal link as a real intersubjective connection, to 
advance an explicit relational model that accords with the source whilst emphasising 
Nick’s status as the autobiographical subject and testimonial ‘I’.  
Being Flynn’s explicit relational structure further emerges through shared “sites” of 
autobiographical narration (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 69). Smith and Watson state that 
these sites can be “occasional, that is, specific to an occasion” and “locational, that is, 
emergent in a specific mise-en-scène or context of narration”, both of which, in tandem, 
constitute “a moment in history [and] a socio-political space” (Smith and Watson, 2010: 
2010: p. 69) specific to the autobiographical act. The Flynns’ corresponding “situatedness” 
 
32 The scene of empathy is explained in my analysis of Arirang in Chapter One. 
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(Smith and Watson, 2010: p 71) expedites explicit relationality through their shared 
occasional and locational sites. Smith and Watson explain: “[t]he emplotment of 
autobiographical narratives […] can be described as a dense and multilayered intersection 
of the temporal and the geographic” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 94); the Flynns’ 
spatiotemporal proximity provides the shared context that allows their relational story to 
unfold. It is Nick, through voiceover, who first articulates the connectedness he feels their 
narratives share, which references the “geographics” of relational identity formation and 
“the spaces of dynamic encounter” (Friedman, 1998: p. 19) that enable relational self-
refection:  
Some part of me knew he would show up some day. If I stayed in one 
place long enough he would find me, like you’re taught to do when you’re 
lost. But what do you do if both of you are lost and you both end up in the 
same place, waiting?  
(3:03-16)   
The dialogue paraphrases the concluding passage of the ‘Ulysses’ chapter (Suck City: p. 
24), which demonstrates that in both Suck City and Being Flynn, occasional and locational 
proximity facilitate the relational narrative, with the city of Boston as the shared 
geographical and socio-political site that instantiates an explicit, ‘situated’ relational 
dynamic.  
The common “’layers’ of narrative location” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 71) that the city 
provides are alluded to in the memoir’s full title, Another Bullshit Night in Suck City, an 
evaluation that belongs to Jonathan Flynn (Suck City, p. 205). The city is responsible for 
bringing the Flynns into regular contact, the catalyst for the relational narrative. In the 
chapter ‘Cloverleaf’, Flynn’s descriptions of Boston emphasise the way his father 
navigates their shared site, mapping Jonathan’s experiential narrative through the places 
he frequents, and describing the city as “his floor plan” (p. 198) whilst he drifts ever-closer 
to homelessness. In the following chapter, ‘The Piss of God’ (pp. 204-205) Flynn uses the 
second person, “indefinite you” (Staels, 2004), as a heterophenomenological gesture 
meant to invite the reader to adopt Jonathan’s perspective, and to view the city as a 
‘home’ for the homeless:  
If not for the rats you could crawl beneath a bush. A bush. A bench. A 
bridge […]. Rats too can pass through that needle’s eye to enter heaven, 
as easily as they pass into a box imagined into a house. Houses inside 
buildings, houses inside tunnels, some exist for only a day, some, 
miraculously, longer. This box held a refrigerator, the refrigerator is in an 
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apartment, a man is in the box. Tomorrow the box will be flattened and 
tossed, you’ve seen the garbagemen stomping them down to fit in the 
truck. 
(p. 205) 
In the very next chapter (‘Countdown’, pp. 206-207), Flynn reports seeing his father 
awaken on a bench on the Esplanade, from a distance, which leads him to reflect on 
heredity as metaphorically located:  
scientists say that one day I could stand in the exact spot my father once 
stood, hold my body as he did. I could open my mouth and his words 
would come out. They say it is only a ‘tendency toward’, a warning. They 
say it is not the future, but a possible future.  
(p. 207)  
The three, successive, short chapters taken together demonstrate an underlying anxiety 
at the heart of Flynn’s self-reflexive narrative, in terms of Flynn’s fear of ‘becoming’ his 
father. However, the narrative construction evinces an inherent empathic track (Anderst, 
2015) between Flynn and his father, whereby his fear is accompanied by an attempt to 
‘feel with’ the elder man, prompted by proximity and Flynn’s recognition of a potentially 
similar path for himself in the future.  
The film also maps the city as though from Johnathan’s perspective, in a progressive 
sequence of scenes that chart the way he inhabits the urban environment (taken from the 
‘Cloverleaf’ chapter mentioned above), marking his “struggle” within the context of the 
parallel conversion narrative (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 91). After he is evicted from his 
apartment, Jonathan sleeps in his cab, but when he falls asleep at the wheel whilst drink-
driving, he loses his licence and is rendered homeless. Initially, Jonathan is resilient, 
maintaining a façade of normalcy that is eventually shattered by the reality of his 
deteriorating circumstances. Jonathan subtly counts out his change to pay his bill at a 
cafe (33:00), before moving on to the library, where he writes a letter to the president, the 
contents of which are recounted in his voiceover (33:07). The letter characteristically 
pronounces Jonathan’s inflated opinion of his artistic prowess, whilst remarking on the 
potential effects of illiteracy on the country’s socio-economic future. When the library 
closes, Jonathan is both racist and indignant when the library attendant checking his bag 
takes out his toothbrush, protesting “that’s my personal property, you ape” (33:43), as he 
snatches it from her hands. As night falls, Jonathan enters an ATM vestibule at the bank, 
holding the door for a departing patron before he steps past a homeless woman on the 
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floor inside. A homeless man hovering by the machine tells Jonathan “they’re making a 
movie, a movie of my life” (34:04), and Jonathan’s dismissive response is inflected with 
both irony and denial given the apparent similarity of their present circumstances and the 
auto/biographical tenor of the retrospective narrative; he levels: “that would be one boring, 
redundant, piece-of-shit movie” (34:18). Jonathan provides an alternate narrative for the 
action on screen through voiceover, in which he describes himself depositing a $750, 000 
advance cheque for his novel, The Button Man; but, he is shown throwing the deposit slip 
into the bin (34:25), and the scenes that follow illustrate the increasingly-desperate reality 
of his homelessness. The cut reveals a close-up of the opening hours on the door of a 
late-night coffee shop, which Jonathan studies before taking up a seat at the counter. 
Jonathan watches as the waitress gives coffee to a homeless man she knows by name, 
telling him “you have to take it outside” (34:52). Jonathan averts his gaze, and a shot of 
the clock is reversed to show him contemplating his own imminent departure. As Jonathan 
leaves the coffee shop, a high shot shows him adjusting his hat and buttoning up his coat 
against the cold. Another homeless man tries to steal Jonathan’s bag whilst he sleeps on 
a stone bench, and after fighting him off, Jonathan makes his way back towards the library 
as it snows. The camera follows Jonathan as he approaches the grated extraction fans in 
the floor, manoeuvring around the already sleeping bodies of the city’s homeless. Nick 
takes up the narration through voiceover: 
He’s seen this before. Bums sprawled out from drinking, but 
he’s never actually stood over the blowers. Let the hot air seep 
into his clothes […]. It’s another prison, these blowers, 
because once you’ve landed you can’t leave. Because one 
step off the blower is cold, hypothermia cold, now that you are 
sodden with steam. The blower is a room of heat with no walls. 
My father is an invisible man, in the invisible room, in the 
invisible city.  
(my italics, 36:40-37:30) 
Nick’s narration is closely paraphrased from the memoir (p. 203), and his use of the 
indefinite you (italicised above) echoes the empathic strategy in the ‘The Piss of God’ 
chapter described above. The retreating aerial shot of Jonathan frames him as small and 
vulnerable, curled up in the foetal position on the steam grates as the snow falls (see Figure 
4.1) (37:30). Nick is shown hurrying towards the shelter after the jump-cut, bracing himself 
against the snow that connects the two scenes to highlight the shared situatedness of the 
city and underscore the severity of the conditions Jonathan faces on the streets. In spite of 
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Jonathan’s façade of normalcy, the film depicts the reality of his homelessness, and the 
circumstances that lead him into regular contact with Nick, as the shared situatedness that 
drives the relational narrative.   
 
Figure 4.1: Jonathan sleeping on the steam grates, from above. 
In both the memoir and the film, the homeless shelter is the literal site where the Flynns’ 
experience overlaps, and where the empathic dynamics of Flynn’s autobiographical 
narrative are most keenly observed. Accordingly, in the film, both Flynn men become 
emotionally and socioeconomically invested in the shelter, first Nick as an employee, and 
then Jonathan as a service user or “guest”. Day-to-day, Nick learns compassion for the 
shelter guests, with his colleagues guiding his interactions and encouraging empathy. For 
example, Nick’s co-worker, Joy (Lili Taylor)33 explains during his orientation that the 
shelter offers temporary respite from the downward trajectory imposed by destitution: “we 
catch them on the way down […]. Next stop, the morgue” (23:44/ p. 31). Nick quickly 
realises that many of the men at the shelter will die, with many conditions – physical and 
mental illness, exposure to the elements, injury, and addiction – exacerbated and 
perpetuated by homelessness. In another scene, Nick asks a colleague how to decipher a 
guest’s pants size in order to replace the soiled pair he is wearing, and his associate 
informs him matter-of-factly “you ask him” (28:38/ p. 39). Nick nods, leaving to make the 
enquiry, but the encounter reveals that a direct, communicative approach had not 
occurred to him prior to that moment, which marks a shift in his capacity for empathy and 
his ability to humanise the guests. These scenes transpose Flynn’s real-life encounters at 
the shelter as reported in Suck City, which serve to demonstrate Nick’s growing 
understanding of the guests who frequent the shelter, not as anonymous service-users, 
but as real people who need help. This realisation manifests as an irreconcilable tension 
when Flynn’s father arrives at the shelter. When Nick comes face-to-face with his father at 
‘the cage’ (see Figure 4.2) – the metal partition between the shelter’s staff and the 
 
33 Lili Taylor is Nick Flynn’s wife. 
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residents as they are signed in –  Jonathan’s humility as a guest seeking sanctuary from 
the Boston streets conflicts with the earlier demands of an entitled, arrogant patriarch, 
which visibly challenges Nick’s long-held contempt for his absent father (38:08). Nick’s 
immediate response is to leave through the fire door, literally removing himself from the 
shared site in an attempt to process the conflict (38:53). When her returns to the shelter, 
he enters the dining room where Jonathan is shown at the centre of a wide shot, eating 
with the other guests, as Nick surveys the room in the background (39:26). In the film, the 
shared site of the shelter functions in two ways. Firstly, it provides the proximity that forces 
Nick to engage with his father directly, prompting a self-examination that looks beyond the 
anxiety of their perceived similarity towards the narrative exposition of Nick’s testimonial 
truth, to which I will return. And secondly, the shelter is both the occasional and locational 
site that makes visible the context for the autobiographical channels of empathy (Anderst, 
2015) that emerge in the retrospective construction of Flynn’s auto/biographical narrative, 
both with himself and with his father.  
 
Figure 4.2: Nick and Jonathan come face-to-face at the shelter’s ‘cage’. 
Though Flynn explains in the memoir that he largely avoided contact with Jonathan during 
their shared time at the shelter, he includes letters that Jonathan wrote at that time, which 
he had passed on to Flynn via members of the shelter staff. Flynn’s inclusion of the 
unanswered letters evinces the empathic track between Flynn’s narrating ‘I’ and Jonathan 
at the time of writing Suck City, as distinct from the lack of an empathic connection 
between his narrated experiencing ‘I’ and his father in the past. Schmitt explains that in 
reading autobiography “one should never mistake the author as the experiencer and the 
author as the narrator” as “it is the latter who establishes the rhetorical strategy [of the 
autobiographical narrative] but it is also [the narrator] who gives [the reader] access, 
through the strategy, to the former” (original italics, 2017: p.138). The distance between 
the experience as narrated in autobiography, and the narrative strategies that can 
articulate it in retrospect are revealing of the agenda – or tone – of the autobiographical 
act. Flynn’s inclusion of the letters he received whilst avoiding his father at the shelter 
161 
 
demonstrates a shift in perspective that occurred after the experience and through the 
construction of the relational narrative, whereby Flynn belatedly re-evaluates Jonathan’s 
attempt at communication, which results in the narrative expression of empathy with his 
father. This narrative strategy preserves the testimonial empathy with the past self and 
Flynn’s own experiential reality as described in his framing narrative, but also exemplifies 
the way that explicitly auto/biographical narratives can reconcile self-witnessing and the 
ethical responsibility of referentiality to produce empathic and relational testimony.  
When adapted, the invitation in auto/biography retains the subject’s testimonial plea, but 
with a supplementary responsibility to reconcile the distance between actual experience 
and the belated, evaluative narrative perspective for the viewer. The letter cited in ‘Like it 
or Not’ (Suck City, pp. 215-217) informs two scenes in the film that illustrate Flynn’s 
auto/biographical dynamic, described above, to enact the reality of Flynn’s past 
experience, but with the autobiographical and testimonial perspective of the self-witness 
after the fact. In Being Flynn Jonathan exploits the shared site the shelter provides to 
enact the filial connection that the letter represents. First, Jonathan attempts to capitalise 
on Nick’s role at the shelter to acquire a pen – an item that is banned in the sleeping 
quarters for safety reasons – attempting to justify his presence at the shelter as “an 
opportunity to see how the other half lives” (41:48). Jonathan explains that he is merely 
“gathering material” for his literary pursuits, alleging that Nick’s motive for working there is 
the same as his (41:54). In the diegetic present, Nick sees his job at the shelter as “a job 
that means something” (20:19), with the experience only becoming what Jonathan terms 
“grist for the mill” (p. 215) in the retrospective act of self-witness, through the literary 
auto/biographical narrative. Jonathan uses his writing to assert further inflammatory 
similarities between himself and his son, with the observation that writers are “particularly 
prone to madness” (45:56/ p. 215) in a letter sent via the staff at the shelter, suggesting 
that their individual instabilities are related to their common creative impulse. The second 
scene to draw from the letter depicts a conversation between Nick and Jonathan during 
Nick’s evening checks of the shelter’s dorms, after Jonathan is caught trying to sneak 
alcohol into the shelter. As Nick stands silently over his father, who initially appears to be 
asleep, Jonathan asks “did you read my last letter? […] Beautifully written wasn’t it?”, at 
which point Nick levels “don’t write to me about my fucking mother”. The exchange 
becomes heated when Jonathan scolds Nick about his use of profanity, with Nick 
asserting “You don’t get to patronise me. You don’t get to pretend to be my father, and 
you don’t get to write about my mother. In fact, stop writing me at all. Stop writing me 
letters” (52:52:53:58). Jonathan further antagonises Nick, repeating a rumour he’s heard 
about Nick’s drug use, before concluding with the aggressive declaration “Remember 
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something Nicholas. You are me! You are me, I made you!”. Nick responds with the 
vehement denial “I am not you!” (54:44-54:54), before reiterating his earlier directive for 
Jonathan to leave the shelter. The way Weitz adapts the letter as an intersubjective 
encounter, manifests the tension implicit in Nick’s attempts to repress and simultaneously 
address the issues Jonathan’s absence – and sudden presence – brings to the fore. 
Furthermore, the discussion of the letter highlights Flynn’s mother’s role as the missing 
link in the relational testimonial narrative, as the unspoken connection that binds the 
Flynns and their narratives.  
In Suck City, the tone of Nick Flynn’s auto/biographical testimony is determined by 
Jonathan Flynn’s absence, which is coded as presence throughout Flynn’s formative 
years. Flynn’s recognition of his father’s absenteeism as significant appears in both the 
memoir and the film: “all my life my father has been manifest as an absence, a 
nonpresence [sic], a name without a body” (p. 24/01:28). Flynn’s phrasing suggests 
physicality, with the ‘weight’ of his father’s absence further implied in the evaluation that 
follows the above assertion in the ‘Ulysses’ chapter: “The three of us sat around the table, 
my mother, brother and I, carrying his name. Flynn?” (original italics, Suck City: p. 24). In 
Suck City, Flynn makes clear that his father’s ‘nonpresence’ shaped both his and his 
mother’s lives in substantial and related ways, beginning before he was even born. 
Jonathan missed both Nick’s (p. 22) and his elder brother’s births (p. 18), seemingly 
without a concrete excuse, leaving his friend Ray to drive Jody to the hospital on each 
occasion. When Jonathan’s car dealership folded, he became increasingly unreliable, 
drinking heavily and falling further into debt, which led Jody to leave him just five months 
after Nick was born. The lack of financial support, or “Nonsupport” (p. 34), from Jonathan, 
is framed in the memoir as the reason for Jody’s multiple jobs, and is further implicated in 
her taste in men. Jody engages in a number of romantic relationships in an attempt to find 
a suitable replacement for Nick’s absent father, with the men she chooses described as 
“the rotating cast of father figures who’d been [his mother’s] husbands, lovers, friends” (p. 
300) in Suck City. The men who temporarily occupy the paternal void are each afforded 
brief but succinct characterisations, as Flynn evaluates their impact upon his homelife 
during his formative years. Flynn states “Vernon was a carpenter […]. He was also 
married” (p. 68), explaining that he renovated their first house after a fire, “which turned 
out not to be such a bad thing” as his mother was able to claim the insurance and hire 
Vernon to carry out the repairs, conveniently allowing them to spend more time together 
“without arousing suspicion” (p. 68). Then, there was “Travis, just back from Vietnam […] 
twenty-one and still looks like a Marine”, who was married to his mother for four years and 
helped to extend their house; Flynn characterises Travis as a “trigger-hippie” who was 
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“armed to the teeth”, drinking and smoking marijuana, as well as committing petty theft (p. 
79). According to Flynn, Liam, whom Jody dated twice, ten years apart, “looked like Tom 
Jones” and was “in the business of smuggling drugs” whilst “working at the fish pier in 
Plymouth” (p. 136). The pier is where Flynn met Keith, who “always [asked] after” his 
mother, and who took him on as a both an apprentice electrician and criminal accomplice 
in “the Organization” during the period leading up to Flynn’s first year at college (pp. 140-
143). Counter to Flynn’s mother’s aspirations to provide a father figure, the men who 
enter, and inevitably leave, the Flynn family’s lives affect them in predominantly negative 
ways, with both Flynn and his mother becoming dependent upon alcohol and drugs in 
large part due to their availability via Jody Flynn’s partners. In the memoir, the testimonial 
tone articulates Flynn’s experience of parental instability, which for him is irrevocably 
linked to his father. 
The inconsistency of Flynn’s paternal proxies is represented, and compressed on screen 
in a game of catch: a young Nick (Liam Broggy) throws a baseball back and forth, yet 
each time the camera tracks the toss, there is a different man in the catcher’s position 
(44:20-44:45). In this Freudian game of “fort/da” (1920), the last instance shows Jonathan 
on the receiving end wearing the catcher’s mitt; but, as the camera follows the ball for the 
final time, it rolls into the road as Jonathan has vanished, replaced by Jody in a waitress’ 
uniform carrying large paper bags full of groceries. This is a particularly rich and 
multifaceted scene that functions in a number of ways within the film’s relational narrative, 
but is particularly revealing of the film’s fidelity to the tone of the source text. First of all, 
the game of catch conveys that the bonds between Nick and his “father figurines” (Suck 
City, p. 302) are unstable and fleeting, positing them as “contingent others” within the 
auto/biographical narrative, as those “who populate the text as actors in the narrator’s 
script of meaning but are not deeply reflected on” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 86). The 
brevity of this paternal history is symptomatic of auteurbiographical adaptations’ 
necessarily narrow social frame, which is limited to ensure that the subject retains primacy 
as the empathic target of the cinematic narrative of witness, as established in Chapter 
Three. This is a particularly pertinent adaptive strategy for auto/biographies, which carry 
the additional referential responsibility to signify more than one relational other as 
embedded in the autobiographical subject’s script of meaning. Secondly, the way that 
Jody steps into the markedly vacant catcher’s position to retrieve Nick’s ball, and agrees 
to play with him despite her obvious exhaustion, underscores her constancy in direct 
contrast with Jonathan’s absence, which is accentuated by the backdrop of unreliable and 
deficient patriarchs. Furthermore, the game of catch is a subtle acknowledgement of the 
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significance of baseball in the memoir, as Flynn describes the way “watching baseball on 
television” (p. 101) served as a ritual of support and cohesion for his family:  
Part of watching the Red Sox together was to hunker down, circle the 
wagons, show a unified front […]. But the greater (if unspoken) part for my 
brother and me was to be close to our mother, to keep an eye on her. It 
was clear she was slipping away from us, from this world. 
(Suck City: p. 103) 
In Suck City, baseball becomes symbolic of familial solidarity for Flynn, and the film 
transposes this notion by limiting the game to two constant players: Nick and Jody.  
The connotations of closeness and concern signified by the baseball game are invoked in 
a later scene in Being Flynn as a young Nick enquires about his misplaced glove. Jody 
light-heartedly chides “if it were up your ass you’d know where it was” (13:03) in a line 
taken directly from the pages of Suck City, in which Flynn describes his mother’s “playful 
and surreal” (p. 64) turn of phrase as a characteristic of hers that he loved. The phrase is 
included in the film to illustrate the good-humoured dynamic between mother and son, but 
it also foreshadows a significant traumatic event. The phrase recurs in a later flashback 
scene, the first in which Nick is older, with Paul Dano in place of Liam Broggy to mark the 
passage of time. Jody is visibly dishevelled, clearing up beer bottles from the night before, 
and her delivery of the phrase is markedly less energetic. Nick teases his mother, 
completing her expression before she can finish it, whilst he attempts to locate his lost 
notebook (59:26). The missing notebook contains Nick’s unfinished short story, the 
contents of which prompt Jody’s suicide. Flynn writes in the memoir:  
I had begun a story about a woman who works two jobs and tries to fit in a 
couple of hours between each to be with her kids […]. I didn’t get to the 
part where it becomes clear that those moments they had together 
between her jobs were precious. 
(Suck City: p. 152) 
Although Flynn had intended to convey appreciation and understanding of his mother’s 
commitment to him through his writing, as he does throughout his memoir, Flynn reports 
that instead, she saw her own struggles in print, before choosing to end her own life. 
Jody’s onscreen death closely resembles Flynn’s account from Suck City, in which he 
describes her suicide note and her final actions as he understands them:  
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She begins by writing how she has just finished reading my notebook, 
about how perceptive I am […]. After swallowing a fistful of painkillers she 
goes for a walk along Peggotty Beach. An hour later she comes back 
home, groggy. “I was unable to throw myself in the ocean,” she writes, the 
handwriting more erratic as the painkillers seep into every cell.  
(Suck City: p. 153) 
The fatal shot is not depicted but implied in the film, as Jody is shown soaking wet, 
retrieving Travis’s pistol from her closet, an action that references her final words as 
reported in the memoir: “Why don’t you use the gun?” (original italics, Suck City: p. 153). 
The faithful interpretation of Flynn’s account of Jody’s final moments is intercut with 
scenes of Nick, intoxicated and smoking drugs in a stairwell in the narrative present in the 
film. The oscillating episode is further appended with flashbacks to a subtle encounter 
from Nick’s childhood: Jody offers Nick her leftover ice-cream to deflect his concern about 
her wellbeing (1:00-1:02:15), which subtly illustrates the intuition she credits Nick with in 
her suicide note. The splicing together of Nick’s drug abuse with the circumstances of 
Jody’s suicide and the memory of a childhood encounter with his mother hiding her pain 
explicates the link between the “major trauma” (Suck City, p. 154) of Nick’s loss of his 
mother and his psychological deterioration. The catalyst for Nick’s rapid “descent into 
darkness” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 91.) is the incident depicted in the previous scene, 
whereby Jonathan is barred from the shelter because Nick fails to intervene on his behalf. 
This intricate sequence constitutes Nick’s “moment of crisis” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 
91) within the context of the film’s conversion narrative. This moment culminates in the 
narrative nexus of Nick’s father’s expulsion from the shelter, which effectively condemns 
Jonathan to homelessness once more, and his mother’s death, for which Nick also feels 
responsible. The confluence of guilt and grief, both past and present, and the ways in 
which they collide and recur through parental presence and absence are indicative of the 
trauma at the heart of the testimonial adaptation. 
Being Flynn’s relational structure initially posits a reconciliatory story about a father and a 
son, in which both men struggle to convert a genetic connection into a real relationship. 
However, the film’s symbolic game of catch and the suturing of the before, during, and 
after of trauma in the montage described above elaborate upon Suck City’s explicitly 
bilateral paradigm of relationality, to articulate Jody Flynn’s significant role in Flynn’s 
autobiographical formation of selfhood. Furthermore, the two sequences, both of which 
are distinctly auteurial interventions, demonstrate Weitz’s perceptive, empathic and ethical 
interpretation of Jody’s death as pivotal to the self-witnessing agenda of Flynn’s 
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auto/biographical narrative. The tone and “subjective signature” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 150) of 
Flynn’s self-witnessing narrative are retained, but Weitz subtly inserts Jody Flynn’s story 
within the explicitly bilateral relational cinematic structure of the film as an introspective 
facet of Nick’s testimonial narrative, to preserve the dual subjective focus of 
auto/biography asserted in the memoir. In the film, Jody’s role is revealed in fragments 
through Nick’s memory, as part of the traumatic context for his testimony; consequently, 
Being Flynn exhibits a supplementary relational level that embeds Jody as “the idealized 
absent other”, as a figure “central to self-understanding” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 87) 
within the relational and testimonial auto/biographical model. Flynn explains that Weitz 
described Jody as “the specter [sic] hanging over every scene” of the film, and that “her 
presence, her death animates the living” (Flynn, 2013: p. 113). Jody’s death, and the 
ongoing impact it has on Nick’s sense of self, exacerbate the existential conflict caused by 
his father’s unexpected reappearance. The inversion of the parental presence/absence 
paradigm – losing Jody, and belatedly finding, or being found by, Jonathan – is the crisis 
at the core of Flynn’s literary testimony, which is consistently, if creatively, transposed in 
the adaptation.   
The primacy of Flynn’s testimony is clear from the moment Nick reclaims narrative 
authority from Jonathan in the opening scenes, right through to the film’s emancipatory 
conclusion that sees Nick a published author with a family of his own. This assertive, 
testimonial narrative framing is instrumental to the film’s transmission of Flynn’s 
autobiographical invitation, and equally important to the film’s transmission of Flynn’s self-
witnessing narrative in spite of Robert De Niro’s distinguished acting calibre. For Janet 
Hirshenson and Jane Jenkins, “star” status is reserved for “actors who become the selling 
point for the movie” and “one of the main reasons people will come to see it” (2006: p. 22), 
a quality that is predicated on an actor’s “bankability” (McDonald, 2013: p. 23) in terms of 
increasing a film’s potential commercial return. In addition, “‘Star’ is a relational rather than 
substantive term” Paul McDonald argues, as “certain actors can only be regarded as stars 
because others aren’t” (2013: p. 24). In Being Flynn, the casting of a bankable star like De 
Niro opposite a comparably less commercial actor like Dano could have jeopardised the 
film’s subjective testimonial focus, a decision further complicated by De Niro’s history of 
leading roles and memorable cinematic characters within the mainstream, commercial 
context of Hollywood studio films. De Niro’s star status brings with it the inevitable 
intertextuality of his former screen performances, whereby his voice and his body invoke 
memories of his previous roles for the viewer. De Niro as Jonathan driving a yellow cab in 
Being Flynn bears reference to his iconic character in the acclaimed Martin Scorsese film, 
Taxi Driver (1976), where he played the troubled veteran, Travis Bickle; likewise, 
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Jonathan’s temper and sporadic violent outbursts invoke De Niro’s portrayal of Jake 
LaMotta in the controversial adaptation Raging Bull (1980).34 However, reflecting on De 
Niro’s casting, Flynn declares him “perfect for the part”, stating that, as well as being age 
appropriate, De Niro could “embody a degree of both grandeur and menace” that enables 
the viewer to “believe, on some level, [Jonathan’s] claim that he is above the situation he 
finds himself in” (Flynn, 2013: p. 132). De Niro was also able to capture the “bite” of 
Jonathan Flynn’s personality that led Flynn to believe his father could “destroy” him if he 
got too close (2013: p. 133). In spite of De Niro’s undeniable screen presence and 
“actorly” authority (Cobb, 2011: p. 41), the film remains focused on Nick’s self-witnessing 
agenda. The clarity and consistency of Nick’s narrative authority and autobiographical 
invitation on screen, coupled with his successful ‘conversion’ – or liberation – at the end of 
the film, underscores Weitz’s commitment to pactual integrity, and the film’s 
auteurbiographical achievement as secondary testimony.       
Weitz’s adaptation faithfully transposes Nick Flynn’s auto/biographical narrative of self-
witness, preserving the explicit relational dynamic of his memoir to privilege his 
autobiographical and testimonial invitation. Nick’s narrating ‘I’ frames the cinematic 
narrative, using subjective voiceover conventions that embed Jonathan Flynn’s voice as 
citation, and his story as biography within the film. The channels of empathic relation that 
are present between Nick Flynn and Jonathan Flynn are remediated through notions of 
proximity, which are facilitated through the shared occasional and locational sites of the 
autobiographical narrative. Weitz’s adaptation translates the shared situatedness of the 
relational narrative on film as more than just setting or context, highlighting the ways in 
which the city becomes an extension of Jonathan to manifest his presence in absence. 
The film’s undulating narrative structure posits the underlying anxiety inherent in Flynn’s 
memoir, to convey to the viewer Nick’s resistance to his filial history as inflected by his 
traumatic past. Weitz stylistically weaves the stories of significant and related others 
through the self-witnessing narrative, demonstrating a perceptive and empathic 
engagement with Flynn’s testimony and its inherently relational construction. In spite of De 
Niro’s powerful performance and relative stardom, Dano’s portrayal of Nick captures the 
traumatic conflict of Flynn’s subjective truth in an authoritative assertion of the 
autobiographical ‘I’. Ultimately, the relational structure and testimonial tone of Flynn’s 
auto/biographical narrative are preserved, and the adaptation reissues the 
autobiographical invitation to bear witness as cinematic secondary testimony within the 
continuum of cinematic I-witnessing.     
 




Julie and Julia – and Nora (and Meryl): Which Chick’s Flick? 
In an extensive promotional interview for Julie & Julia, Ephron admitted that when she first 
read about Powell’s blog project in Amanda Hesser’s piece in the New York Times, she 
felt the story was not “a movie” (‘TimesTalks’: 01:31). Ephron further explained that it was 
not until Colombia bought the rights to Powell’s memoir with a plan to incorporate Child’s 
story that she could envision working on the film, after which she made clear her desire for 
full auteurial control from the outset (‘TimesTalks’: 02:10-02:45). Where Being Flynn 
adapts one, single-authored relational auto/biography, Julie & Julia is purportedly “based 
on two true stories” (01:15), adapting two distinct autobiographies, namely: Julie Powell’s 
2005 memoir, Julie and Julia: My Year of Cooking Dangerously (2005) (hereafter Cooking 
Dangerously)35 and Julia Child’s My Life in France (2006). The transposition of more than 
one source text immediately increases the auteurbiographical labour and the referential 
responsibility of pactual integrity. However, Ephron’s adaptation is even more complex 
than this intertextual claim suggests, which underlies my decision to include Julie & Julia 
as a limit case within the context of Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing.  
With two female subjects, a renowned – and rare – female auteur, and a female star in 
one of the title roles, Julie & Julia brings to the fore the gendered discourse of film 
authorship/ownership and adaptation. These issues are further determined by the 
interrelated expectations and limitations levied by the commercial and patriarchal 
Hollywood arena. As advanced in my analysis of Being Flynn, star status and the auteur’s 
creative approach can affect the viewer’s ‘reading’ of auteurbiographical adaptations, in 
terms of intertextuality, subjective focus, and the testimonial tone of the adapted 
discourse. Julie & Julia is the first text in the thesis to address the cinematic 
representation of a celebrity, in the figure of Julia Child, which alters the witnessing 
dynamic and the way that the subject is read. Unlike Being Flynn, then, Julie & Julia is a 
complex mise en abyme adaptation, with intricate, and sometimes competing, levels of 
representation, through which I interrogate the limits of auteurbiographical adaptation.         
Julie Powell’s memoir, Cooking Dangerously, is an overtly constructed literary adaptation 
of her blog, with the addition of imagined vignettes based on her aspirational engagement 
with Julia Child as a cook, author and public figure. Powell’s adaptive labour supplements 
the original diary format of the blog to add personal details and additional autobiographical 
context, as well as the organised insertion of Child’s biographical narrative. Ephron used 
 
35 I refer specifically to the Penguin Books film tie-in reprint (2009), which was retitled but 
otherwise unchanged from initial publication. 
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both the blog and the memoir to inform the adaptive process. Secondly, as the film’s 
opening titles confirm, Julie & Julia is also based on My Life in France (2006), the “as-told-
to” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 67) autobiography Julia Child wrote collaboratively with 
her great nephew, Alex Prud’homme: although she died before the volume was complete. 
The book is written in the first person, with a clear iteration of the autobiographical ‘I’, but 
the paratextual inscription of a co-author inevitably complicates the notion of 
autobiographical authority. Thirdly, Ephron and members of the cast conducted their own 
supplementary research, much like the auteurial équipe in The Diving Bell, reading 
archived letters and Noël Riley Fitch’s Appetite for Life: The Biography of Julia Child 
(1999), and watching videos of Child’s numerous appearances on television. And, finally, 
Child’s status as a well-known celebrity chef installs multiple levels of signification, 
whereby those involved in the adaptation – and the viewer – attempt to reconcile familiar, 
intertextual aspects of Child’s public persona with her cinematic representation in the 
process of bearing witness. With multiple sources and two distinct subjects, the prospect 
of auteurbiographical adaptation is immediately more complex, in terms of the 
commitment to pactual integrity that the process entails and the greater referential 
responsibility that relational narratives impose. Ultimately, I explore the ways in which 
these additional factors affect pactual integrity and the autobiographical invitation in Julie 
& Julia, towards an understanding of the conditions that reveal the limits of cinematic I-
witnessing as an autobiographical and testimonial approach.   
Julie & Julia begins in medias res, with Julia Child (Meryl Streep)36 and her husband Paul 
(Stanley Tucci) arriving in France, as they begin the last leg of their transatlantic journey in 
their freshly transported, American car, an intertitle providing the date and location within 
the first minute: “France, 1949”. The mise-en-scène is quintessentially French, with 
tracking shots enriched by images of the Eiffel tower and the unspoilt countryside, a 
French cafe marking their arrival in the capital and at their new home. The accompanying 
score, ‘Julia’s Theme’, features optimistic and upbeat accordions, which perfectly matches 
the Childs’ mood as they embark upon their continental adventure. Julia eventually 
introduces herself through character-to-character dialogue rather than subjective 
voiceover, with the assertion “Je suis Julia Child” as the first diegetic reference to the real 
person (02:55). After the jump cut, a closely framed copy of Child’s Mastering the Art of 
French Cooking in the original red and white fleur de lis cover is packed into a box marked 
cookbooks, symbolic of the narrative hinge that connects its owner, Julie Powell (Amy 
 
36 I use Julia when referring to Julia Child the character in the film, and Child when 
referring to the author/person.  
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Adams),37 and the woman who wrote it within the film’s relational structure. The sequence 
that follows depicts the Powells moving from Bay Ridge to “Queens, New York 2012”, 
driving their boxed belongings in the back of an old Jeep, complemented by a more 
pedestrian rise and fall leitmotif, ‘Julie’s Theme’, which is expectant and played on modern 
strings. The parallel depictions of the women moving home with their respective husbands 
are suggestive of their similarities within the cinematic narrative, and their respective 
realities and “material locations[s] of subjectivity” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 77) are 
hereby charted, aesthetically sympathetic in complementary colours, but with period sets 
and costuming providing visual distinctions between their story worlds for the viewer. The 
film’s oscillating structure, much like Being Flynn’s, allows Julie’s and Julia’s narratives to 
emerge in tandem, reflecting the structure of Powell’s memoir. Though the focal subjects 
are introduced, there is no clear assertion of narrative authority or the contingent 
articulation of the narrating ‘I’ in the opening scenes, making it unclear how the relational 
structure operates and delaying the invitation to emersive viewership that is predicated on 
the cinematic conventions of autobiographical subjectivity. Consequently, the subjective 
stories are convened in an “implicit” relational dynamic (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 44) 
that accords with the structure of Powell’s memoir, but without the requisite diegetic cues 
that can confirm a referential claim to an auto/biographical source.  
Julie’s autobiographical invitation, along with her formal diegetic introduction, comes much 
later, in the scene where she begins the Julie/Julia blog project and composes her first 
post. Julie’s husband, Eric (Chris Messina), helps her to set up the blog on her laptop, and 
then a series of progressive shot-reverse shots show Julie writing the initial post on her 
blog page (see Figure 4.3) as the words she writes are heard in the subjective voiceover 
(16:24-17:23). Though the autobiographical invitation comes comparatively late, this 
scene follows the same convention for establishing the narrating ‘I’ as autobiographical ‘I’ 
as was observed in Being Flynn, whereby the proper name is reconciled with the 
autobiographical subject through corresponding written and spoken assertions of the 
narrating ‘I’. In addition, Julie’s blog is the basis for the “virtual bond” (Benson-Allott, 2010: 
p. 83) that underscores the relational structure of the film narrative, framing Julia as a 
pedagogical and aspirational figure within the context of Julie’s autobiographical act. 
Through the blog, Julie uses self-reflexive writing to document the practicalities of the 
project in real time, and her narrative authority in the film is further emphasised through 
her voiceover, which accompanies swift, day-to-day sequences that elide the passage of 
 




time between blog posts, as she works progressively through the recipes in Child’s 
cookbook.  
 
Figure 4.3: Julie writing her blog. 
By contrast, Julia’s voice in the film not presented as her own. The first occasion that 
voiceover is deployed within Julia’s narrative occurs in an early scene whereby Julia is 
shown navigating a Parisian market, but it is her husband, Paul’s voice that can be heard, 
reciting the words of a letter he is writing to his brother, Charlie. Paul describes Julia’s 
adjustment to the French lifestyle, and the way in which the French are adjusting to Julia: 
“Dear Charlie, we’re settled in finally and Julia loves it here. She wants to stay forever. 
You know how famously grouchy the French can be, dear brother, but Julia brings out the 
best in a polecat” (18:20-37). Though the content of the letter is paraphrased from Paul 
Child’s genuine correspondence (Riley Fitch, 1999: p. 159),38 the inclusion of Paul’s 
voiceover rather than Julia’s complicates the narrative framework and undermines the 
assumed parallel structure. Julia’s voiceover does not appear until just under a quarter of 
the way through the film, as she begins to attend cooking school. Julia begins with the 
salutation ‘Dear Avis’ (32:30), representative of a detached, epistolary communication with 
an as-yet-unknown-to-the-viewer acquaintance, rather than the direct assertion of Julie’s 
narrating ‘I’ described above. Though the viewer is seemingly granted access to the 
Childs’ private communiqué, the subjective perspective and immediacy of the 
autobiographical invitation are absent from Julia’s voiceover, which lacks the agency and 
narrative authority of the autobiographical ‘I’.  
Instead, I argue that Julia is presented as a narrated, biographical subject, and as an 
auteurial assemblage based on the literary mise en abyme of sources consulted during 
the adaptive process. In Cooking Dangerously, Child is portrayed as Powell imagines her, 
and the implicit relational structure is facilitated by Powell’s inclusion of creatively 
reconstructed vignettes between her own self-referential chapters. These were informed 
 
38 In Riley Fitch’s biography, the letter was reportedly addressed to the Kublers, who were 
friends of the Childs, but do not appear in the film. 
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by Powell’s engagement with Julia Child’s televisual oeuvre and the auto/biographical 
writings by and about her (including Riley Fitch’s biography). These episodes portray Julia 
as an “annoyingly ebullient, oddly compelling giant of a woman” (Cooking Dangerously: p. 
58) who was “unsophisticated, charming, excitable” (p. 167), and “raucous” (p. 241), 
observations Powell frames as Paul Child’s retrospective reportage in dated, diaristic 
entries. The Julia Child that emerges in Powell’s memoir is essentially a caricature, but 
the primary objective of these narrative inserts is to identify Julia’s great passions – her 
husband and food – as similar to Powell’s. Nora Ephron, in turn, embarked upon her own 
auteurbiographical investigation, consulting Child’s family, and studying interviews, 
auto/biographies, letters, and her TV work to ensure that Julia’s story was faithfully told, in 
the same emersive contextual labour undertaken by the auteurial équipe in The Diving 
Bell. Accordingly, Julie & Julia blends Powell’s auto/biographical ‘version’ of Julia – “the 
great JC” (Cooking Dangerously: p. 93) that inspired her combined culinary and literary 
efforts – with Ephron’s auteurbiographical construction, to create the “great big good fairy” 
(14:10) embodied by Meryl Streep. In the ‘making of’ documentary included as a special 
feature on the DVD, Streep confirms that the Julia in the film is less a reenactment of the 
late Julia Child than a performative interpretation of Powell’s literary version mobilised by 
Ephron’s script:   
Julia Child was a larger-than-life character. So, while I felt a responsibility, 
certainly to her legacy and her memory, of the great work that she did and 
the essence of her character, I’m not really doing Julia Child, I’m doing 
Julie Powell’s idea of who she was.  
(Streep in ‘Secret Ingredients’ 6:30-6:48)  
Fundamentally, the Julia on screen is a “characterisation” of Julia Child rather than an 
“impersonation” according to one of the film’s producers, Laurence Mark (‘Secret 
Ingredients’: 6:57-7:00), which implies that the film’s Julia is a transposition of Powell’s 
aspirational and implicitly relational other rather than a representation of the real person. 
As a result, the relational structure of the film renders Julia’s voice a reconstructed citation 
of the myriad auto/biographical and metatextual sources, and “the idealized absent other” 
(Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 87) of Powell’s memoir, instead of a distinct, self-reflexive 
autobiographical subject with her own autobiographical invitation, which accords with the 
implicit relational dynamic advanced in Powell’s memoir. 
Powell’s inclusion of Child as a relational auto/biographical subject in her memoir is an 
acknowledgement of her influence as a role-model throughout the practical aspects of the 
Julie/Julia Project; she describes Child as ‘the polestar of my existence’ (Cooking 
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Dangerously: p. 125) and claims that, during the project, she existed in ‘the Juliaverse’ (p. 
125). Powell recognises her inclusion of Child’s story as an appreciative and adaptive 
interpretation (see Hutcheon 2013), which she explains in the paratextual author’s note 
that precedes the memoir proper:  
the scenes from the lives of Paul Child and Julia McWilliams Child are 
purely works of imagination, inspired by events described in the journals 
and letters of Paul Child, the letters of Julia McWilliams, and the 
biography of Julia Child, Appetite for Life, by Noël Riley Fitch. I thank Ms. 
Riley Fitch for her fine work, and the Schlesinger Library at Harvard 
University for generously making Mrs. Child’s archives available to the 
public.  
(Cooking Dangerously: n.p.) 
Unlike the genetic, locational, and occasional similitude shared by the Flynns as explicit 
relationality, and preserved by Weitz in Being Flynn through the emphasis of shared sites 
and situatedness, Julie and Julia’s relationality is entirely manufactured, firstly, by Powell 
in her memoir, and subsequently by Ephron in the film. Consequently, Julie and Julia’s 
shared sites are thematic rather than material; they are connected by their culinary labour, 
their gender, and the common domestic spaces of their individual self-remaking projects, 
which posits an implicit relational alignment rather than an explicit, embedded relational 
structure. As a result, the only autobiographical invitation in the film is issued by Julie, with 
her story functioning as a narrative frame for Julia’s, in line with the relational structure of 
Powell’s memoir. 
The film further facilitates relational alignment by emphasising Julie and Julia’s shared 
“positionality”, which, as explained in Chapter One, refers to culturally determined 
“discourses of identity” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 215). Julie considers her “subject 
position” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 215) similar to Julia’s; she articulates the 
similarities as “major overlaps” on screen during a reflective blog entry: 
I’ve been thinking about me and Julia. She was a secretary for a 
government agency, and I am too. A really nice guy married her; a really 
nice guy married me. Both of us were lost, and both of us were saved by 
food in some way or other.  
(1:27:06-1:27:20) 
Julie’s simplistic assessment of the attributes she shares with Julia epitomises the 
parameters of relational alignment in the film, as determined by their jobs, their respective 
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supportive relationships, and a shared love of food. Their secretarial similarities are 
largely unexplored in the film, to which I return in the discussion of tone, with marriage and 
cooking becoming the central focus of their relational alignment. Julie goes on to identify 
the ways in which she feels she and Julia are not alike in the same scene mentioned 
above:  
but let’s face it. I am not Julia Child. Julia Child never lost her temper just 
because something boiled over or collapsed in the oven, or just plain fell 
through. And she was never horrible to her husband, I’m sure. She never 
behaved like who has time to be married? Which is how I behave 
sometimes I’m sorry to say. I wish I were more like her. She deserved her 
husband and I don’t. That’s the truth. Well anyway, that’s the truth for 
now.  
(1:27:21-1:28:00) 
In this post Julie identifies the differences between herself and Julia as flaws, which 
further emphasises the way that the idealised figure of Julia functions within her self-
remaking project, just as in Powell’s memoir. Julie not only values Julia’s culinary 
expertise, she also looks to her relationship with Paul as an example of a healthy and 
supportive marriage. Though the above blog post does not appear in either of Powell’s 
source texts, marking it as an auteurial interpretation, the post preserves Julie’s – and by 
extension, Powell’s – autobiographical invitation by positing Julie’s relational engagement 
with Julia as “central to self-understanding” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 87) in the context 
of the blog’s testimonial tenor.  
The fidelity mandated by pactual integrity holds the preservation of subjective truth as 
paramount. Ephron’s task as the auteur is to adapt the available source material to create 
a cinematic text that can transpose the autobiographical invitation to testimonial 
witnessing in a faithful and cinematically engaging way. However, Ephron’s auteurial 
authority in Hollywood is largely attributable to the commercial success of her films, most 
of which are categorised as chick flicks and/or romantic comedies – terms that are often 
used synonymously – as mentioned above. According to Claire Mortimer: 
The romantic comedy seeks to involve the spectator in the characters’ 
emotional journey; we need to care about their ordeals […]. In this respect 
it is important that the spectator can relate to and feel empathy for the 
characters.  
(2010: p. 82) 
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Mortimer equates romantic comedy’s affective capacity with Barthesian jouissance, which 
she contends “is an uncontrolled pleasure which is difficult to rationalise, creating a more 
intense relationship between the film and the spectator” (2010: p. 78), which renders the 
romantic comedy genre “one of the more affecting genres […] in terms of eliciting an 
affective response” (2010: p. 78). As the primary directive of an auteurbiographical 
adaptation is to invite the viewer to bear witness to and empathise with the 
autobiographical subject’s testimonial truth, the empathic potential of the romantic comedy 
genre can, in principle, be considered compatible with the cinematic I-witnessing agenda. 
Schmitt contends that autobiographical texts capitalise on “readers’ expectations and 
perceptions of the generic contract offered by the author” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 33), which, as 
I have argued throughout, extends to viewers’ engagement with cinematic texts as 
representative of autobiographical experience. In Julie & Julia, the viewership pact is 
determined by both generic markers of romantic comedy and the subjective conventions 
of the filmic autobiographical invitation. As the auteurbiographical adaptative process is 
governed by an ethical and empathic commitment to pactual integrity, it is theoretically 
possible for an adapted film with source material that lends itself to the romantic comedy 
genre, to function as secondary testimony, provided the tone of the source text(s) is 
preserved.  
As explained in Chapter Three, the tone of an autobiographical narrative cultivates the 
reader’s perception of intimacy (see Schmitt, 2017), which promotes an empathic 
connection with the autobiographical subject. For Schmitt, “tone is an authorial strategy 
guided by the will to create the original experience” through the autobiographical narrative, 
“but also, in a fundamental manner, by the psychological profile of the author” (2017: 
p.141). Powell adopts a somewhat cynical and distinctly self-depreciating register from the 
blog project’s inception, which reflects her desire to convey the self-remaking experience 
of the project, rather than a narcissistic or indulgent creative impulse. In Being Flynn, Nick 
admits early in the film that he’s “sort of trying to be a writer” (01:15), but the narrative 
reveals that his writing offers more than a creative outlet. For Flynn, writing Suck City was 
a form of “scriptotherapy”, which Suzette Henke describes as a “process of writing out and 
writing through traumatic experience in the mode of therapeutic reenactment” (2000: p. xii) 
(as mentioned in Chapters Two and Three). In Being Flynn, Nick’s writing is framed as a 
response to the traumatic experience of loss, which accords with the tone of the source 
text and its inherent autobiographical invitation. In Powell’s case, the project represents a 
similarly therapeutic outlet, which combines the practices of cooking and self-reflexive 
writing as a remedial response to cultural trauma, to which I will return. In Julie & Julia, 
Julie’s invitation is evident, but distorted by a shift in tone, as the narrative centres on 
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personal, existential anxiety rather than the complex conflict Powell articulates in the 
source texts. Powell’s decision to cook her way through Julia Child’s cookbook was not an 
arbitrary one, as seemingly suggested in the film; it was the conscious undertaking of a 
creative “opportunity” intended to make her feel “better” (25/11/02). At just over halfway 
through the project, Powell reiterates this sentiment in her blog to ensure that her readers 
understand the project as more than self-congratulatory navel gazing: 
I hope that no one thinks that my intention here is to flaunt my culinary 
expertise. To me that seems obvious, but maybe it isn’t. I simply thought it 
would be good for me, and hopefully entertaining for others, to map my 
progress as not an accomplished, but a passionate, cook, using the 
Julie/Julia project as a tool. 
(14/03/03) 
In this post, Powell rejects the notion of narcissism, instead reaffirming the project as a 
necessarily self-reflexive and therapeutic vehicle for personal development, which 
manifests an autobiographical and testimonial narrative invitation through the blog.  
By contrast, Julie is portrayed throughout Julie & Julia as “hypersensitive, self-
absorbed, and shrill” (Benson-Allott, 2010: p. 84), which demonstrates a 
significant deviation from the source texts, foregrounded as Ephron’s auteurial 
invention. The ways in which one particular episode from Powell’s memoir is 
reimagined in the film offers a clear example of adaptive deviation. In Cooking 
Dangerously, Powell explains that a journalist from The Christian Science Monitor 
contacted her to arrange for her to cook for Judith Jones, Julia Child’s original 
editor for Mastering the Art of French Cooking. For myriad reasons, including 
weather conditions and Jones’ reluctance to travel to Powell’s apartment in Long 
Island, the much-anticipated meeting is cancelled. But, in the memoir, the 
journalist does eat with Julie and her husband and the evening is salvaged in 
spite of Powell’s disappointment (Cooking Dangerously, pp. 101-106). In the film, 
neither Jones nor the journalist attend to eat with Julie, and the frustration of her 
wasted efforts leads to a fight with her husband in which he criticises her 
commitment to the project. In the midst of the argument, Eric accuses Julie of 
egotism, asking: “what’s gonna [sic] happen when you’re no longer the centre of 
the universe?” (01:16:59), to which Julie concedes: “Ok maybe I’m being a little 
narcissistic […] but what do you think a blog is? It’s me, me, me, day after day” 
(1:16:28). Eric responds with a scathing evaluation: 
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I thought it’d be fun. How stupid is that? It just turns out to be a lot of what 
you call meltdowns, but they don’t feel like meltdowns. They feel like I’m 
living with a totally self-absorbed person who writes this stuff for a bunch 
of complete strangers. And it’s supposed to be a big adventure, but it’s 
not. It’s our life. It’s our marriage, and here in this room it doesn’t feel like 
an adventure. It feels like shit!  
(1:16:36-1:16:56) 
As well as devaluing Julie’s project, and cutting off Julie’s affirmation of the fulfilment that 
it brings, Eric implies that the appreciation she expresses for his peripheral input 
emasculates him, stating, “I am not a saint […]. And it makes me feel like an asshole 
every time you say it!” (1:17:03-1:17:11). After this brief, pantomime, to-and-fro, 
throughout which the couple follow one another around the apartment, Julie slams the 
kitchen door in Eric’s face, prompting him to yell “and do not write about this on your blog!” 
before storming out. This explosive episode is not depicted in either Powell’s blog, or her 
memoir; the only minor marital conflicts that Powell reports in either pertain to the 
practicalities of the project, in terms of its expense and the number of dishes produced by 
the labour, with a single occasion where she snaps at Eric for mocking her commitment to 
her readers in front of her brother (Cooking Dangerously: p. 82). In fact, as Powell 
explains in the memoir, the blog was originally Eric’s idea – which Julie does say in the 
middle of the argument – suggested to enable her to advance her culinary skills as a 
potential alternative to the secretarial job she hated (Cooking Dangerously: pp. 20-21). As 
a plot device, this incident resembles “the comedy of remarriage” (Cavell, 1981) most 
often associated with Romantic Comedies, and their early predecessor, the Women’s 
Film, whereby the “stubborn and headstrong” screwball heroine (Mortimer, 2010: p. 24) is 
forced to consider the error of her ways before accepting her failings, eventually 
reconciling with the hero with a greater sense of appreciation and gratitude (see Hollinger, 
2012; Mortimer, 2010; Ferris and Young, 2008; et al.). The film further enforces this 
gendered genre trope, as, after a very brief separation, Eric returns, having read Julie’s 
self-depreciating blog post, quoted above, which her mother deems “uncharacteristically 
thoughtful” (01:29:21) as a subtle confirmation of Julie’s characteristic narcissism and her 
subsequent improvement. After the argument, Julie moderates her behaviour, becomes 
mindful not to praise Eric, and is generally calmer and less prone to ‘meltdowns’ for the 
remainder of the project, reinforcing the sexist cinematic stereotype of the hysterical 
heroine who must “learn something […] about themselves” or “undergo some change” 
(Cavell, 1981: p. 56). The inclusion of this original episode evinces Ephron’s creative 
license in the adaptive process; but, unlike the auteurial interventions observed in The 
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Diving Bell and the Butterfly and Being Flynn, which accentuate the testimonial tone and 
advance the autobiographical invitation, this insertion impresses Ephron’s “signature 
auteurist stamp” (Hollinger, 2012: p. 230) on the film, which complicates the witnessing 
agenda and the invitation that the film issues.  
The distinctly testimonial tone of Powell’s source texts is determined by the self-
witnessing agenda implicated in the conception of her blog. Powell’s adoption of the blog 
format immediately installs intimacy, which is predicated on its reciprocal structure, as 
blogs “are interactive sites for communities that allow users to comment by raising 
questions, offering the comfort of shared experience, and ‘being there’ for others” (Smith 
and Watson, 2010: p. 183). Powell’s first post issues her autobiographical invitation, and 
outlines the ideological, socioeconomic, existential and creative factors that motivated her 
project: 
The Contender 
Government drone by day, renegade foodie by night. Too old for theatre, 
too young for children, and too bitter for anything else, Julie Powell was 
looking for a challenge. And in the Julie/Julia project she found it. Risking 
her marriage, her job, and her cats’ well-being, she has signed on for a 
deranged assignment. 365 days. 524 recipes. One girl and a crappy 
outer-borough kitchen. How far will it go, no one can say….39     
(my italics, Cooking Dangerously, 2005: p. 22-3) 
In the blog’s opening gambit, Powell reveals the context for what is fundamentally an 
autobiographical act, defining the tenets of her narrative subjectivity as her professional 
and socioeconomic dissatisfaction, her culinary passion, ageing anxiety, and her 
consequent cynical disposition (see my italics). These personal details designate the 
“emplacement” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 42) of Powell’s self-reflexive narrative, which 
is not only geographical, but also culturally situated, as indicative of “the juncture from 
which self-articulation issues” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 42). Smith and Watson explain 
that, in life writing, emplacement encompasses the “location” and “position” of the 
narrative. Firstly, location is “the national, ethnic, racial, gendered, sexual, social, and life-
cycle coordinates in which narrators are embedded by virtue of their experiential histories 
and from which they speak” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 42). And secondly, position 
“implies the ideological stances – multiple and heteroglossic rather than single and 
 
39 Spelling and grammar are consistent with the source throughout. Any and all 
irregularities are represented as they appear in the sources. 
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unified” and the ways in which they are “adopted by a narrator toward self and others” 
(2010: p. 43). Powell’s first post articulates her unique subjective position and the location 
from which her narrative emerges, describing how she will navigate the project and her 
distinctive subjective perspective by plotting the coordinates of identity through her brief 
description of herself and her circumstances. Powell’s narrative emplacement offers her 
readers some insight into the context of her autobiographical act, which expedites the 
testimonial witnessing structure by encouraging emersion. Consequently, Powell’s 
underlying autobiographical invitation is characterised by the implicit plea for a witness 
with whom she is willing to share her experience, which underscores the testimonial tone 
of the project. 
 
Figure 4.4: Julie Powell’s first blog post. 
Significantly, Powell’s first blog entry contains a hyperlink, accessed through the phrase 
“government drone” (see Figure 4.4), a term loaded with the connotations of mindless 
industry; once clicked, the reader is redirected to Powell’s employer’s homepage, the 
Lower Manhattan Development Corporation’s website, which outlines the nature of the 
9/11 memorial work in which she is engaged. This sublimation communicates the context 
of cultural trauma, and its bearing on Powell’s everyday life as a key vector of her 
narrative subjectivity. Powell’s employment places her at the geographical epicentre of the 
September 11th attacks, which Neil J. Smelser describes as a “quintessentially cultural 
trauma”, the events of which “were appreciated almost immediately by the American 
population as perhaps the greatest trauma in the nation’s history” (2004: p. 44). In the 
epilogue of Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (2004), written just four months after 
the attacks, Smelser concludes: “Because of their scope, intensity, timing and symbolism, 
it would be difficult to conceive that [the September 11th attacks] would not be traumatic in 
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nature” (original italics, p. 270). In her blog, Powell identifies herself as “the official voice of 
the World Trade Center [sic] Memorial Competition” (02/05/03), which determines the 
historical and socio-political “site” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 69) specific to her 
autobiographical narrative emplacement. Powell’s role involves fielding public 
submissions relating to a proposed monument at the ground zero site, meaning that her 
job is inflected with the irony of commemoration; Smelser explains: 
To memorialize is to force a memory on us by the conspicuous and 
continuous physical presence of a monument; at the same time a 
memorial also conveys the message that now that we have paid our 
respects to a trauma, we are now justified in forgetting about it. 
(2004: p. 53) 
Through her work, Powell is constantly caught between remembering and forgetting the 
“horrendous event”, which exacerbates the “indelible” effects of cultural trauma 
(Alexander, 2004: p. 1), imposing upon Powell a state of irrevocably traumatised inertia. 
Powell’s physical proximity to the memorial project, and her involvement in its expedition, 
manifests as what she describes as “secretarial ennui” (11/12/03).  Jeffrey Alexander 
claims, “trauma will be resolved, not only by setting things right in the world, but by setting 
things right in the self” (2004: p. 5), which adequately describes the self-remaking impetus 
for Powell’s culinary and literary project, as described in the above blog post. Powell’s 
professional life is a significant factor in the emplacement of her autobiographical 
subjectivity, which incites her to seek a therapeutic outlet outside of her secretarial role in 
order to address the existential flux she describes in her initial post. The Julie/Julia project 
offers Powell relief from the perpetual conflict of cultural trauma as a type of coping 
mechanism, functioning as what Piotr Sztompka describes as an “innovative strategy” for 
adjustment whereby the irrevocable effects of cultural trauma are accepted, but “people 
make attempts at creative reshaping of their personal situation within the system, in order 
to alleviate trauma” (2004: p. 184).  
Powell describes her attempt to ‘creatively reshape’ her ‘personal situation’ as “trying to 
make a space for myself in my own life” (Powell in ‘Secret Ingredients’: 08:08), to eschew 
the limitations that the post-traumatic ‘system’ imposed and to process her circumstances 
in a productive way. In the memoir, Powell writes: 
When I thought back to the days Before the Project, I remembered crying 
on subways, I remembered cubicles, I remembered doctor’s appointments 
and something looming, something with a zero at the end of it. I 
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remembered the feeling of wandering down an endless hallway lined with 
locked doors.   
(Cooking Dangerously: p. 124) 
This reflective summary references a complex nexus of personally traumatic 
circumstances, underscored by cultural trauma, which encompasses Powell’s distressing 
occupation at The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), her diagnosis of 
Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome (PCOS), fear of ageing, and the resultant feeling of 
existential stasis imposed as the culmination of these anxieties. Powell’s narrative 
emplacement identifies a very specific and significant “moment in history [and] a socio-
political space” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 69) from which her autobiographical act 
emerges as testimony.  
The specificity of subjective emplacement, which is appropriately demonstrated in Being 
Flynn, is largely overlooked within Julie & Julia, which effectively obscures the testimonial 
tone and compromises the transposition of Julie Powell’s autobiographical invitation. Both 
Powell and her cinematic counterpart express the desire to reconfigure their lives through 
their autobiographical act; however, Julie’s rationale for doing so is significantly different 
from Powell’s, as evinced in Julie’s first post: 
The challenge, 365 days. 524 recipes. 
The contender, Julie Powell.  
Government employee by day, renegade foodie by night, 
risking her marriage, her job and her cat’s well-being, she has 
signed on for a deranged assignment. How far it will go, no 
one can say. 
(17:38-57) 
The oversimplified mission statement offered by Julie in the film suppresses much of the 
contextual detail provided in Powell’s first post, quoted earlier. In the film, Julie dismisses 
her husband’s suggestion that her work could serve as an appropriate topic: “the whole 
idea of writing a blog is to get away from what I do all day, the way that cooking is a way 
that I get away from what I do all day” (13:22-28). Though the notion of writing the blog as 
an “innovative strategy” (Sztopmka, 2004: p. 184) is retained in the film, references to the 
source content concerning Powell’s professional life are immediately ruled out, which 
limits the testimonial scope of the cinematic adaptation. Instead, Julie’s work life is quickly 
summarised by a montage of telephone calls from distressed and angry patrons to the 
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LMDC, calls that cause her to feel powerless and frustrated, and even reduce her to 
sympathetic tears (07:55). The conversations offer a condensed insight into the myriad 
emotional responses to the World Trade Centre tragedy, and the context of collective 
cultural trauma it represents. Rather than elaborating upon the impact of her everyday 
environment, which is a recurrent theme in Powell’s blog, Julie’s inexorable proximity to 
the ongoing effects of cultural trauma is swept aside in an early adaptive elision that 
minimises the traumatic context of Julie’s work. At the “ritual cobb salad lunch” (09:00), 
Julie receives mock, shallow pity from her high-flying girlfriends, Cassie (Vanessa Ferlito), 
Regina (Casey Wilson), and Annabelle (Jillian Bach), all of whom are seemingly 
unaffected, and indeed, disinterested in Julie’s work, or the effect it has on her wellbeing. 
The women brag about their financial and professional successes, and complain about 
their incompetent assistants, before turning their attention to Julie. Cassie asks “so how’s 
your job Julie?”, but cuts her off before she can form an answer, firing back “I can only 
imagine the heartbreak”. Regina contributes with “so sad – but not in a bad way”, with 
Cassie adding “painful” as Regina speaks (10:49-10:55). The following mid-close shot of a 
stricken Julie invites the viewer’s empathy, as she struggles to compose herself with an 
apologetic shake of the head (10:56). Before Julie can speak, Cassie’s and Regina’s 
phones ring simultaneously, and they briskly excuse themselves before answering their 
calls. Julie is given no opportunity to articulate the specificity of her daily struggles, and 
though framing cues empathic engagement, the ‘feeling with’ is predicated on Julie’s 
marginalisation instead. This scene centres on Julie’s failure to ‘fit in’ with her 
contemporaries, who are installed as a successful and self-centred social benchmark. As 
a result, Julie’s friends are posited as “contingent others” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 86) 
within Julie’s cinematic narrative, as their relationships lack the reciprocal empathic 
channels that can assist with the viewer’s empathic engagement with the autobiographical 
subject as self-witness. When questioned about the lunch scene in an interview, Julie 
Powell claimed that it was intended to convey Julie’s motivation, claiming “It was very 
necessary to externalise the conflict that Julie Powell was having” (Powell, 2009: 5:43). 
But, instead of providing an onscreen outlet for the articulation of testimonial context, or a 
contextual collective with whom Julie can identify, the group dynamic functions as a 
generic plot device. It serves only to advance the ‘fabulous’ Sex and the City trope of 
successful ladies who lunch, a stereotype to which Julie fails to conform, as the basis of 
her existential discontent.  
Powell’s “[narrative] of crisis” (Smith and Watson, 2010: p. 219) occurs at the intersection 
of multiple, inextricable contextual factors; but, the film narrative elides the complexity of 
the sources’ testimonial inflections. Instead, the ‘odd-one-out’ trope is stretched further in 
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the film when, in an attempt to legitimate her inclusion within her peer group, Julie agrees 
to be interviewed for a lifestyle article that one of her lunch companions is writing. 
Annabelle describes the topic as “Our generation. Turning thirty” (11:26), but the poster in 
the scene that follows reveals a New York Times feature with the title: ‘Is 30 the new 20? 
Portrait of a Lost Generation’, with large mugshot-style photographs of Julie and three 
other people. Julie is despondent and defensive, complaining to her friend Helen (Mary 
Lynn Rajskub) that Annabelle misled her by focusing on her failings and describing her as 
“a mid-level bureaucrat” (12:08). These scenes outline Julie’s existential discontent, as 
determined by the related aspects of ageing and a lack of professional fulfilment, both of 
which are found in the blog and the memoir. Nevertheless, though the autobiographical 
source texts do highlight Powell’s reluctance to turn thirty, she reflects more deeply upon 
what she perceives as the personal and biological implications of the milestone in the 
memoir, alongside her lack of orientation and accomplishment in her career. Powell 
describes the pressure she feels to have children on the very first page40, which she 
emphasises as an age-related concern pertaining to the fertility issues that PCOS can 
cause (Cooking Dangerously: p. 5). Powell also mentions a conversation with her mother, 
who drops “the Pushing Thirty bomb” shortly after her 29th birthday (p. 12), before 
describing the way her ambitions foundered in the years since she moved to New York 
from Austin. This fear of ageing is also framed as the reason that Powell agrees to take a 
permanent role at the LMDC, even as she acknowledges and describes at length the 
distress her temporary position causes (pp. 62-63). Julia & Julia repackages and 
reprioritises the emplacement of Julie’s autobiographical subjectivity into a more 
accessible and genre-contiguous ageing anxiety that is largely unqualified by anything 
other than career envy and social detachment.  
In Julie & Julia, Julie’s dissatisfaction with Anabelle’s article becomes the impetus for her 
blog project, which is reframed as a response to her misrepresentation as a failed writer 
and a perpetual temp, encompassed in her complaint “She [Annabelle] left so much out” 
(12:15). Julie’s reactive and competitive motivation is further implied when, on hearing that 
Annabelle is starting a self-reflexive blog, she asserts “I could write a blog. I have 
thoughts” (13:32). Julie’s statement is a double assertion of agency and selfhood, 
expressing aloud her desire to be narratively signified, but on her own terms. This view 
accords with feminist autobiography scholar, Susan Friedman’s argument that “alienation 
from the historically imposed image of the self is what motivates the writing, the creation 
 
40 On the first page of the memoir where she refers to herself rather than Julia Child. 
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of an alternate self in the autobiographical act” (1988: p. 41), which posits 
autobiographical writing as a remedial narrative strategy. Similarly, Gilmore contends: 
For many writers, autobiography’s domain of first-person particularities 
and peculiarities offers an opportunity to describe their lives and their 
thoughts about it; to offer, in some cases, corrective readings; and to 
emerge through writing as an agent of self-representation, a figure, textual 
to be sure, but seemingly substantial, who can claim ‘I was there’ or ‘I am 
here’.  
(p. 9) 
For Julie, the project offers relief from the secretarial stasis of her work life, and an 
opportunity to prove to Annabelle, and to herself, that she is more than an almost-thirty 
bureaucrat. But, the removal of the sources’ cultural trauma context, as determined by 
Powell’s autobiographical emplacement, delimits the testimonial tone of both the project 
within the film narrative, and consequently, the film’s overall pactual integrity.    
This simplified conception renders Julie’s narrative little more than contemporary framing 
for a celebrity biopic, with the additional adaptive caveat that the Julia represented in the 
film is an idealised caricature within a particular generic setting. As mentioned at the 
beginning of my analysis, Ephron was uninspired by Powell’s story alone, but Columbia’s 
idea to combine Powell’s story with Child’s sparked Ephron’s auteurial interest. Ephron’s 
excitement for the project was linked to the “imaginary relationship” that she felt she had 
with Julia Child through her own cultural engagement with the celebrity chef (Ephron in 
Julie & Julia Featurette: 2:28), placing a question mark over the auteurbiographical 
potential for the adaptation in terms of balanced subjective representation. Ephron’s 
interest in Child, coupled with the adaptive approach to Julie’s representation, confirms 
the film’s subjective bias, but it is more complex than upfront auteurial favouritism. In a 
panel interview with the New York Times writer Alex Witchel, Nora Ephron, Meryl Streep 
and Stanley Tucci speculate on the probability of a film like Julie & Julia being made in 
Hollywood at all. When Streep is asked about the films she likes to see in her leisure time, 
she complains that many of the films at the box office contain “material [that] isn’t worth it” 
(‘TimesTalks’: 42:08), suggesting that fault lies with the commercial drive of Hollywood 
studios rather than with writers, claiming “writers can’t get the stuff bankrolled, I guess” 
(42:29). Streep levels that the successful production of Julie & Julie was “flukey” (43:02), 
citing the commercial successes of The Devil Wears Prada (2006) and Mama Mia! (2008) 
as incentives that “gave the studio a lot of confidence” (42:47). The audience’s laughter at 
this point in the interview acknowledges the implicature in Streep’s statement, with 
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reference to Hollywood’s institutional marginalisation of female-led films and the inferior 
bankability of female stars. Tucci confirms that “the timing was perfect” for a film like Julie 
& Julia with Streep in a lead role, as “Meryl’s stock had climbed” (43:23) as a result of her 
recent box office success. Ephron agrees that Streep’s star status was instrumental in 
enabling her to “make this movie about Julia Child” (43:30). What becomes clear in this 
interview, primarily, is that the film is being promoted as a Streep/Ephron film, with neither 
Amy Adams who plays Julie, nor Julie Powell present for the discussion. Furthermore, the 
successful production of Julie & Julia is attributed to the leveraging of Streep’s prominent 
and timely star status and bankability, which inevitably invigorates interest an otherwise 
uncommercial figure like Julia Child.      
Julie & Julia is essentially “two movies rolled into one” (Mark in ‘Secret Ingredients’: 
21:24); the patriarchal construction of Hollywood all but forecloses the notion of either 
subject’s experience being adapted for the big screen alone. Consequently, Julie & Julia’s 
relational alignment is as integral to the film’s production as implicit relationality is to 
Powell’s auto/biographical self-witnessing. The film conveys Julia’s important aspirational 
role within Julie’s relational and remedial autobiographical act, stylistically emphasising 
their similarities and shared passions as important to Julie’s self-understanding. However, 
Ephron’s hard-won auteurial signature is difficult to overlook within the gendered context 
of the commercial chick flick, which compromises the testimonial tone of the adaptation 
through the elision and reduction of significant contextual framing. Julie Powell’s 
autobiographical invitation remains visible, albeit abridged and appended with the generic 
melodrama of a commercial chick flick, both of which invite empathic engagement but 
preclude testimonial witnessing. But, the film’s inevitable subjective bias, predicated on 
Streep’s star status and Julia Child’s celebrity, renders Powell’s self-witnessing story 
contemporary framing for an Ephron/Streep film that enables the cinematic depiction of 
Julia Child – at the right time. Ultimately, the expectations and limitations imposed by the 
commercial drive of Hollywood dictate that the subjective truth of female experience is not 
bankable enough to warrant ethical and empathic witnessing in the mainstream, and 
these limitations reveal the gendered and generic limits of cinematic I-witnessing. 
Auteurbiography or Bourgeois Biopic? 
Auteurbiographical adaptations of auto/biography entail additional referential 
responsibilities that extend the testimonial agenda of pactual integrity to significant, 
related others. The process requires a faithful transposition of the source memoir’s 
relational structure, which conveys the ways in which the relational other is embedded 
within both the experience and the context of the subject’s self-witnessing narrative. In 
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Being Flynn, Weitz preserves the explicit relational structure of Suck City to privilege and 
reissue Nick Flynn’s intimate, autobiographical invitation and transpose the testimonial 
tone of the source. Weitz achieves this by citing Jonathan Flynn’s voice through an 
oscillating narrative structure that makes Nick’s narrative authority clear, but also 
demonstrates the tracks of empathy that emerge through the father and son’s shared 
emplacement. In Julie & Julia, Ephron simplifies Julie Powell’s autobiographical invitation 
by eliding the cultural trauma found in the blog and memoir sources, choosing instead to 
emphasise Julie and Julia’s relational alignment as determined by their relationships and 
food. This reinterpretation of Cooking Dangerously’s implicit relational structure renders 
Julie’s narrative a contemporary frame for a bourgeoise biopic, which emphasises the 
gendered generic tropes for which Ephron is renowned in the Hollywood arena. When 
analysed comparatively, the two films in this chapter illustrate the necessity for pactual 
integrity in the auteurbiographical approach to adaptation, as the ethical and empathic 
commitment to faithful representation that can convene cinematic I-witnessing’s 
testimonial witnessing structure. Tonal deviations and the reappropriation of relationality 
inevitably affect the transmission of the subject’s invitation, which impedes the viewer’s 
requisite reconciliation of the filmic narrative with the experiential reality of subject’s 
testimonial truth. 
The expectations and limitations imposed upon the auteur by the mainstream, Hollywood 
context of production can have a substantial impact upon an adaptation’s testimonial 
potential. The seven-year development of Weitz’s screenplay was largely attributed to 
ongoing studio input, which led to a version that Flynn deemed “unrecognisable” (Flynn, 
2013: p. 81) when compared to Weitz’s first draft. De Niro stayed with the project and 
Focus eventually approved the version that became Being Flynn, which closely resembled 
Weitz’s original draft, and Flynn was involved in the adaptive process throughout. The 
result of Weitz’s auteurial and pactual integrity is a successful auteurbiographical 
adaptation that functions as a faithful secondary testimony within the continuum of 
cinematic I-witnessing. The production of Julie & Julia, however, was studio-led from the 
beginning; Colombia approached Ephron with both the rights and the concept for 
combining Powell’s story with Child’s, with a view to capitalising on Ephron’s auteurial 
credibility and Streep’s timely stardom. Powell’s involvement was limited to an initial 
meeting with Ephron to discuss the blog and the memoir, and a single set visit during 
filming, whilst research into the late Julia Child was extensive, including consultations with 
her family, trips to France, and the auteurial équipe’s collective engagement with the mise 
en abyme of available source texts. The unbalanced, adaptive approach, coupled with 
Streep’s star status and Ephron’s auteurist signature, skews the focus of the film, meaning 
187 
 
Powell’s story is overwhelmed by the multiple authorities that permeate the production. 
Though some aspects of Powell’s reality are retained, Julie & Julia is primarily a 
commercial Colombia-Streep-Ephron collaboration that capitalises on the 
contemporaneity of Powell’s project to depict a well-known figure for profit.           
Auteurbiography is predicated on pactual integrity, which entails a willing, ethical and 
empathic engagement with a self-witnessing narrative, and its faithful adaptation to film. 
Though the relationality of auto/biographical narratives increases referential responsibility, 
it is possible to preserve the relational structure whilst privileging the subject’s testimonial 
truth. An adaptation’s status as secondary testimony within the continuum of cinematic I-
witnessing is determined by the faithful transposition of tone, intimacy, and the 
autobiographical invitation, the combination of which provides insight into the reality of a 
subject’s lived experience. When adaptation involves deviation, the testimonial witnessing 
structure breaks down, and the testimonial transaction between the real subject and the 
viewer as witness is disengaged. As explained in previous chapters, the notion of multiple 
authors in autobiographical and testimonial texts, along with a certain amount of artistic 
license, can be overlooked. But, cinematic I-witnessing, like testimony, requires a 






Each testimony changes and brings a different focus to the genre. 
Robert Eaglestone 
Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing – To What Ends? 
Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing’s dialogic proposition is predicated on an 
intersubjective pact between a subject and a viewer, whereby the subject invites the 
viewer to bear witness to the testimonial truth of autobiographical experience, and willing, 
ethical, and empathic viewership equates to acceptance of their invitation. Accordingly, 
the self-made and self-reflexive films analysed in Section One of this thesis constitute self-
witnessing (autofilmic testimony), whilst the adaptations in Section Two function as 
secondary testimony (auteurbiography), as audiovisual “narratives of witness” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 133) that show and tell an autobiographical subject’s testimonial truth. In 
autobiographical and testimonial texts, these truths emerge through narrative negotiations 
with “the sources and dynamic processes of autobiographical subjectivity” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 21), which necessarily encompass representations of the social, 
historical and cultural discourses through which the subject comes to understand – and 
narrate – selfhood. Films possess a particular proficiency for the depiction of subjectivity 
within these diverse and interrelated contexts, using visual media to reduce the referential 
labour required in order to reconcile experiential narratives as real. Consequently, the 
representative reality of the autobiographical experience on film, and the codes and 
conventions that assert the first-person subjective perspective, instantiate an 
intersubjective witnessing structure that equates viewership with testimonial witnessing.    
The films analysed in this thesis demonstrate the cinematic approaches used to issue the 
autobiographical invitation, as determined by the first-person, subjective perspective they 
seek to convey. The ways in which films assert this subjective perspective are related to 
the depiction of the autobiographical ‘I’, which is realised on screen through narrative 
strategies that can signify point-of-view and voice, as representative of the embodied 
subject. In Chapter One, Kim Ki-duk and Jonathan Caouette take advantage of 
documentary practices, as filmmaker-subjects who construct and literally occupy the 
narrative frame to provide unified, yet diachronic accounts of autobiographical experience. 
Similarly, Jennifer Fox and Marjane Satrapi produce their autofilmic testimonies with the 
inherent narrative authority of author-subjects in Chapter Two; however, they depict self-
witness in narrative films in order to offer their autobiographical invitations through multiply 
embodied and discursive interactions between temporally distinct iterations of the 
narrating and experiencing ‘I’s. Derek Jarman’s Blue, by contrast, refuses the image of the 
embodied subject, instead harnessing the referential power of the voice and self-reflexive 
189 
 
language to encourage emersive engagement with his autobiographical narrative of self-
witness. The films in Section One use multiple performative strategies to represent 
embodied subjectivity, which not only attest to autobiographical experience, but also invite 
the viewer to bear witness to the process of self-witnessing itself.   
The emersive viewership engendered by the autobiographical invitation encourages the 
viewer to reconcile the autobiographical ‘I’ on screen with the real autobiographical 
subject outside of the text, along with the real-world context in which their narrative was 
formed. With the exception of Blue, the films in this thesis seek to reduce the referential 
labour involved in emersive viewership, by bringing the real-world testimonial context, to 
varying degrees, into the cinematic discourse. In Section One, the films manifest a dual 
offer of seeing and hearing, which allows the subjects to represent the unrepresentable 
conditions that determine traumatic experience, and to articulate the existential struggle 
that self-witnessing aims to resolve. In Arirang, Kim adopts a pragmatic, if performative, 
approach, using confessional monologues to describe the past events that led to his 
creative and existential inertia. Caouette introduces multimedial artefacts of memory to 
show the familial and relational context of his self-formation, with photos, home-videos 
and other intertextual footage integrated into the audiovisual narrative to convey the 
significant influence of these contextual factors. In The Tale, Fox uses a parallel 
spatiotemporal narrative structure to oscillate between the depiction of the circumstances 
of her childhood sexual abuse, and the belated memory-work of exploration and 
reconciliation. Satrapi redeploys the graphic imagery of her comic memoir in the animated 
Persepolis, to draw out the historical and ideological framing of cultural trauma as context 
for collective identity. Like Fox, Satrapi’s narrative oscillates between showing the past 
and evaluating its impact in the diegetic present, to communicate the process of 
existential reconciliation that self-witnessing entails. For Jarman, the testimonial context 
remains integral to his self-witnessing narrative, but he purposely prompts the viewer to 
“shuttle” between the film text and its metanarrative context (Felman and Laub, 1992: p. 
xv) to make a personal, political statement. On the whole, the films in Section One 
highlight the importance of contextual framing to both the production and process of self-
witnessing, whereby the representation and mediation of autobiographical experience is 
intended to create an intimate textual space for ethical and empathic witnessing.   
The films in Section Two develop the Cinematic I-Witnessing paradigm, by adapting the 
autobiographical invitation through intertextual, transmedial projects that are underwritten 
by a commitment to pactual integrity. Accordingly, auteurbiographical adaptations require 
an extensive and emersive engagement with literary narratives of self-witness, which also 
entails comprehensive, biographical research. The auteur – and by extension, the 
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auteurial equipé – aim to represent, and re-present the intimate testimonial narrative of a 
real subject, whereby the adapted film reissues the subject’s autobiographical invitation as 
secondary testimony. To achieve this, the films in Section Two largely preserve and 
transpose the tone and intimacy of their literary sources, using cinematic media to 
recreate and reconstruct the “dimensions of autobiographical subjectivity” (Smith and 
Watson, 2010: p. 63). In Chapter Three, the analysis reveals the ethical, empathic, and 
cooperative labour involved in the auteurbiographical adaptation of The Diving Bell. The 
film is focused on the late Jean-Dominique Bauby’s experience of Locked-In Syndrome, 
which brings into relief the embodied experience of vulnerable subjectivity. As with the 
autofilmic testimonies in Section One, The Diving Bell uses recognisable subjective 
conventions to convey Bauby’s first-person perspective on screen; but, drawing a parallel 
with Jarman’s Blue, the film initially withholds the image of the subject to privilege 
embodied experience, and to emphasise the cognitive and imaginative aspects of self-
witnessing that the source narrative foregrounds. Through an evaluation of the distinct 
discoursal levels of the adaptive process – the source memoir, the adapted screenplay, 
and the film – Chapter Three emphasises the importance of fidelity in auteurbiographical 
adaptations, beyond the reductive, logocentric purview of fidelity criticism. Instead, the 
analysis draws attention to the ethical implications of empathic engagement, and the risks 
of deviation, as related to the testimonial imperative at the heart of the adaptive 
endeavour.  
In Chapter Four, Weitz’s Being Flynn and Ephron’s Julie & Julia reveal and test the limits 
of auteurbiographical adaptation, to demonstrate the additional expectations and 
limitations imposed by auto/biographical narratives adapted within the mainstream, 
Hollywood arena. Though both films install oscillating narrative structures to articulate 
relationality, and provide recognisable on-screen iterations of the autobiographical 
invitation, the comparative analytical approach brings to the fore the commercial, 
gendered and generic boundaries that problematise pactual integrity. Being Flynn asserts 
Nick Flynn’s requisite subjective focus and narrative authority in spite of its explicit 
relational structure, which embeds Jonathan Flynn’s voice through citation, so conveyed 
by hierarchical narrative strategies. By contrast, Julie & Julia interrogates the testimonial 
agenda of auteurbiography, using Julie Powell’s memoir and blog project as contemporary 
framing for Julia Child’s cinematic biography. The disparity between the seemingly similar 
auto/biographical films’ testimonial efficacy is determined by issues of fidelity and 
ownership, which affect the intersubjective invitation to ‘feel with’ the real subject. Fidelity 
pertains to both the manner by which the autobiographical subject establishes the intimate 
tone of the text, in terms of the way they present and share experiential truth, and the 
191 
 
contextual couching of the self-witnessing narrative, which encompasses the occasional 
and locational aspects of emplacement. The elision of, or deviation from, these 
determinate dimensions of subjectivity alters the autobiographical invitation to testimonial 
witnessing, which can obscure and even preclude the emersive viewership that can 
reconcile the represented experience as real. Ownership, as a related concern, is often 
conceived as synonymous with authorship, both of which are inevitably complicated by 
the collaborative industry of adaptation. The mainstream, Hollywood context intensifies 
issues of authorship, because the adapted film becomes inscribed with the multiple 
‘signatures’ of the creative authorities involved in production. The generic identity of the 
auteur, coupled with the intertextual stardom of the actors, can compromise the necessary 
privileging of the subject within the film; furthermore, the studios that commission and 
ultimately control the production and distribution of these films do so with specifically 
commercial – and financial – goals in mind. Though creative and interpretive contributions 
throughout the adaptive process can buttress auteurbiographical adaptations’ testimonial 
efficacy, as seen in The Diving Bell and Being Flynn, auteurbiographies must always 
place the “subjective signature” (Schmitt, 2017: p. 150) at the forefront, to lead the viewer 
“directly back to life” (original italics, Schmitt, 2017: p. 117) as experienced and 
subsequently narrated by the real subject as testimonial truth.     
The conclusions I draw in Chapter Four indicate that Julie & Julia more closely resembles 
a biopic, given the commercial and auteurial interventions that delimit the testimonial tone. 
The recognisable characterisation of a public figure such as Julia Child, when considered 
within a broad and accessible cultural oeuvre, offers clear possibilities for viewer empathy 
and engagement with the real subject, as demonstrated in Julie Powell’s project and 
subsequent memoir. As an evaluation of the representation of autobiographical 
subjectivity on screen, a more detailed exploration of the ethics and empathic potential of 
biopics is beyond the scope of this project. However, many of the observations I make 
regarding the metacritical approach to adaptation and the faithful representation of 
auto/biographical subjects may assist in future research into biopics, which remain at the 
fringes of academic criticism.  
The notion of ‘feeling with’ real subjects through films is complex, and my analysis 
illustrates the multiple processes involved in identifying the empathic potential of a 
cinematic text. Cinematic media capitalise on precognitive, phenomenological and 
neurological impulses, to maximise the affect potential of the narratives depicted. In 
autofilmic testimony and auteurbiography, the ethics of feeling are heightened by the non-
fictional status of the experiential narrative, which is further intensified by the traumatic 
contexts that testimonial narratives introduce. Robert Eaglestone argues:  
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Testimony aims to prohibit identification on epistemological grounds (a 
reader really cannot become, or become identified, with the narrator of a 
testimony: any such identification is [an] illusion) and on ethical grounds 
(a reader should not become identified with a narrator of a testimony, as it 
reduces and 'normalizes' or consumes the otherness of a narrator's 
experience and the illusion that such an identification creates is possibly 
pernicious). Testimony, then, is a genre which displays a paradoxical 
'doubleness': the form leads to identification while the content and 
surrounding material lead away from it.  
(2002: p. 118-9) 
However, as explained in the introduction, and as becomes clear throughout this thesis, 
making a distinction between empathy – as a cognate emotional response – and 
identification – as a reactionary attempt to imagine how the subject feels – can resolve 
this epistemological and ethical quandary. The films in this thesis encourage empathic 
relation at a textual remove, by asking the viewer to bear witness to testimonial truth as 
determined by the personal and partial autobiographical accounts shared. Designating the 
viewer as witness is an attempt to recognise the ethical imperatives that testimonial 
narratives inherently invoke.  
Cinematic I-Witnessing draws attention to what testimony does for the subject, and in 
seeking to define the formal and generic distinctions of testimonial subjectivity on screen, I 
emphasise the reconciliatory, therapeutic and cathartic tropes of self-witness in film as 
related to creative assertions of agency. Though recurrent themes and conventions 
emerge, the most significant similarities pertain to the confessional and cathartic qualities 
that the testimonial narratives share, which signal the therapeutic and reconciliatory remit 
of the self-witnessing process more broadly. Consequently, the testimonial function of the 
films in this thesis is not necessarily confirmed nor determined by ethical and empathic 
engagement; rather, the viewer’s willingness to engage in testimonial witnessing attests to 
their desire to participate, however vicariously, in the exploratory and reconciliatory 
process.  
As indicated in Chapter Two, “opening to the trauma of others facilitates opening to one’s 
own”, and likewise, “being open to one’s own trauma is necessary in order to be open to 
that of another” (Atkinson and Richardson, 2013: p. 3). Fox’s self-witnessing process led 
her into situations of reciprocal witnessing, whereby she was able to elicit testimonial 
telling through the revelation of her own traumatic truth. Fox explicitly seeks to perpetuate 
this testimonial reciprocity through her film, mobilised by the outreach screenings she 
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authorises in partnership with her distributor, HBO. Fox’s advocatory move comes at a 
time when cultural attitudes to testimonial disclosure are shifting, in response to recent 
collective movements such as #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter. The visibility and authority 
of self-witnessing across these new modes and platforms for testimonial exchange is 
fundamental to the perpetuation of engagement, which can in turn forge new testimonial 
territories for therapeutic practices.  
The perspective taking and associated emotional rehearsal afforded by viewing autofilmic 
testimonies and auteurbiographies have practical and theoretical implications for 
Cinematherapy, which is used as a complementary tool in psychotherapeutic settings. 
Cinematherapy is by no means new, with Charles R. O’Brien and Josephine L. Johnson 
offering an introductory perspective over forty years ago. In their article, simply entitled 
‘Cinema Therapy’ (1976), O’Brien and Johnson describe the practical applications for film 
viewership in counselling contexts, as related to films’ ability “to stimulate the thoughts, 
responses, and behaviors necessary for counselees to live productive lives” (1976: p. 42). 
O’Brien and Johnson outline eight specific “uses” for films as therapy, with the first citing 
empathy as “crucial” (1976: p. 40). The remainder of the proposed uses primarily point the 
potential models for problem-solving, catharsis, and the exploration of emotions and “the 
dimensions of life” (p. 40). O’Brien and Johnson align Cinematherapy with Bibliotherapy, 
which, at the time their article was written, was theorised as engagement with literature as 
an “opportunity to learn to know oneself better, to understand human behaviour [and] to 
find interests outside of the self” (Edwards, 1972: p. 213). In the years since O’Brien and 
Johnson’s article was published, Bibliotherapy has amassed substantial scholarly 
attention for its applications in trauma counselling and therapy (Hynes, 2019; Glavin and 
Montgomery, 2017; Stewart and Ames, 2014; McCulliss, 2012; Malchiodi and Ginns-
Gruenberg, 2008; Pehrrson and McMillen, 2005; et al.), with a noteworthy surge in the 
academic literature in the last ten years that is largely focused on its applications for 
children (Catalano, 2017; De Vries, et al., 2017; Robinson, 2012; et al.). By contrast, 
Cinematherapy remains under-theorised,41 with only a handful of noteworthy studies that 
discuss its use in psychotherapeutic settings (Schulenberg, 2003; Sharp, Smith, and Cole, 
2002; Hesley and Hesley, 2001; Newton, 1995; Berg-Cross, Jennings and Baruch, 1990). 
Even this available literature neglects to consider the use of autobiographical and 
testimonial films, specifically, favouring commercial, fictional films for the metaphorical 
insights they offer. For Janet Sharp, et al., viewing films can offer therapeutic benefits as a 
“useful adjunct to more traditional approaches to therapeutic change” (2002), but they too 
 
41 A sizeable list of anecdotal and specialised/genre-specific literature on the applications 
and efficacies of cinematherapy are available via cinematherapy.com. 
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argue that the films selected should be “relevant on a metaphorical level rather than in 
terms of literal content”, drawing on empirical studies from the related field of bibliotherapy 
to describe the resistance clients can exhibit when engaging texts that explore issues too 
similar to their own (2002: p. 272). Sharp and her colleagues do, however, point out that 
further empirical studies on the direct applications and benefits of cinematherapy are 
required, a view that Stefan F. Schulenberg (2003), and I, wholeheartedly share.  
There is also scant empirical data pertaining to empathic engagement with 
autobiographical and testimonial narratives, or with non-fictional narratives more broadly. 
Narratology and empathy scholar Suzanne Keen attests that further work is needed in 
terms of the ways in which narrative strategies of empathy function in non-fictional texts 
(in Hühn, et al., 2013). In connection with the apparent gaps in both the Cinematherapy 
and empathy scholarship, I propose that Cinematic I-Witnessing could offer some insight 
into theorising the intersection of both, with further interdisciplinary potential in the related 
fields of life writing, the medical humanities, psychology, sociology, and film.         
Many of the scholars with whom I have engaged throughout this thesis have sought to 
characterise the contemporary cultural landscape in line with the ubiquity of subjective 
and testimonial narratives. These figures have mapped an interdisciplinary framework 
through which the ongoing evaluation of lives and their experiential narratives can offer 
insight into contemporary concerns. As we approached the turn of the century, Felman 
and Laub declared “the age of testimony” (1992: p. 53), as they catalogued the many 
belated accounts of Holocaust survival through their video archives. The ‘memoir boom’ 
straddled the arrival of the twenty-first century, and shortly thereafter Leigh Gilmore 
observed that “the age of memoir and the age of trauma may have coincided” (2001: p. 6). 
In the second edition of Reading Autobiography: A Guide to Interpreting Life Narratives 
(2010), Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson elaborated upon their extensive pedagogical 
handbook, to address the paradigmatic evolution of digital, relational and multimedial self-
reflexive forms. As noted in my introduction, the most recent developments in self-
representational practices are indicative of a “visual turn” (Tamboukou, 2017), which is 
emerging alongside a marked shift in attitudes toward testimonial telling and the platforms 
of bearing witness. At this juncture, empathy is entering the critical discourse of 
autobiography and documentary studies, in attempts to reconcile subjective narratives 
with experiential reality. In theorising Contemporary Cinematic I-Witnessing, I draw upon – 
and draw together – the definitive academic approaches to subjectivity, to identify the 
ways in which testimonial showing and telling converge on screen. In so doing, I bear 
witness to the processes, products, and people who willingly share the subjective truth of 
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